Spheres of Skepticism - The Integration of the Climate Skeptic Counterpublic Within the German Networked Public Sphere by Kaiser, Jonas
 
 
Spheres of Skepticism 
The Integration of the Climate Skeptic Counterpublic 




Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the degree of Dr. phil. 
At Zeppelin Universität, Faculty of Social Sciences 
 
 
Submitted by:   Jonas Kaiser 
Matriculation number:  13201577 
Date of birth:   15.05.1984 
Place of birth:   Heidelberg 
Address:    Am Friedrichshain 11, 10407 Berlin 
First supervisor:   Prof. Dr. Markus Rhomberg 
Second supervisor:   Prof. Dr. Mike S. Schäfer 
Third supervisor:  Prof. Dr. Monika Taddicken 
  
 
Table of Content 
 
1.	 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1	
2.	 Relevance ........................................................................................................................... 4	
3.	 Theoretical Background ...................................................................................................... 6	
3.1.	 From Public Sphere to Networked Public Sphere ............................................................ 7	
3.1.1	 The Relationship Between Democracy Theory and Public Sphere .............................. 8	
3.1.2	 Two Classical Concepts of the Public Sphere .......................................................... 13	
3.1.3	 Internet and the Public Sphere ................................................................................. 19	
3.1.4	 Research on Online Publics ..................................................................................... 25	
3.1.5	 The Networked Public Sphere ................................................................................. 28	
3.2.	 Counterpublic Theory .................................................................................................... 32	
3.2.1	 Classical Understandings of Counterpublics ............................................................ 33	
3.2.2	 Online Counterpublics ............................................................................................. 36	
3.2.3	 Integrating Counterpublics in the Networked Public Sphere ..................................... 41	
3.3.	 Blogs, Comment Sections and the Public Sphere .......................................................... 42	
3.3.1	 Blogs & Current Research ....................................................................................... 43	
3.3.2	 Comment Sections & Current Research .................................................................. 46	
3.3.3	 Blogs and Comment Sections in the Networked Public Sphere ............................... 49	
3.4	 Summary: Networked Public Sphere and Counterpublics ............................................... 50	
4.	 Climate Change Skepticism .............................................................................................. 54	
4.1	 Terminology of Skepticism .............................................................................................. 55	
4.2	 Current Research on Climate Skepticism ........................................................................ 58	
4.2.1	 Who is a Climate Skeptic? ....................................................................................... 59	
4.2.2	 Climate Skepticism in the Mass Media ..................................................................... 60	
4.2.3	 Climate Skepticism Online ....................................................................................... 62	
4.3	 Climate Skeptics as a Counterpublic in Germany ............................................................ 64	
5.	 Interim Conclusion, Research Questions & Methods ......................................................... 65	
6.	 Case Studies .................................................................................................................... 69	
6.1	 Study: Alliance of Antagonism: Counterpublics and Polarisation in the German Online 
Climate Change Discourse ...................................................................................................... 69	
6.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 69	
6.1.2 Climate Change and the Internet ................................................................................ 71	
 
6.1.3 The Online Public Sphere and Counterpublics ............................................................ 72	
6.1.4 Climate ‘Skepticism’ and its Potential as a Counterpublic ........................................... 74	
6.1.5 Hyperlink Networks as Indicators for Polarization and Counterpublics ......................... 75	
6.1.6 Data and Methods ...................................................................................................... 76	
6.1.7 Results: Comparison of the Climate Network with a Random Graph ........................... 78	
6.1.8 Results: Centralization and Assortativity of the Climate Network ................................. 81	
6.1.9 Results: Relations of Actor, Topic and Stance Groups ................................................ 84	
6.1.10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 86	
6.2	 Interim Conclusion: ‘Alliance of Antagonism’ ................................................................... 88	
6.3	 Study: Questioning the Doubt: Climate Skepticism in German Newspaper Reporting on 
COP17 .................................................................................................................................... 89	
6.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 89	
6.3.2 Theoretical Framework: Conceptualizing Climate Skepticism ...................................... 91	
6.3.3 Framing Climate Change ............................................................................................ 92	
6.3.4 Method ....................................................................................................................... 94	
6.3.5 Results ....................................................................................................................... 97	
6.3.6 Interpretation ............................................................................................................ 103	
6.3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 105	
6.4	 Interim Conclusion: ‘Questioning the Doubt’ ................................................................. 106	
6.5	 Study: Public Spheres of Skepticism: Climate Skeptic Online Comments in the German 
Networked Public Sphere ...................................................................................................... 106	
6.5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 106	
6.5.2 The Networked Public Sphere and Counterpublics ................................................... 108	
6.5.3 Climate Skeptics as a Counterpublic ........................................................................ 110	
6.5.4 Hypotheses .............................................................................................................. 111	
6.5.5 Methods ................................................................................................................... 113	
6.5.6 Results: Skeptic Comments in Different Comment Sections ..................................... 115	
6.5.7 Results: Climate Skeptic Frames .............................................................................. 119	
6.5.8 Results: Exclusion and Inclusion of Skeptics ............................................................. 120	
6.5.9 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 123	
6.5.10 Limitations & Outlook .............................................................................................. 125	
6.6	 Interim Conclusion: ‘Public Spheres of Skepticism’ ....................................................... 125	
7.	 Conclusion: The Integration of Counterpublics in the Networked Public Sphere .............. 126	
8.	 Outlook .......................................................................................................................... 133	
9.	 References ..................................................................................................................... 136	
 
10.	 Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 172	
10.1	 Codebook for Paper 1: ‘Alliance of Antagonism’ ......................................................... 172	
10.2	 Appendix for Paper 1: ‘Public Spheres of Skepticism’ ................................................ 174	
10.2.1	 Codebook ........................................................................................................... 174	
10.2.2	 List of Actors ....................................................................................................... 177	




Table of Tables 
Table 1: Perspectives and research foci when looking at online publics and the associated 
societal level (own depiction) .................................................................................................... 26	
Table 2: Publics and their potential for acts of counterpublicity, integration of 
counterpublics and societal impact (own depiction) ................................................................. 51	
Table 3: Differentiation of this thesis’ paper and their focus of analysis ..................................... 68	
Table 4: Core network statistics for the climate change website network and for the 
simulated graph ....................................................................................................................... 79	
Table 5: Network statistics and centrality metrics for groups of actors (a) and stances (b) ........ 82	
Table 6: Contingency table of node counts by factions (mainstream-skeptical) and actors ....... 84	
Table 7: Contingency table of node counts by factions (mainstream-skeptical) and topics ....... 84	
Table 8: Number of edges between actor types by frequency ................................................. 85	
Table 9: Number of edges between factions (mainstream-skeptical) by frequency ................... 86	
Table 10: Amount of identified skeptical idea elements ............................................................ 99	
Table 11: Usage of Skeptical Frame Packages by Media Outlets ........................................... 100	
Table 12: Relevance of Comments per Outlet in % (n=10.262) .............................................. 116	
Table 13: Position of Comments per outlet (n=4,425) ............................................................ 117	
Table 14: Mean comparison of skepticism in each outlet’s comment section ........................ 118	
Table 15: Skeptical Frames per Comment Section in % (n=2,945) ......................................... 119	
Table 16: Reactions to Skeptic Comments per Comment Section in % (n=1,377) ................. 121	
Table 17: Average Likes per Outlet and Position (n=3.678). ................................................... 122	
Table 18: Results per paper concerning the different dimensions of integration ..................... 132	
 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1: Climate website network graph (left) and Erdős-Rényi random graph (right) .............. 78	
Figure 2: Histogram of degree distributions in the website graph (light red) and the Erdős-
Rényi random graph (light blue) ............................................................................................... 80	
Figure 3: Density plot of the local clustering coefficient distributions in the website graph 
(light red) and the Erdős-Rényi random graph (light blue) ......................................................... 81	
Figure 4: Hyperlink network of the German language climate discourse (communities 
identified with modularity; node size = Indegree; layout algorithm = ForceAtlas2) ................... 114	
 
Acknowledgments 
The research that I have conducted over the last four years – with all its ups and downs, 
twists, turns and further U-turns – as well as the writing of the papers and this thesis 
would not have been possible without the help of my friends and colleagues. First and 
foremost, I want to thank my PhD advisor Markus Rhomberg for his supervision and 
time over the last four years. Indeed, his optimism even though at times things looked 
bleak, his critical and constructive feedback as well as his passion for my topic kept me 
going and kept my head up. I also want to thank my second advisor Mike Schäfer for 
his helpful feedback and for giving me the opportunity on several occasions to present 
the progress of my thesis in a friendly yet challenging and inspiring environment at the 
University of Zürich. Likewise, I want to thank Monika Taddicken for her spontaneity 
and enthusiasm for the topic. In addition, I want to thank Cornelius Puschmann for 
sharing my passion for digital methods and identifying counterpublics online that 
eventually resulted in a joint paper that is also part of this thesis. Furthermore, I want to 
thank Stephan Schlögl for his many helpful and critical comments over the years as well 
as his never-ending agenda to get me to learn R properly and which finally paid off. 
Last, but most certainly not least, I want to thank Birte Fähnrich and Dennis 
Lichtenstein for their reassuring comments, critical feedback, open ears and willingness 


















»Because this idea that the Internet’s gonna become incredibly democratic? I mean, if 
you’ve spent any time on the Web, you know that it’s not gonna be, because that’s 
completely overwhelming.« 




This thesis is an investigation into the climate change discourse in the German 
networked public sphere with a focus on the climate skeptic counterpublic. I will focus 
in particular on the hypothesis that a polarizing discourse might lead to a fragmentation 
of the public sphere and the formation of echo chambers. This overarching research 
question of this thesis, then, asks how the climate skeptic counterpublic can potentially 
be integrated in the German networked public sphere and to what extent. The climate 
change discourse in Germany serves as a suitable example since it is heavily polarized 
with the mainstream being convinced that dangerous anthropogenic climate change is 
happening while the skeptic minority rejects the idea of a global warming and/or 
mankind’s responsibility. To understand the possible integration of the skeptic 
counterpublic in the networked public sphere three studies were conducted based on the 
integration dimensions of similarity of discourse, connectivity and collective identity.  
In the first study the German-language climate networked public sphere was 
mapped with a hyperlink network analysis of over 10,000 climate websites. The results 
show a highly polarized, almost unconnected discourse and suggest that climate 
skeptics could even be considered to form an echo chamber in which only climate 
skeptic and antagonistic messages are being shared. The second study, then, identifies 
several skeptic frames in the German news media’s reporting on COP17. However, it 
can be concluded that climate skeptic messages are barely being included in the media 
coverage thus showing that skeptics are also excluded in the mass media. In the third 
study, 10,262 online comments of ten comment sections (four news sites, two climate 
skeptic blogs, two climate activist blogs, two climate science blogs) were analyzed to 
look at if and how connected skeptics are on the different sites. The results show that 
skeptics are highly active in the comment sections and account for over 40% of the 
relevant comments. It is further shown that even though there is discussion between 
mainstream and counterpublic, users from the mainstream react highly critical to skeptic 
messages. 
 In sum, this thesis shows that albeit the climate skeptic counterpublic is 
structurally only barely connected to the mainstream as well as excluded from the mass 
media, skeptics are very vocal and foster discussions over climate change and climate 
science. These discussions, even though characterized by the clash of two opposing 
beliefs, are a sign of integration and show that the fear of an echo chamber that is 
disconnected from other opinions and, indeed, society is premature. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
This thesis will contribute to the theoretical conception of the networked public sphere 
and counterpublic theory as well as to the fields of climate change communication and 
digital communication. I will focus on the complex relationship between counterpublic 
and mainstream public with regards to the counterpublic’s integration in the networked 
public sphere. From a theoretical point of view I will first show how counterpublic 
theory and the networked public sphere concept can be combined, and then propose to 
adapt the concept of integration to describe different levels on which counterpublics 
and mainstream can potentially meet. As an empirical example the case of climate 
change skepticism1 in Germany has been chosen. The case is especially instructive since 
those Germans who doubt – against all scientific evidence (IPCC, 2013) – that climate 
change exists or that mankind is not responsible for global warming are both a minority 
and seldom represented in the mass media (Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Hornschuh, 
2008). However, the Internet offers skeptics new possibilities to voice their opinions 
through blogs or comment sections.  
Indeed, the advent of any new media, such as the printing press, telegraph, radio, 
TV, and lastly the Internet, has always excited the imaginations of writers, journalists, 
politicians and scholars alike. Regarding the developments of the Internet some saw the 
potential for a further democratization (Rheingold, 1993) of society whereas others like 
Wallace2 (Lipsky, 2010) were less optimistic in their assessment. Wallace, for example, 
proposed that the Internet would not lead to a more democratic sphere where everyone 
would watch/read/see what s/he needs but rather to a platform where some people 
would actively turn into professional gatekeepers who then reduced the complexity of 
this plethora of information for them. Hindman (2009) and others described the result of 
these developments in their concentration hypotheses: It was assumed that most of our 
attention is directed toward a few very prominent websites whereas the rest is ignored. 
Accordingly, the Internet’s potential for diversity, inclusion and participation needs to 
be negated (see chapter 3.2.3). Coming from a similar pessimistic background Sunstein 
                                                
1 From now on I will use the more commonly used and shorter term climate skepticism 
(Howarth & Sharman, 2015; O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010) when referring to climate 
change skepticism. 
2 The quote on the first page was taken from an interview that Lipsky (2010, p. 87) 
conducted with Wallace in 1996.  
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(2001, 2007) suggested the opposite and proposed that the Internet would lead to a 
fragmented society which was shaped by self-referential enclaves, the so-called ‘echo 
chambers’ and would slowly drift away from a societal common ground. Sunstein 
feared that these echo chambers were so detached from each other that a common 
ground for public discourse was almost unachievable. 
These projections have in common that they deal with the fundamental questions 
of changes in democracy which go hand in hand with the new media developments. 
Concerning questions are where people get their information from, if they are able to 
make themselves heard under what circumstances and, most importantly, if they – in 
fact – are heard. These questions and fears are thus closely connected with the concept 
of the public sphere and, even more so, with the question whether the Internet is able to 
foster a more integrative public sphere or rather hinders it. 
Against this background the heated debate on climate change is an interesting and 
relevant topic with the skeptic counterpublic on the one side and the mainstream on the 
other. Indeed, climate skeptic communication on the Internet can be considered to be a 
suitable example to examine if and how a potential echo chamber can still be connected 
with the mainstream and on what levels. Climate skepticism is a special case since 
skeptics are not only in opposition to an overwhelming majority of climate scientists 
(Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; IPCC, 2013) but there is also little 
common ground between skeptics and the mainstream which may lead to a polarized 
discourse and entrenched positions (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Hoffarth & Hodson, 
2016). In addition, the rhetoric surrounding climate change –especially in politics – 
signals that the debate is very heated. The potential Democratic candidate for the US 
presidential elections in 2016, Bernie Sanders, once equated skeptics with Nazis 
(Hoffman, 2011, p. 11), whereas the Republican senator James Inhofe (2012) wrote a 
book called The Greatest Hoax. How the Global Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your 
Future. Additionally, several studies were able to show that climate skeptic think tanks 
and scientists have ties to big fossil fuel companies (Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2010), a finding that may even make the positions more entrenched 
when people suspect that skeptics have a hidden agenda. 
However, the US debate on climate change cannot be compared to the German 
one. The ecological friendly Green Party, for example, was already part of the German 
government in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s and, in general, the climate debate is 
shaped by politicians or climate scientists such as Rahmstorf or Schellnhuber (both 
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Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research) who clearly speak out for political 
action regarding climate change and there are only few prominent skeptics (Rhomberg 
& Kaiser, 2015).3 Additionally, in Germany there is a wide consensus that climate 
change exists and that mankind is to blame (Engels, Hüther, Schäfer, & Held, 2013) 
which is also – with some exceptions – reflected in the mass media’s reporting 
(Grundmann & Scott, 2014). As climate skeptics were not represented politically until 
recently4, the Internet offers them ways to make their voice heard and to find support for 
their positions that were not possible before. 
This, then, raises the question whether German climate skeptics form their own 
echo chamber online or whether the less aggressive German debate potentially 
contributed to a more integrative public sphere. The overarching research question of 
the thesis is: 
 
RQ: Are climate skeptics integrated in the German networked public sphere, 
and if so to what extent? 
 
Accordingly, this thesis is structured as following:  
First, I will outline the relevance of this thesis and the research gaps I aim to close 
or contribute to (chapter 2). Then, the connection between democracy and the public 
sphere is presented to both show the public sphere’s importance but also to lay a 
theoretical foundation for the further chapters (chapter 3.1.1). Based on this framework 
I will focus on the mass media’s relevance for the public sphere and outline in this 
context Habermas’ (1992; 1992) understanding of the public sphere that inspired many 
scholars in their understanding of the online public sphere. At the same time, Gerhards 
and Neidhardt’s (1993) model of the arena publics is introduced to demonstrate how 
these publics can be integrated in the public sphere (chapter 3.1.1). Against this 
background it is suggested that the Internet changed our understanding of the public 
sphere. To do so, issues like fragmentation, polarization and the formation of echo 
                                                
3 Former RWE Innogy CEO Vahrenholt who wrote a skeptic book (Vahrenholt & 
Lüning, 2012) may be the exception but it can be argued that even he is not as 
prominent as the two climate scientists named above (Rhomberg & Kaiser, 2015). 
4 It has to be noted that all studies that will be presented in this thesis were conducted 
before the AfD was successfully voted in several German federal state parliaments 
(Landtage). However, the AfD’s stance on climate politics and science was heavily 
discussed on the climate skeptic blog Eike with some users expressing their 
disappointment that the AfD was not skeptic enough. 
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chambers are delineated (chapter 3.1.3). Then, research on online publics is outlined to 
show on which layers empirical research can be situated (chapter 3.1.4). Next, the 
networked public sphere is presented as a suitable theoretical concept that allows for the 
integration of different publics and forms of communication (see chapter 3.1.5). As this 
thesis focuses on how counterpublics can be integrated in the networked public sphere 
and to what extent, I will examine how counterpublics can be understood (chapter 
3.2.1), how the Internet changed counterpublic communication (chapter 3.2.2) and how 
counterpublics can be integrated theoretically in the concept of the networked public 
sphere (chapter 3.2.3). Climate skepticism is then introduced as an important and 
suitable case for the research question in this thesis.  
After addressing issues with regard to the label ‘skeptic’ (chapter 4.1) I will focus 
on current research with regard to the skeptic’s identity (chapter 4.2.1), with what 
frames they appear in the mass media (chapter 4.2.2) and how they use the Internet for 
their cause (chapter 4.2.3). The considerations with regard to the networked public 
sphere, the integration of counterpublics and climate skepticism are then combined to 
establish more concise research questions and propose how these can be answered 
empirically (chapter 5). The three case studies are presented to highlight different 
dimensions of integration (chapters 6.1, 6.3, 6.5) that are finally being discussed and 
interlinked to fully examine and answer the question of the climate skeptic 
counterpublic’s integration in the German networked public sphere (chapter 7). Lastly, 
the limitations of these studies are considered and further research possibilities proposed 




This thesis is placed at two crossroads: On the one hand, it combines public sphere and 
counterpublic theory with environmental communication. On the other hand, it 
combines classical empirical methods with digital methods. By doing so, this thesis 
contributes to multiple research strains. Additionally, due to the uprising of the right- 
wing and climate skeptical party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD; transl.: 
Alternative for Germany) and its political success in the latest German state elections in 
2016, research on climate change skepticism seems all the more important from a 
 5 
societal point of view. Indeed, due to their recent success in the federal state elections in 
Saxony-Anhalt, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg this is the first time in 
Germany’s history that climate skeptic positions have been represented politically.  
The theory of the public sphere is perhaps one of the most prominent theoretical 
concepts within communication science but also in the social sciences and humanities in 
general (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002a; Imhof, 2003; Jarren & Donges, 
2011). As chapter 3.1.1 will show, there are several schools of thought with different 
assumptions of what a ‘good’ public sphere would look like and what its structure and 
functions would be. In this regard I draw from Benkler’s (2006) adaption of the 
networked public sphere and Kleinen-von Königslöw’s (2010) analysis of how different 
public forums can be integrated. Since I am especially interested in the relationship 
between counterpublic and mainstream publics,5 Nuernbergk’s (2013) analysis of 
follow-up communication in counterpublics and their integrative potential for the 
networked public sphere serves as a good starting point. However, all the authors 
mentioned either do not focus on counterpublics – broadly understood as publics that 
are in opposition to the mainstream public sphere due to marginalization or exclusion – 
or hold a somewhat narrow view, i.e. understand counterpublics as positive. By 
choosing a ‘problematic’ case, that is where one side rejects the scientific consensus, I 
follow Downey and Fenton’s (2003, p. 198f.) suggestion that counterpublic theory 
should also look at ‘radical’ cases. I believe that looking at a public that partially rejects 
scientific facts, even promotes lies and thus also thwarts the idea of an honest public 
discourse, offers the opportunity to look at how different publics interact with each 
other.  
By analyzing online comments I build on Nuernbergk’s (2013, p. 586) suggestion 
that research on public discourse should include online comments as well, and recent 
research (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015) suggests that comment sections could bear separate 
counterpublics. Lörcher and Taddicken (2015) emphasize in this context that skeptics 
seem to be more active online and that this should be looked at more closely. 
Accordingly, the German climate skeptic counterpublic seems to be very active within 
different comment sections. Consequently I will also be able to address the question of 
how counterpublics, i.e. publics which are per definition in opposition to the 
mainstream publics, are integrated or excluded within the wider networked public 
                                                
5 Publics are understood in this thesis as parts of the overarching concept of the public 
sphere (see also chapter 3.1.2). 
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sphere through comment sections and thus adding a novel perspective both to 
counterpublic theory as well as to the research on online comments. 
In addition, climate change skepticism is a research topic that has gained much 
attention over the last years and thus a lot is known about who the attitudes of skeptics 
and what frames they use (see chapter 4.2). But compared to other countries, climate 
skepticism does not seem to be a major issue in Germany (Engels et al., 2013; Kaiser & 
Rhomberg, 2015; Metag, Füchslin, & Schäfer, 2015). The study therefore also sheds a 
light on the peculiar German case of climate change skepticism and shows how the 
German perspective differs from other countries.  
By looking at climate skeptics with the means of network analysis these two 
research strains can be combined. Hyperlink analysis enables the identification of 
different publics and how these are connected with each other (Adamic & Glance, 
2005). Thus, it is possible to empirically detect the ‘counter’ in counterpublics (Asen, 
2000). Hyperlink analysis also allows for a broader look at the alliances climate skeptics 
form and thus contributes to both the identification of how “autonomous public spheres 
[…] create alliances and organize solidarity” (Downey & Fenton, 2003) as well as our 
understanding of environmental communication and the identification of places of 
contestation. 
Empirically, it has been stressed several times that the Internet challenges not only 
our theoretical concepts of the public sphere but also our empirical methods (Maireder, 
Ausserhofer, Schumann, & Taddicken, 2015; Rogers, 2002, 2013). Additionally, a 
multi-method approach can be seen as key when tackling such complex issues as the 
relationship between publics and counterpublics. By combining a hyperlink network 
analysis with a content analysis of news articles as well as online comments, I will test 
“whether the construction of a virtual counter-public sphere leads to radical groups 




3. Theoretical Background 
To tackle the outlined overarching research questions I will draw on public sphere 
theory. I will first describe how the public sphere was conceptualized before the advent 
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of the Internet and then focus on the changes the Internet brought for the public sphere 
as well as our understanding of it. In this context, the concept of the networked public 
sphere serves as a way to integrate classical theoretical conceptions with the new 
challenges and chances the Internet brought about. Counterpublic theory is then 
presented as a way to think about different publics with regard to phenomena like 
inclusion, exclusion but also fragmentation or concentration. In this sense, 
counterpublic theory is integrated into the networked public sphere concept as a special 
form of polarized discourse and an empirical template for testing the integration of 
counterpublics within the broader mainstream publics. However, since the public sphere 
is often thought of as mass media induced, new forms of communication such as blogs 
and comment sections that facilitate the formation of new publics are presented since 




3.1. From Public Sphere to Networked Public Sphere 
‘Public sphere’6 is an often-used term in academia that differs among different schools 
of thought, academic disciplines and national contexts. Negt and Kluge (1993, p. 1) 
consider the public sphere to be a “historical concept of extraordinary fluidity” whereas 
others see it as “an essentially contested concept” (Rauchfleisch & Kovic, in press, p. 
3). Indeed, there are many different and mostly normative understandings of what 
constitutes a public sphere, which actors have to be involved, what the prerequisites are, 
or what functions it has to fulfill for society. These reflections can be traced back to 
philosophers like Aristotle (Lingenberg, 2010, p. 26), Locke, Rousseau, Mill (Ferree, 
Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002b; Rhomberg, 2008) and more contemporary scholars 
like Lippmann or Dewey (Lingenberg, 2010; Schudson, 2008). What all of these 
scholars had in common was an interest in how the civil society7 could be integrated in 
                                                
6 ‘Public’ in this context is often times contrasted to ‘private’ and refers usually to 1) 
events that are of public interest, 2) communication that is directed at everyone and 3) 
free access to spaces and places (Plake, Jansen, & Schuhmacher, 2001, p. 18ff.). 
7 Understood in this context as “pluralistic entity of public associations, coalitions and 
gatherings which are based on the citizens’ voluntary and conjoined action. Clubs, 
organizations or social movements are in this context characteristic forms of 
organization.” (Adloff, 2005, p. 8, own translation) 
 8 
the broader political context, especially with regard to democracy.8 The close 
connection between public sphere and democracy emerges from its roots in 
democracy’s basic notion which can be “conceived in terms of the ideal of collective 
self-determination” (Blumler & Coleman, 2015, p. 112). For this self-determination 
specific civic rights like freedom of speech or freedom of the press are paramount in 
allowing for public discourse. Consequently Klier (1990, p. 23; own translation) 
explicates that the public sphere “is the place in which ‘democracy’ has to show and 
prove itself in every way.” However, the role the public sphere has to play within 
democracy is dependent on how authors conceptualize democracy (Ferree et al., 2002a). 
Against this backdrop the public sphere can be broadly understood as the “constellation 
of communicative spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, 
debates […] and also the formation of political will” (Dahlgren, 2005, p. 148).  
Based on these introductory remarks I will first outline the connection between 
democracy and public sphere theory (chapter 3.1.1) to then present two influential 
public sphere concepts and establish the concept of integration of different publics 
(chapter 3.1.2). Since we understand the public sphere as a product of communication I 
will then describe how the Internet changed public communication and thus the public 
sphere by presenting two major issues the public sphere faces online with fragmentation 
and concentration (3.1.3). Then, I will present different ways to understand online 
public to show the differences with regard to variety and scope (chapter 3.1.4). Finally, 
the concept of the networked public sphere is presented as a way to account for these 
problems and to integrate new forms of communication (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2007; 
Friedland, Hove, & Rojas, 2006). 
 
 
3.1.1 The Relationship Between Democracy Theory and Public Sphere 
When it comes to different conceptualizations of the public sphere the differences can 
either be explained with the underlying democratic theory or the sociological macro 
theory. Based on Ferree et al.’s (2002a, p. 289) distinction that “[d]emocratic theory 
focuses on accountability and responsiveness in the decision-making process [whereas; 
J.K.] theories of the public sphere focus on the role of public communication in 
                                                
8 Naturally, the scholars differed with regard to their understanding of democracy and 
how actors from the civil society can be defined (e.g. Dahlgren, 2006; Gerhards, 1997; 
Habermas, 1992). 
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facilitating or hindering this process” the four public sphere theory strands9 of the 
representative liberal, participatory liberal, discursive and constructionist tradition10 will 
be presented to emphasize the relevance of the public sphere for society and democracy. 
In addition, the theoretical traditions also function as a foundation for the next chapters 
and this thesis in general since they emphasize different aspects such as who is allowed 
to talk but also who gets excluded. These are paramount considerations when focusing 
on the potential integration of counterpublics. 
The representative liberal tradition is based around an elite-centered 
understanding of democracy (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 290ff.). Elitism in this regard refers 
to both how the role of citizens is seen as well as how political decisions are 
legitimized. Naturally, different authors who can be subsumed under this label like 
Schumpeter (1947), Downs (1957), Dahrendorf (1993) or Kornhauser (1959) differ with 
regards to the degree of how involved citizens should be in the political process. Yet the 
overarching theme is a skeptic position towards the citizens’ level of information and 
interest (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 291). Consequently, even though citizens are seen as 
fundamental for democracy, their main objective according to the representative liberal 
model is to vote responsibly and thus give legitimacy to political parties and the 
governmental bodies. According to this model, political parties and interest groups are 
especially significant since they act as intermediaries between citizens and political 
decision makers (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 47). Authors of this position stress in this 
context the need for a competent political leadership. Therefore, the public discourse 
should be transparent so that citizens are able to make informed and rational decisions, 
with the actors being represented proportionally (decided by elections) and the content 
being decided by the “free marketplace of ideas”11 (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 293). This, 
however, is somewhat problematic with regards to minorities: Although they are 
                                                
9 Ferree et al.’s (2002a) differentiation can be considered as highly influential and 
serves as a starting point for many scholars when talking about the relationship between 
democracy and public sphere (e.g. Kaiser, Fähnrich, Rhomberg, & Filzmaier, in print; 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010; Lingenberg, 2010; Olof Larsson & Moe, 2013; Schäfer, 
2015b). Whereas Zimmermann (2006), for example, only adjusts the name of the 
discursive model to deliberative, Nuernbergk (2013, p. 46) suggests that the 
constructionist model can be considered rather a critique of the others and not an 
independent model. Martinsen (2009) excludes the latter altogether and differentiates 
between liberal, deliberative and participatory theory models. 
10 It has to be noted though that these traditions are not separated accurately. As Rucht 
(2012, p. 115) points out, for example, the representative liberal model may also include 
deliberative processes, albeit within elite circles. 
11 See for a critique of the idea of the public sphere as a marketplace Steininger (2007). 
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allowed to participate, minorities are marginalized since authors of this tradition 
emphasize that actors should be allowed to speak proportionally to their relevance 
determined through elections (Habermas, 1992, p. 403f.). The overall tone of the public 
discourse is supposed to be civil which is guaranteed by the actors’ detachment from 
their positions. Detachment in this sense refers to a distanced and unemotional stance. 
This is not to say that political actors are not allowed to disagree but rather that their 
detachment is obligatory when coming to a compromise in order that a decision can be 
found and the debate considered closed. Debates according to authors of this theoretical 
strain should center around the idea of “conversational restraint” (Ackerman, 1989, p. 
17ff.) which emphasizes that the aspects on which actors are not able to find a 
consensus should be brushed aside in favor of finding a consensus on the points which 
can be agreed upon. Against this background, the mass media’s main objective is to 
inform all parts of society about relevant matters and represent the involved actors 
according to their relevance within the discourse (proportionality). 
Where the representative liberal model tries to minimize the citizen’s direct 
involvement, authors from the participatory liberal theory emphasize the role of active 
and emancipated citizens who are able to influence the political process through the 
means of participation (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 295ff.). Consequently, the aim is to 
include as many citizens in the political process as possible even though it is admitted 
that not all people are interested in participating (Ferree et al., 2002a). Public discourse 
is thus not dominated by detached elite communication but rather by the inclusion of 
citizens who are not necessarily bound by the normative requirement of civility but are 
also allowed to use a more emotional approach (e.g. through polemics). Even though 
representatives of the model differ in their perceptions on how citizens should behave in 
the public discourse, they agree that a freedom regarding the “range of communicative 
styles” (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 298) is needed. Through the inclusion in public 
discourse citizens are able to learn to express their own interests and defend them 
vocally (Zimmermann, 2006, p. 26). The central motif of the participatory liberal model 
is the empowerment of citizens (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 297). Hence, grassroots 
movements are more important in this theory strain since they are able to channel 
opinions, highlight alternative viewpoints and foster participation. The mass media are 
thus also expected to represent the civil society more prominently than in the 
representative liberal model (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 49). In this sense the public sphere 
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can be considered as a critical counterweight to the political hegemony (Martinsen, 
2009). 
Closely connected to the participatory liberal theory is the discursive theory 
model which can be mainly attributed to the works of Habermas (1992; 2006[1962]). 
The main difference between the two models is that the discursive model emphasizes 
the need for deliberation within the political decision making process and thus 
emphasizes the importance of an institutionalized deliberative process which is based on 
inclusion whereas the participatory liberal model assumes that popular inclusion would 
suffice (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 302; Habermas, 1992, p. 368). Rucht (2012) remarks 
that participation in itself does not guarantee deliberation. Hilmer (2010), however, adds 
that participatory models include spaces like the private realm or work whereas the 
deliberative models do not. Public discourse in the deliberative tradition should be 
centered around core values like respect and dialogue that ensure an equal and 
reciprocal deliberation based on rational and accepted arguments (Ferree et al., 2002a, 
p. 306; Martinsen, 2009, p. 50). Since the goal of deliberation is to find a common 
ground, debates can also be considered closed after a consensus has been found.  
The public sphere in this tradition is centered on deliberation processes of actors 
from the civil society whose task it is to shed light on overlooked issues or make diverse 
opinions heard. Civil society actors are seen as especially important since their opinions 
and arguments are assumed to be “better” for the public discourse, i.e. freer, more 
diverse, rational and without influence of external or internal constraints such as 
economic or power considerations (Habermas, 1992, p. 443). Gerhards (1997), on the 
contrary, finds in his empirical analysis of this claim no proof for more diverse and 
rational arguments by civil society actors. The result of free civic deliberation is 
legitimized power (Habermas, 1992). Civil society actors in this sense are situated on 
the periphery of the political process, whereas the center is shaped by political or 
administrative institutions (e.g. governmental bodies) and courts (Habermas, 1992; 
Peters, 1993). The public sphere in this model is situated near the periphery and is 
thought to bring actors from periphery and center together so that a discursive 
consensus can be achieved. Habermas (1992) adds that public deliberation, even though 
paramount in this model, is not necessary for all, mostly routine, political issues but 
only for those which spark conflict. The mass media’s task in this understanding, albeit 
problematic since driven by economic goals, is to include actors from the civil society 
and make different positions heard.  
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Authors from the constructionist theory model are mostly concerned with the 
question of who is being left out in the other traditions (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 306). 
Based on post-structuralist authors like Foucault (1972), they are interested in society’s 
underlying power dynamics and how these reproduce inequalities as, for example, 
access to the public sphere (e.g. Benhabib, 1992; Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1990). Authors 
from this tradition often argue from a feminist point of view and contextualize women’s 
marginalization within the broader societal picture (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 307). They 
assume that the demarcations of private and public sphere as well as political and other 
topics which Habermas, for example, draws in Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (Habermas, 1989), are in themselves an artificial act of exclusion that 
marginalize important topics and actors (Fraser, 1990). From this perspective, discourse 
is in itself a power practice and categories like knowledge are not neutral but also 
methods of control (Zimmermann, 2006, p. 31). As the line between private and public 
is blurred, the representative liberal notion of expertise naturally has to be rejected since 
other actors from the civil society may be more appropriate to connect these two 
spheres (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 307). The consequence of this demand is not only that 
all actors, especially the marginalized ones, have to be actively included within the 
public sphere but also that they have to be recognized as ‘strange’ or ‘different’ (Ferree 
et al., 2002a, p. 307f.). The form of communication within the public sphere is thus not 
supposed to be detached or civil, since these attributes in themselves can be considered 
excluding, but should focus on its own narratives to make experiences and differences 
more clear and obvious (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 313f.; Young, 1993, p. 123ff.). 
Discourses in this context are never supposed to end since this could exclude potentially 
marginalized positions. Consequently, authors from the constructionist tradition reject 
the aim for a consensus as it implies that actors have to give up their (subjective) 
positions and thus are marginalized (Mouffe, 1999). Accordingly the public sphere has 
expanded due to previously unknown positions and actors.  
Based on the underlying power structures within the public sphere, Fraser (1990) 
is also deeply skeptical as to whether one public sphere, in which all positions and 
actors are included, would actually be a good thing for democracy. She suggests rather 
that minorities should form subaltern counterpublics in which they are able to regroup 
(Fraser, 1990; chapter 3.2). The mass media in this context are presumed to make the 
marginalized groups visible and give them the chance to share their narratives. Despite 
these differences to the other models, it has to be noted that the constructionist model 
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offers no alternative regarding the ideal structure of democracy or how the public sphere 
can be evaluated. Rather, authors from this tradition point to weaknesses in the other 
traditions (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 315; Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 58). This also brought, for 
example, Habermas (1992) to adjust his theory and to take marginalized groups more 
into account. 
The four different traditions, albeit not fully delimitable, can be divided by their 
main focus: whereas the representative liberal theory focuses from an elite perspective 
on the question of ‘who’ has to be involved within the public sphere, authors from the 
participatory liberal model emphasize the role of popular inclusion and the 
empowerment of citizens within the political process (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 316). For 
representatives of the discursive tradition, however, the main focus lies on the question 
of which functions the discourse should fulfill to allow for deliberation, while 
constructionists explicate the need for a truly inclusive discourse that avoids excluding 
minorities and thus expands the public sphere (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 316f.). These, 
then, serve as a good starting point for the inquiry into not only how a public sphere can 
be conceptualized both off- and online but also how counterpublics form and what 
relationship they have to the mainstream public sphere.  
 
 
3.1.2 Two Classical Concepts of the Public Sphere 
After having outlined the close connection between democracy theory and public sphere 
I will focus on how the public sphere can be conceptualized and operationalized 
empirically. In order to do so I will first present structurally different tiers of publics, 
explain how the mass media comes into play and then outline Habermas’ (1992, 2006 
[1962]) deliberative and Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s (Ferree et al., 2002b; Gerhards, 
1998; Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991, 1993) liberal model and its adjustments of the 
public sphere12. These two concepts are being chosen here since they show how the 
public sphere can be understood but the authors also emphasize different aspects that 
are fruitful when trying to understand the online public sphere that Benkler (2006), for 
example, did not consider in his analysis of the networked public sphere, namely 
integration of different publics. The mass media’s relevance for integrating different 
                                                
12 For a more in-depth analysis of the different public sphere concepts in communication 
science see Imhof (2003) or Wimmer (2007). 
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publics has also to be outlined so that it can be contrasted with the Internet and to 
emphasize why mass media research is imperative when looking at the integration of a 
counterpublic.  
 
Tiers of the Public Sphere 
When talking about the public sphere it is important to note that the public sphere is not 
made up of one big public but rather of many different only partially connected publics 
(Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991, p. 50). These publics can be divided into three layers, or 
tiers, based on three criteria: amount of communicating participants (openness), the 
“elaboration of their organizational structure” (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010, p. 144) and 
societal impact (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010). These three 
tiers are ‘encounter’ public, ‘public events’ public13 and ‘mass media’ public. The 
encounter public can be considered an ‘everyday’ public because it consists of casual 
everyday, face to face encounters, for example in the train or on the street, where 
everyone is able to voice his/her opinion without the need of a specific structure. 
However, the encounter public is naturally also the public with the least structural 
prerequisites as well as reach and societal influence due to its small size and ephemeral 
character. The ‘public events’ public on the other hand is more advanced with regard to 
structural prerequisites. Public events are, for example, demonstrations or public 
lectures and thus need at least a minimal degree of organization and a demarcation of 
who is allowed to speak and who is not. But they are also more influential than the 
encounter publics since they reach more people. Finally, the mass media public is the 
most influential public since it can be assumed that most people read/listen/watch media 
content in some way. However, the structural prerequisites (infrastructure, expertise, 
etc.) are also the most advanced to gain such a reach, thus leading to a stark delineation 
between an abstract audience (i.e. the audience is not spatially present) and speaker (e.g. 
journalists or politicians) which may lead to an exclusion of topics and/or actors (see 
section 3.1.1) and a reduction of social complexity (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010, p. 144). 
Similar to Gerhards and Neidhardt (1993), Habermas (1996, p. 374) differentiates 
between episodic publics (e.g. in coffee houses), occasional publics (e.g. performances 
or concerts) and the abstract public sphere “of isolated readers, listeners, and viewers 
                                                
13 I refer in this context to the literal translation of “Öffentliche Veranstaltungen” 
(Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991, p. 53) which is also used by Gerhards and Schäfer (2010, 
p. 144). Raupp (2011, p. 79) on the other hand refers to this tier of publics as “public 
sphere of assemblies”. 
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scattered across large geographic areas, or even around the globe, and brought together 
only through the mass media.” Nuernbergk (2013, p. 41f.), however, points out that the 
criteria of the different public tiers are closely connected to the conditions the mass 
media public sphere dictates, whereas such a clear-cut distinction is barely applicable to 
the Internet. 
Based on these differentiations I will now focus on the most influential tier of the 
public sphere: the mass media public (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1993). Indeed, many 
scholars use the mass media for their empirical analysis of the public sphere since they 
consider them as somewhat representative of the public discourse (e.g. Eilders, 
Neidhardt, & Pfetsch, 2004; Ferree et al., 2002b; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006; Kleinen-
von Königslöw, 2010; Lichtenstein, 2014; Weßler, 1999).14 As Gerhards, Neidhardt and 
Rucht (1998, p. 87) put it: “The modern public sphere is thus mostly a mass media 
public sphere.” This perspective is not only based on the mass media public sphere’s 
general reach and influence but also on the mass media’s potential for fulfilling the role 
as an intermediary between state and society (Habermas, 2006). The mass media system 
in this context has a double function: it serves as forum of the public sphere and as actor 
that selects other actors, topics and/or opinions and how these should be framed. This 
selection process, like most processes within the mass media, is based on several news 
factors such as the type of event, the actors involved or the societal influence (e.g. 
Eilders, 1997; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1976). These processes are shaped by 
highly ritualized and professionalized programs within mass media that guarantee 
constant communication and lead Blöbaum (2004, p. 209ff.) to differentiate between 
presentation, organization, selection and information collection programs. I will thus 
focus on how the mass media can be embedded theoretically in the public sphere.  
 
Habermas’ public sphere model 
Even though the mass media’s role within the public sphere cannot be disputed, it can 
be criticized. Habermas (2006 [1962]), who is probably the most prominent scholar 
when it comes to the public sphere, proclaimed that with the mass media the public 
sphere changed from culture reasoning (kulturräsonnierend) to culture consuming 
(kulturkonsumierend) since the mass media pushed the citizens back into the private 
                                                
14 This is especially the case in communication science. Neidhardt (2007, p. 19) 
emphasizes this when he calls the public sphere a “fundamental term of a political 
communication science”. 
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sphere where they only passively consumed the news but did not deliberate about it. 
According to Habermas (2006[1962]), the mass media’s interest does not lie in fostering 
deliberation and integrating different actors but rather on economic growth. Habermas 
fears that this would weaken the public sphere in favor of an elite-dominated public 
discourse that would leave no room for public deliberation and the formation of a public 
opinion and would thus incapacitate the citizens. In his later works (Habermas, 1992, 
2006), however, he revised his perspective on the mass media and also emphasized the 
need for a strong press in order to empower citizens. Yet, this differentiation shows how 
the ideal public sphere would look according to Habermas’ (2006 [1962]) analysis of 
the bourgeois public sphere and its structural transformation: unregulated access for 
every citizen to a freely and unconstrained assembly where all publicly relevant issues 
could be discussed respectfully and reciprocally with everyone being able to voice 
his/her opinion. In this context, he contrasts the autonomous (autochthon) to the power-
regulated (vermachtet) actors within the public sphere. In this understanding, the 
autonomous actors derive from civil society and are able to speak freely and without 
any pressure. The power-regulated actors are regulated “by formal bureaucratic 
relations of hierarchy.” (Ferree et al., 2002b, p. 216) The unrestrained autonomous 
actors can thus be considered more rational (see chapter 3.1.1). 
Habermas understands the public sphere in the following way: “The public sphere 
can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view 
(i.e. opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of 
communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesized in such a way that they 
coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions.” (Habermas, 1996, p. 360) 
This definition is helpful since it already emphasizes the need for active civil 
society actors in the public discourse, the public sphere’s network character and also 
leaves room for public communication outside the mass media. These aspects are highly 
important when thinking about a public sphere on the Internet and have influenced 
many scholars who conceptualized the online public sphere (e.g. Boyd, 2010; Gerhards 
& Schäfer, 2010; Papacharissi, 2002). However, Habermas’ concept has often been 
criticized, for example for being too naïve when it comes to the distinction between 
public and private (Calhoun, 1992, p. 35), for its very ambitious preconditions for 
public discourse (Gerhards, 1997) and indeed, Habermas (1996, p. 326) himself noted 
that this concept could be considered as an ‘ideal’ and “methodological fiction”. 
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Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s (1993) model is, in contrast, more functionalist and less 
normative. 
 
Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s public sphere model and the concept of integration 
Coming from the tradition of the representative liberal model, Gerhards and Neidhardt 
(1991) tried to conceptualize the public sphere in a way that both keeps Habermas’ 
vision of an ideal public sphere in mind and yet is suitable for empirical analyses 
(Wimmer, 2007, p. 108). Based on the three tiers of the public sphere mentioned above, 
they understand the public sphere as an intermediary communication system which “can 
realistically be only a mass media public sphere” (Gerhards, 1991, p. 61; own 
translation). It thus functions as an arena or forum between the civil society and the 
political system. They assume that the public sphere is not a unity but rather consists of 
numerous different forums in which the mass media constitutes the “master forum” 
since it guarantees social communication that bridges subsystems and specific topics 
and thus helps integrate the different forums (Gerhards, 1994, p. 84; Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2010). The authors emphasize that the mass media public cannot be thought 
of without the other publics since it is rooted in them and depends on their input, e.g. for 
topics (Wimmer, 2007, p. 111). In the concept of Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991), the 
public sphere is shaped by a distribution of roles – the audience, the media and the 
speakers15 – and a process of input, output and throughput where topics and opinions are 
collected (input), processed (throughput) and passed on (output) (Neidhardt, 1994, p. 
8f.). Similar to Habermas the public sphere has to be open for every member of society 
regardless of expertise or status (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1991, p. 44ff.).  
Based on the assumption that the public sphere consists of numerous different 
forums they propose that these can be divided into topic-specific sub-forums like a 
science forum and a social movement forum (Ferree et al., 2002b). The audience, in this 
picture, is situated in the gallery (the size differs depending on media type and outlet) 
and media and speakers16 on the stage. The audience in this context is the addressee of 
media and speakers and can be considered as the reference group of both (Gerhards et 
                                                
15 Ferree et al. (2002a) note in this context, that the differentiation between media and 
speaker is problematic since journalists may very well act as speakers themselves. 
16 Neidhardt (1994, p. 14) differentiates between fives types of speakers: 1) 
representatives (e.g. of societal groups), 2) advocates (e.g. of special issues), 3) experts 
(e.g. in their scientific field), 4) intellectuals (e.g. those of a high reputation within 
society) and 5) commentators (e.g. journalists that voice their opinion). 
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al., 1998, p. 56). Additionally to the gallery and the stage there is also the backstage in 
which actors plan their communication strategies to persuade the audience and try to 
find sponsors or resources which may support them on the stage (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 
11).  
This concept has been adapted by several scholars (e.g. Ferree et al., 2002b; 
Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010; Weßler, 1999) but I will focus in particular on Kleinen-
von Königslöw’s (2010, p. 36) question of how these diverse public forums actually can 
be integrated into one public sphere.17 Integration in this context can be understood as 
the “coherence of parts in a ‘systemic’ whole and the resulting demarcation to an 
unstructured environment” (Esser, 2000, p. 261, own translation). Consequently, 
integration refers to the differentiation of an ingroup and an outgroup. Kleinen-von 
Königslöw (2010, p. 40f.) thus proposes four dimensions which indicate whether a 
forum or a public is integrated in the national public sphere or not: 1) observation of 
governing (i.e. the forums observe and discuss the political system), 2) similarity of 
discourses (i.e. the similarity of the forums’ observations and discussions), 3) 
connectivity of discourses (i.e. if the forums exchange topics and speakers and thus 
interact with each other) and 4) collective identity (i.e. who is seen by the forums as 
ingroup and who as outgroup).18 In her analysis, Kleinen-von Königslöw (2010, p. 292, 
300) concludes that the German public sphere is “sufficiently” integrated and suggests 
that the four dimensions can also be used for analyzing the relationship between 
mainstream public and counterpublic.  
However, Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s (1991) model of the public sphere also 
sparked criticism which Wimmer (2007, p. 127) summed up in two major points. On 
the one hand, Gerhards and Neidhardt mainly focused on the political public sphere 
                                                
17 Kleinen-von Königslöw’s (2010) differentiation is based on Wessler et al.’s (2008) 
analysis of the transnationalization of the public sphere with regard to a possible 
formation of an European Public Sphere. 
18 Wessler et al. (2008, p. 30) differentiated in this context between 1) monitoring 
governance, 2) discourse convergence, 3) discursive integration, and 4) collective 
identification. And Nuernbergk (2013, p. 292) proposes that these can be understood 
more generally as 1) monitoring/transparence, 2) validation/similarity, 3) 
orientation/connectivity, and 4) identity/alternativity. Since Wessler et al. (2008) 
focused on the transnationalization of the public sphere and Nuernbergk (2013) did not 
take framing into account, I will draw on Kleinen-von Königslöw’s (2010) dimensions. 
However, it has to be noted that all authors leave the dimension collective identity 
unclear with regard to what factors constitute a collective identity as in an ingroup that 
can be clearly separated from an outgroup (Lichtenstein, 2014). As I will show in 
chapter 4.2.2 but also empirically in 6.5 climate skepticism can indeed be considered to 
be part of one’s identity based on one’s attitudes. 
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which leaves out other aspects of the lifeworld (see also the constructionist perspective 
in chapter 3.1.1) and which is also reflected by those studies on the public sphere which 
mostly focus on the mass media and leave out other “dimensions of social context” 
(ibid). On the other hand scholars criticized the concept for being limited to a national 
context and question whether the model can be used to analyze a transnational public 
sphere. Both issues are especially relevant when thinking about the Internet since a 
political public sphere online is an artificial construct at best in the sense that political 
issues are discussed in all different kinds of publics (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009); mass 
media are not necessarily needed anymore for information and opinion formation 
(Goode, 2009) and national borders can easily be transcended (Castells, 2007).  
Yet, Habermas’ (2006[1962]) discursive and Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s (1991) 
liberal model offer important insights on the multiplicity of publics, the importance of 
the mass media for the public sphere, the public sphere’s network character, and how 
public discourse would ideally look. In addition, the importance of the mass media for 
the formation of a public sphere but also the integration of different publics has been 
outlined. These aspects need to be considered when thinking about the online public 
sphere and the question whether the Internet can lead to an integration of counterpublics 
and to what extent. In the next chapter I will thus focus on how the Internet changed 
communication and, in turn, the public sphere. 
 
 
3.1.3 Internet and the Public Sphere 
As the last chapter has shown the mass media are instrumental in facilitating a public 
sphere. In this sense, the Internet, as a new and highly disruptive medium, could lead to 
a new transformation of the public sphere (Bruns & Highfield, 2016). In this chapter I 
will focus on the question: Is the Internet suitable for people to form a public sphere and 
what aspects may hinder them? 
There were high hopes for democracy when the Internet was first19 introduced. 
Websites, e-mails, mailing lists, discussion boards, chat systems and other services 
promised new forms of communicating with each other, thus circumventing the mass 
media and, at the same time, informing oneself through new and old channels. This new 
                                                
19 ‘First’ in this context refers to the wider introduction to and adaptation by the general 
public in the 1990s and not to prior mostly closed (military) versions that can be traced 
back to the 1960s (Schmidt, 2013, p. 36). 
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medium20, like most media before, was therefore seen to have the potential to 
fundamentally influence the social, economical and political environment (Castells, 
1996, 2004). Neuberger (2009, p. 22ff.)21, in an attempt to wholly grasp the medium 
Internet and its impact, differentiates between the medium’s technical potential and how 
it’s selectively adapted as an institutionalized medium. On the technical side he 
describes how the Internet changed the social (integration of different forms of 
communication), channel and sign (best seen on multi-media sites where video, audio, 
text and picture are integrated) as well as space and time dimensions (being able to 
communicate both instantly as well as after years, regardless of physical distance). On 
the adaption side, he outlines how the Internet’s multi-optionality, decentralization and 
meta-communication (which allows for a system’s (self-)observation) changed how, 
when, and where people communicate. The Web 2.0 and the ‘rise’ of user-generated 
content naturally made these changes even more apparent and also sped them up 
(Neuberger, 2009; Schmidt, 2011). These myriads of small and big changes – some 
only assumed – lead scholars to the conclusion that the Internet would have a significant 
impact on our understanding and conceptualization of the public sphere (e.g. Benkler, 
2006; Bieber, 1999; Castells, 2007; Couldry, 2003; Dahlberg, 2001; Gerhards & 
Schäfer, 2007, 2010; Neuberger, 2009, 2014; Schmidt, 2013; Sunstein, 2001). But these 
changes do not necessarily lead to an online public sphere. In contrast, some authors 
(Hindman, 2009; Sunstein, 2001) proposed that the Internet would harm the public 
sphere and democracy. Thus, before I present how scholars study and understand the 
online public sphere I outline the potential problems it faces. 
Indeed, when it comes to early assessments of the Internet and democracy and/or 
the public sphere there can be roughly divided between two camps: the optimistic and 
the pessimistic.22 The US politician Gore, for example, prominently claimed that the 
                                                
20 The Internet in this context can be considered a “hybrid medium” (Höflich, 1997) 
since it allows for several modes of communication on a variety of hardware (e.g. 
smartphone, computers, etc.) ranging from mass media communication to interpersonal 
communication (Schmidt, 2013).  
21 Neuberger (2009) is one of several scholars who outlined how the Internet changed 
society and communication and especially focused in this context on journalism and the 
public sphere. For a more broad analysis see Castells (1996, 2004; Castells & Cardoso, 
2006) or Benkler (2006). 
22 In this context, Zimmermann (2006, p. 121) adds that there are also ambivalent or 
neutral positions. However, since these emerged only after the first debates between 
optimists and pessimists I will focus on the two extreme positions. She also lists other 
terms that have been used for both sides, e.g. “techno-determinists” or “dystopianist” 
(Zimmermann, 2006, p. 121; 2007, p. 169).  
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Internet “will not only be a metaphor for a functioning democracy, it will in fact 
promote the functioning of democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens 
in decision-making” (Schulz, 2011, p. 214, emphasis in original)23. In contrary, Sunstein 
(2001) proposes that the Internet may lead to a more polarized and scattered discourse 
(the so-called “Babel objection”). And Hindman (2009) even calls digital democracy a 
“myth.” So whereas the optimists proposed that the Internet would lead to a more 
democratic society in which the citizens could be more informed and involved in the 
public discourse and the political process, the pessimists feared that the Internet would 
lead to the contrary and to an overly individualized society in which already existing 
inequalities would be reproduced. Before focusing on how the online public sphere can 
be understood and conceptualized it is mandatory to look at some of the problems it 
faces. 
In their literature review, Zamith and Lewis (2014, p. 4) identified six 
overarching problems the public sphere faces on the Internet: “a ‘digital divide’; 
incivility among participants; the anonymity of communicators; the fragmentation of 
deliberation; selective exposure by individuals; and the homogenization of discussions”. 
24 Digital divide, in this context, refers to inequalities as, for example, access to the 
Internet, technical infrastructure but also digital literacy which not only limits a person’s 
ability or will to inform him/herself on the Internet but also to participate in a 
meaningful discourse (Hargittai, 2002; Hargittai & Walejko, 2008; Schradie, 2011; van 
Dijk, 2006). Incivility, on the other hand, is deeply connected with Habermas’ (1996) 
ideal of a deliberative discourse and refers to the tone in which online discussions are 
held. Most studies that take a closer look at civility online (e.g. in comment sections, 
forums or on social media sites like Twitter), however report that online discourses are 
mostly characterized by their incivility (e.g. hate speech, personal attacks or lies) and 
leave little room for true deliberation (Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & 
Ladwig, 2013; Freelon, 2013; Papacharissi, 2004; Zamith & Lewis, 2014). Whereas the 
anonymity of users might potentially lead to a more equal discourse, studies show that it 
can also be detrimental for the public sphere as it may encourage the use of fake 
                                                
23 See also Negroponte (1995) or Rheingold (1993) for a positive take on how the 
Internet would change society for the better. 
24 See also for an in-depth discussion of these phenomena Kaiser, Fähnrich, Rhomberg 
and Filzmaier (in print) and regarding fragmentation and concentration in particular 
Nuernbergk (2013, p. 163ff.). 
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persona, trolling25, flaming26 or lying since there is no accountability for the users (Lee, 
2005; Zamith & Lewis, 2014). Selective exposure describes the conscious or 
unconscious27 act of ignoring content that may lead to cognitive dissonance and thus to 
withdrawal in an “echo chamber” (Sunstein, 2001) or “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011) in 
which only topics and opinions are being shared and discussed that are consonant with 
one’s own worldview but excludes a more diverse public discourse (Kaiser, Fähnrich, et 
al., in print; Zamith & Lewis, 2014). 
Finally, fragmentation and homogenization can be described as the two 
opposing extremes on the same scale that ‘measures’ the public sphere’s28 diversity (of 
participants, topics or opinions and websites). These two phenomena usually refer to the 
audience; the ‘homogenization’ of media use is called concentration (Hindman, 2009). 
So, then, whereas fragmentation in its extreme form refers to the public sphere’s 
disintegration into numerous echo chambers that are not integrated at all, 
homogenization insinuates the “winner takes all”-rule of attention by which a 
potentially healthy and diverse public sphere is dominated by a few users or, in the case 
of concentration websites, whereas the rest is ignored.  
Habermas (2008a; 2009, pp. 53, 157), for example, proposes that the Internet 
may be especially helpful in authoritarian or oppressive states where the public 
discourse is censored but may lead to a fragmentation of the public sphere in democratic 
states. This is in line with Sunstein (2001, p. 67; 2008) who proposes that the Internet 
may lead to more deliberation although not in the general public sphere but rather in 
“deliberative enclaves” or echo chambers which then, as a result, may become even 
more extreme since there are no opposing voices. He suggests that these enclaves thus 
become an echo chamber, i.e. a “breeding ground for group polarization and 
                                                
25 Trolling can be defined as: “A troller is a CMC [computer-mediated communication; 
JK] user who constructs the identity of sincerely wishing to be part of the group in 
question, including professing, or conveying pseudo-sincere intentions, but whose real 
intention(s) is/are to cause disruption and/or to trigger or exacerbate conflict for the 
purposes of their own amusement.“ (Hardaker, 2010, p. 237) 
26 Flaming is here understood as “a hostile expression of strong emotions such as 
swearing, insults, and name-calling“ (Lee, 2005, p. 285). 
27 Mostly through algorithms that select content based on one’s preferences and thus 
also hide content that potentially goes against one’s preferences (Pariser, 2011) 
28 Some authors refer not to the public sphere or publics but rather to audience 
fragmentation, i.e. the fragmentation of what was previously considered one audience 
into numerous different smaller audiences of different channels and media (Tewksbury, 
2005; Webster, 2014; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). Since it was already outlined that the 
public sphere is heavily dependent on the audience these studies are also included here 
(see chapter 3.1.2). 
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extremism” (Sunstein, 2001, p. 71). Putnam (2000) also refers to the phenomenon of 
these numerous un- or only loosely connected publics as “cyberbalkanization.” Indeed, 
several studies were able to identify echo chambers, fragmentation or polarization 
processes online – often along ideological lines (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Sunstein, 
2008; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Hugo Lambert, 2015; see also chapter 5.1).29 
However, concerning this position, there are two major issues. On the one hand, 
as it has already been pointed out before (see chapter 3.1.1) it is highly questionable 
whether there ever was one public sphere and, more importantly, if this is even 
something to aspire to. Fraser (1990), for example, made clear that counterpublics are 
actually better for society since they extend the public sphere by giving a voice to 
minorities and excluded groups whereas a single public sphere would marginalize those 
voices (see also chapter 3.2). Dahlberg adds (2007, p. 833) that “the model fails to 
theorize respect for difference as a fundamental end of democracy. Difference is seen as 
a threat to social stability, to be overcome by rational deliberation aimed at consensus.” 
On the other hand, authors who study fragmentation or polarization processes online 
often do so by looking at one specific topic and one proxy for connectedness (e.g. 
hyperlinks, blogrolls, follower/followee relations or direct interactions). These proxies 
only shed light on one specific way of attributing relevance or attention. However, as 
Kleinen-von Königslöw (2010) points out, there are multiple ways of integrating 
different publics as, for example, observing each other or discussing the same topics. 
Additionally, there are, of course, other topics where actors who differ on one subject 
may now interact. As Bruns and Highfield (2016) point out there are numerous publics 
on the Internet and although some may be polarized or fragmented, others are not.  
In contrast, homogenization or concentration processes refer to an overly 
monotonous public sphere. Zamith and Lewis (2014), for example, understand the term 
mostly from a participation perspective and consequently define the main problem as 
online discourses being dominated by a few highly active users while a mostly passive 
and consequently silent audience sits back. In several empirical studies, Hindman 
(2009) shifts the focus from the users’ participation to their attention and suggests that 
since everyone’s attention is limited people do not necessarily check out all possible 
                                                
29 A prominent topic for research in this context is the online polarization between 
Republicans and Democrats in the US (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Colleoni, Rozza, & 
Arvidsson, 2014). Empirically, ingroup/outgroup relations are often times measured 
with regard to a group’s homophily, i.e. people prefer to interact with like-minded and 
stay within a group of like-minded (Colleoni et al., 2014; Yardi & Boyd, 2010). 
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websites (e.g. political websites) but rely on more classical outlets (e.g. the mass media) 
or on search engines like Google. He, too, proposes that the combination of the user’s 
limited amount of attention, a sheer unlimited amount of websites and Google’s quasi-
monopoly would lead to a “Googlearchy” (Hindman, 2009, p. 55). He thus “suggests 
that online concentration comes from the sheer size of the medium and the inability of 
any citizen, no matter how sophisticated and civic-minded, to cover it all” (Hindman, 
2009, p. 57). Consequently users are only paying attention to a small amount of selected 
websites which, however, make up most of their attention. Thus the Internet could 
eventually be regarded as being even more effective in excluding minority voices than 
traditional mass media (Hindman, 2009, p. 12). 
Hindman’s (2009) analysis can also be considered as an attempted rebuttal of 
Benkler’s (2006, p. 248) diagnosis that online fragmentation and homogenization 
processes are “just right” to support “universal intake and local filtering”. Nuernbergk 
(2013, p. 170ff.), however, disagrees with Hindman’s (2009) assessments and remarks 
that it is not clear which sites are actually the most prominent ones in the analysis. He 
adds that mass media outlets, for example, are not only covering many different topics 
but also fulfill highly crucial tasks within the public sphere like giving orientation or 
information. Additionally, a study by Neuberger and Lobigs (2010), which focused on 
the diversity of sources online, could not confirm the claim of concentration processes 
within the online public sphere. Another aspect which counters the fear of an online 
concentration is the role of the social web and its closely connected recommendation 
and sharing system which enables the quick diffusion of information or opinions across 
different publics and the circumvention of classical gatekeepers (Benkler, Roberts, 
Faris, Solow-Niederman, & Etling, 2015; Maireder & Schlögl, 2014; Nahon & 
Hemsley, 2013). With regard to the question of user homogenization, Hargittai and 
Walejko (2008) noted that inequalities, albeit existing, disappeared when controlling for 
digital literacy. It thus seems likely that the more people adapt to the Internet and its 
opportunities, the more these inequalities (e.g. digital literacy, education) will at least be 
reduced. 
The outline has shown how the Internet has transformed and challenged users 
and scholars alike and could display that the online public sphere differs from the 
traditional mass media public sphere with respect to issues such as fragmentation or 
concentration but also new opportunities for participation. Accordingly, the public 
sphere model cannot just be translated to the Internet but should take key aspects such 
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as the Internet’s network character into account. Especially fragmentation and the 
special case of echo chambers are highly relevant for this thesis as these can be used to 
describe online counterpublic empirically. In the next chapter I will focus on different 
aspects that have been highlighted when looking at the online public sphere. 
 
 
3.1.4 Research on Online Publics 
The Internet and all its different forms of communication (e.g. mails, forums, blogs, 
videos and posts, likes, shares or retweets on social media platforms) that open up new 
opportunities for citizens to participate politically (both on a national and transnational 
level) as well as journalistically can be seen as indicators for another structural 
transformation of the public sphere (Bruns & Highfield, 2016). Accordingly, a variety 
of labels have been coined to describe the new online public sphere(s) that can be 
differentiated based on their analytical perspective, societal level and research focus 
(see Table 1). In general, authors either focus on a forum or a discourse perspective 
when conducting research on the online public sphere.  
Zimmermann (2007), for example, refers broadly to the “online public sphere” 
and, similar to Gerhards and Schäfer (2010), takes a closer look at search engines as an 
influential forum of the public sphere. In comparison, Schmidt (2013) distinguishes 
between four different kinds of publics ranging from the micro to meso level 
(depending on the number of participants): mass media, expert (e.g. open access 
journals), collaborative (e.g. on Wikipedia) and personal publics. He thus emphasizes 
that the mass media are relevant online but also that other forums form through the 
users’ activity on different platforms. Neuberger (2009) and Nuernbergk (2013) 
specifically take a closer look at how the mass media can be integrated in the networked 
public sphere and emphasize that the mass media still play a crucial part online. Bruns 
and Burgess (2012) analyze the social media site Twitter and identify the formation of 
ad-hoc publics which have both a temporal character, since they can be considered 
ephemeral, but also a spatial character since they are mostly restricted to a platform. 
The social media also lead to the erosion of the (potentially artificial) differentiation of 
‘public’ and ‘private.’ Papacharissi (2010), for example, proposes that Facebook and 
other similar services would lead to “private spheres” that are only open to a few and 
closed to most, while Schmidt (2011) suggests that users now form their own “personal 
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publics” on Twitter or Facebook. Both have in common that they focus on the user and 
thus on the micro perspective. 
 
Analytical perspective Societal level Research focus Selected authors 
forum macro search engines Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Hindman, 2009; 
Zimmermann, 2006, 2007 
meso mass media Neuberger, 2009; Nuernbergk, 2013; 
Schmidt, 2013 
micro/meso social media Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013; Bruns, 
Burgess, Highfield, Kirchhoff, & Nicolai, 2011; 
Papacharissi, 2010; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 





Benkler et al., 2015; Bruns & Highfield, 2016; 
Dahlgren, 2001, 2009; Habermas, 2006; 
Poor, 2005; Schmidt, 2013 
micro/meso identity Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2015; 
Nuernbergk, 2013; Renninger, 2015; Toepfl & 
Piwoni, 2015 
micro/meso emotions Papacharissi, 2015; Tong, 2015 
Table 1: Perspectives and research foci30 when looking at online publics and the 
associated societal level (own depiction) 
 
In contrast, Dahlgren (2001, 2009) describes “issue publics” which form around 
one specific topic or issue (see also Habermas, 2006). These can be considered to range 
from micro, meso to macro level since some issues are very specific and only relevant 
to a few, whereas other issues are highly relevant to society at a whole. Even though 
issue publics are often analyzed on a specific platform, they can also be investigated on 
several platforms or via hyperlinks (Benkler et al., 2015; Chadwick, 2011; Rogers, 
2002). Since issue publics, ad-hoc publics, fragmentation processes as well as a myriad 
of user preferences may lead to rather small publics, Gitlin (2008) proposes that these 
would form “public sphericules” which are usually small but have the potential to grow 
and have a larger impact (see also Bruns, 2008). 
Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015) look at the special case31 of Sina Weibo in China 
and differentiate between thematic, short-term, encoded, local, non-domestic political, 
                                                
30 Focus in this context refers to aspects that the authors covered with their empirical 
analysis and/or theoretical considerations. Rauchfleisch and Schäfer (2015), for 
example, analyzed in their study the use of Sina Weibo in China (platform) and 
highlight different adaptations and cases that also had a political impact. And 
Nuernbergk (2013) analyzed how the mass media and counterpublics were situated in 
the networked public sphere. In general, it has to be noted that this table is by no means 
exhaustive and should be seen as a heuristic categorization. 
31 Their study (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015) is especially remarkable since it focuses 
not on a democratic country in which the freedom of speech is guaranteed but rather on 
an authoritarian country in which censorship is prevalent. By doing so they also give 
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mobile and meta public spheres, thus also accounting for technical access, spatial 
circumstances in the lifeworld32 but also how online publics are able to influence the 
political process. They thus emphasize that within a forum, in this case Sina Weibo, 
different publics can form around different aspects. Other authors like Renninger 
(2015), for example, highlight that publics cannot only form around issues but also 
around identity, for example in the case of counterpublics. Even though identity 
building is essential for the formation of a national33 or even transnational public sphere 
as Wessler et al. (2008) emphasized, the studies in which identity is a central aspect of 
the publics with regard to the Internet, usually focus on a micro or meso level. Since the 
new forms of online communication like social media empower users to share their own 
personal opinion and individual framing these may lead to “affective publics” 
(Papacharissi, 2015; Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012) in which not only the 
argument but also the emotional state and one’s individual perception play a role. 
These, however, often transcend the individual and thus are on a micro or meso level. 
What most of these concepts have in common is a) the attempt to grasp the ways 
in which different form of communication foster the creation of new publics, as well as 
b) a less normative approach to how the public sphere has to look and what its functions 
are in favor of a more descriptive and systemizing attempt to grasp the Internet’s 
complexity. Indeed, the segregation of different tiers of the public sphere in mass 
media, public events and encounter publics (see chapter 3.1.2) seems more and more 
artificial in a time where search engines like Google have a further reach than the mass 
media (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010) and weakly organized individuals have now the 
potential to directly influence the political discourse (Bieber, 2002; Maireder & Schlögl, 
2014). Thus, Rauchfleisch and Kovic (in press) suggest that the public sphere should 
not be looked at from a normative perspective but rather from a functionalist one, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                          
Habermas’ (2009) hypotheses that the Internet would be more helpful for facilitating a 
public sphere in authoritarian countries empirical weight. 
32 Habermas (1996, p. 22) understands lifeworld as “background knowledge”: “The 
lifeworld forms both the horizon for speech situations and the source of interpretations, 
while it in turn reproduces itself only through ongoing communicative actions.” 
33 Even though studies still often focus on a national context (e.g. Ausserhofer & 
Maireder, 2013; Bruns et al., 2011; Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2015) authors are not 
necessarily bound to it anymore since they can now look at, for example, English- or 
German-language debates (e.g. Benkler et al., 2015; Etling, Kelly, Faris, & Palfrey, 
2010; Jang & Hart, 2015) or a transnational discourse (Volkmer, 2014) 
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with a focus on the public sphere’s general functions34 and the aspects that foster or 
hinder the formation of a public sphere. In a next step I will focus on the networked 
public sphere and will demonstrate how this less normative concept helps us to 
understand and to integrate the different issues of concentration and fragmentation. 
 
 
3.1.5 The Networked Public Sphere 
The concept of the networked public sphere, which I will focus on in this thesis, is 
another way to grasp the new and different forms of communication as well as to 
account for the Internet’s decentralized and networked technical infrastructure. Even 
though several scholars emphasized the Internet’s network character (Bieber, 1999; 
Boyd, 2010) when talking about the public sphere, Benkler’s (2006; Benkler et al., 
2015) concept is used here as a starting point since it described the Internet’s influence 
on society from a more general perspective and also inspired communication scholars to 
advance this concept (e.g. Boyd, 2010; Friedland et al., 2006; Neuberger, 2009, 2014; 
Nuernbergk, 2013; Raupp, 2011).  
The starting point for Benkler’s (2006, p. 1) public sphere theory is the 
assessment that the “change brought about by the networked information environment is 
deep. It is structural. It goes to the very foundations of how liberal markets and liberal 
democracies have coevolved for almost two centuries”. New forms of communication 
(e.g. blogs, social media or user comments) enable citizens to circumvent the classical 
mass media public sphere and establish their own channels of communication, 
information and journalism. These, then, are not dependent on the mass media as 
gatekeepers who differentiate between what is relevant and what is not, but rather allow 
citizens to decide for themselves and also set the agenda themselves. Bruns (2005) 
names this change “gatewatching,” a process in which citizens now monitor both mass 
media and other sources for potentially relevant information. These gatewatching 
processes take place all over the Internet (e.g. blogs, Twitter, Facebook, Reddit) and are 
an essential part of the networked public sphere since they fulfill the task of giving 
orientation (Neuberger, 2009; Nuernbergk, 2013). Another fundamental change the 
Internet has brought about is the erosion of clear-cut communication roles. Whereas in 
                                                
34 They establish four general functions of the public sphere: identity building, agenda 
setting, control and criticism and deliberation (Rauchfleisch & Kovic, in press). 
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classical public sphere concepts there was the differentiation between speaker and 
audience, the Internet (especially visible through the social web) gives everyone the 
potential to be what Bruns (2005) calls a “produser”.35 The term describes the fluid 
change between producing (i.e. speaking) and using (i.e. audience) of information. 
“Produsers” are then another potential source of information, both for citizens as well as 
for the mass media. As a consequence, a feedback loop is created in which a discussion 
is never truly ‘finished.’ However, the mass media, too, are very prominent online and 
now have the ability to integrate more voices, information and opinions in their 
coverage. They have created an opening for more interaction, thus giving citizens a 
voice within public discourse (Loosen & Schmidt, 2012). Nuernbergk (2014) adds that 
the Internet fosters follow-up communication to journalistic coverage through 
participative formats such as comment sections but also on other platforms like Twitter, 
Facebook or on blogs which then, in turn, may influence further journalistic coverage. 
Adapting Gerhards’ and Neidhardts’ (1991) input/throughput/output model to the 
networked public sphere, Nuernbergk (2013, p. 160) suggests that on the input side –
even though there are still exclusions (e.g. through technical or social aspects; see also 
chapter 3.1.3) – there is now more transparency with regard to selected opinions and 
topics.36 In the throughput phase mass media are still highly important but users now 
also have the potential to participate in the process and establish new topics and 
opinions and to extend the discourse. Nuernbergk (2013, p. 160), however, adds that the 
two main problems for the mass media are to keep the audience’s attention and to 
ensure discursiveness within the decentralized structure of the Internet. On the output 
side, he proposes that the uneven attention distribution may hinder the giving of 
                                                
35 Larsson (2011, p. 1190) identifies with a survey five different types of users: 
prosumer (active users), lurker (rarely active, mostly passive usage), bystander (not 
active, only passive), filter (mostly sharing content), and critic (mostly passive but 
appreciates options for participation). Since these types are not selective Springer, 
Engelmann and Pfaffinger (2015), for example, only differentiate between user (active), 
lurker (passive) and non-users. 
36 Nuernbergk (2013, p. 58ff.) also refers to the long tail principle which Neuberger 
(2009, p. 41ff.) adapted for the networked public sphere. In short, it takes the 
fragmentation and concentration process (on the supply side) into consideration and 
suggests that both processes happen to a certain extent (i.e. there are few websites that 
are very prominent and there are many which are almost unknown) but that these do not 
endanger the public sphere since there are services like search engines or blog 
aggregators which also shed light on the long tail (i.e., the many sites that are rarely 
paid attention to). Neuberger (2009, p. 43, own translation) thus suggests that fears of 
fragmentation “can be judged as doubtful” since these are still integrated within the 
networked public sphere. 
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orientation (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 160). In contrast, the networked public sphere enables 
individuals to find these alternative sites and opinions even though alternative 
viewpoints may also be excluded this way (similar to the classical public sphere). 
However, the question remains as to how the networked public sphere can be 
defined. Boyd (2008, p. 38) emphasizes in this context that networked publics are 
“constructed through networked technologies” and can be characterized by an 
“imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, 
and practice.” By emphasizing the “imagined collective” she refers to what Anderson 
(2006[1983]) called “imagined communities” which refers to an idea of community and 
shared identity. For Boyd this feeling of an “imagined collective” is what users of the 
same platform (e.g. a forum) experience and which makes them feel as if they 
‘belonged’ to the community. Ito (2008) focuses on the technological side and proposes 
that networked publics “reference a linked set of social, cultural, and technological 
developments that have accompanied the growing engagement with digitally networked 
media.” And for Benkler (2006: 253) the multiple networked public spheres “cluster 
around topical, organizational or other common features.” Boyd outlines four main 
differences between networked publics and other publics: persistence, replicability, 
scalability and searchability (Boyd, 2010, p. 26ff.). Persistence refers to the fact that 
‘the Internet never forgets’ and that there exist multiple ways in which information (e.g. 
content) gets stored online. Replicability describes that information can easily be 
replicated without loss of quality since it is stored digitally. Scalability emphasizes the 
potential of reach within networked publics, i.e. that information from small networked 
publics can reach a wide visibility through diffusion effects or virality. Finally, 
searchability refers to the fact that most content in networked publics can be found 
through search engines and is thus easily accessible. 
The networked public sphere is thus made out of numerous publics of different 
size and influence which are sometimes strongly, sometimes loosely37 connected and 
cluster around different issues (thus also accounting for the other publics mentioned 
                                                
37 This is in reference to social network theory in which a network consists of nodes 
(e.g. actors, websites, user profiles, etc.) and edges (e.g. if people are related to each 
other, if websites link to another website, if people are friends on Facebook) and some 
of these nodes are more strongly connected to a community (strong ties) and some of 
them are only loosely connected (weak ties). The strength of a tie is usually measured 
with regard to nodes’ “closeness of bond” (Herring et al., 2005, p. 2). Whereas strong 
ties usually suggest a close community, weak ties are considered to have a bridging (e.g. 
of information) function between communities and thus enable their integration 
(Granovetter, 1973). 
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above) but who all have the potential to influence one another, to set the agenda or to 
influence the public discourse. The networked public sphere is a highly integrative 
concept that allows the inclusion of different types of publics38 and different forms of 
communication and emphasizes the civil society’s role in the public discourse which, in 
traditional concepts of the public sphere, had been considered to be mostly passive. It 
can be understood as “the range of practices, organizations, and technologies that have 
emerged from networked communication as an alternative arena for public discourse, 
political debate, and mobilization alongside, and in interaction with, traditional media.” 
(Benkler et al., 2015, p. 3)  
It is, then, not a replacement of the classical mass media public sphere but rather a 
new form of public sphere that is closely connected and even entwined with the mass 
media public sphere. 39  With these changes, new forms of societal observation and 
participation become possible which may have an impact “on the gatekeeping of the 
traditional media” (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 281). The networked public sphere thus 
emphasizes the connectivity of different actors and the potential for citizens as well as 
marginalized minorities to voice their opinions. The concept is thus chosen as the 
theoretical framework for this thesis as I want to look at different forms of 
communication and contextualize these with each other. However, even though the 
Internet makes it easier to find alternative viewpoints it does not guarantee that these are 
also heard in the public discourse. This has been shown with regard to the phenomena 
of fragmentation and concentration. Polarization and echo chambers in this context have 
been presented as a special form of (self)exclusion that will be analyzed empirically in 
this thesis. Indeed, exclusion processes still exist and it is thus important to focus on the 
question of how counterpublics can be defined and how these can be integrated into the 
networked public sphere40.  
                                                
38 Publics in this context refers to the tier system of Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991; see 
also chapter 3.1.2). Or as Raupp (2011, p. 83) states: “The concept of the networked 
public sphere takes into account not only horizontal relationships on the various levels, 
but also vertical networks between all the three levels.“ (She translates the German 
Ebene as level whereas in this thesis it is translated as tier) 
39 Bruns and Highfield (2016) even suggest that the Internet is now that closely 
connected to the classical mass media public sphere that the prefix ‘networked’ is not 
needed anymore.  
40 Since the networked public sphere is not a replacement of the mass media public 
sphere I will refer to the ‘public sphere’ when talking about the general overarching 
idea of a public sphere, the ‘mass media public sphere’ when talking about the public 
sphere which is facilitated by the mass media and the ‘networked public sphere’ when 
talking about the online public sphere. 
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3.2. Counterpublic Theory 
Albeit the theoretical foundation for an online public sphere has been presented, the 
question arises how groups that are hardly represented in the public discourse and who 
vocally reject the mainstream positions, as for example climate skeptics, can be 
theoretically conceptualized and integrated in the concept of the networked public 
sphere. Indeed, the exclusion of specific groups from society based on their beliefs, 
political ideology, social status, gender or other reasons has a long history. In ancient 
Greece, for example, the political arena was only open for some citizens – the poor, 
slaves and women were left out (Euben, 1993). Habermas (2006 [1962]) found in his 
analysis of the bourgeois public sphere in the 18th century that workers and women were 
not part of that discourse either. However, in a democratic society, which is centered on 
the idea that all citizens are equal, it can be argued that marginalized groups and 
minorities naturally also need a voice within the public discourse (see chapter 3.1.1). 
Indeed there are groups which have the power to organize, make their voice heard and 
challenge the status quo publically. Due to their opposition to the mainstream public 
they are called counterpublics41. In this chapter I will first outline how counterpublics 
have been traditionally understood and then draw from studies that analyzed the 
formation of counterpublics online. I will finally show how counterpublics can be 
understood and integrated in the networked public sphere and, in turn, also show how 
the Internet challenges our understanding of counterpublics. 
 
 
                                                
41 Depending on the author the term is either written ‘counterpublic’ (e.g. Asen, 2000; 
2016; Fraser, 1990) or ‘counter-public’ (e.g. Chávez, 2011; Wimmer, 2005). It has to be 
noted, that both spellings vary regarding their popularity on Google Scholar (last 
checked: March 29, 2016). Whereas the singular ‘counter-public’ seems to be more 
popular with scholars (5,840 to 4,750 results) the plural ‘counterpublics’ is used more 
frequently (7,730 to 2,980 results). In Germany, however, most authors seem to favor 
the singular form ‘Gegenöffentlichkeit’ (e.g. Engesser & Wimmer, 2009; Nuernbergk, 
2013) over the less used ‘Gegen-Öffentlichkeit’ (e.g. Baumann, 1993; Sutter, 2010) 
(3,240 to 532 results). The plural forms ‘Gegenöffentlichkeiten’ or ‘Gegen-
Öffentlichkeiten’ are according to Google Scholar rarely used (663 to 121 results). 
Google Scholar results are in this context, naturally, only seen as an indicator as it 
neither can be seen as representative of the whole academic discourse nor are the search 
results selective. Since I agree with Fraser that the public sphere is made out of 
numerous publics it seems counterintuitive to assume that there exist only one 
counterpublic. I will thus use ‘counterpublics’ as plural when referring to 
counterpublics in an unspecified way and ‘counterpublic’ when referring to a specific 
public, e.g. the climate skeptic counterpublic in Germany. 
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3.2.1 Classical Understandings of Counterpublics 
From a social science perspective the history of counterpublics is closely connected to 
the introduction of the printing press which enabled the creation of printed 
counterspeech and thus a way to (potentially anonymously) question those in power. 
Indeed, first acts of counterpublicity can be traced back to the pamphlets of the 
reformation in the 15th and 16th century (Wimmer, 2007, p. 153f.). Nowadays, the use of 
the term counterpublics, however, is directly connected with the student movements in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s which used the notion as “a fighting term which is in opposition 
to the media system and its structures and functions that legitimate the contexts of 
power” (Stamm, 1988, p. 40, own translation). This practice of questioning the political 
status quo and its legitimating and reproducing structures manifested itself in acts of 
activism (e.g. protests) or counterpublicity (e.g. alternative media). Counterpublic 
theory is thus closely connected to social movement research but also to the critical 
theory and cultural studies (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 95f.).  
To detangle these different positions Oy (2001) differentiates three types of 
counterpublics with regard to their connections to mass media, public sphere and 
democracy. The first type counterpublic communication is characterized by the 
counterpublic’s “worry about democracy” (Oy, 2001, p. 192, own translation). Based on 
this worry, counterpublics either try to influence the bourgeois public sphere and mass 
media through spectacular acts or exclude themselves from the public sphere through 
radicalization. The second type is based on critical theory and the assumption that 
within the public sphere authentic communication from directly involved actors is 
needed to truly get an idea of an issue and its effects on people (see also chapter 3.1.1). 
The third type emancipatory communication is a critique of the classical sender/receiver 
model and based on critical theory and cultural studies. Its main focus is the integration 
of the ‘receiver’ in an interactive and thus emancipatory communication process. In this 
context, Oy (2001, p. 203) emphasizes that counterpublic communication can only have 
an impact if it is also embedded within the daily life of the receivers who, then, are also 
able to question the contexts of power. 
Wimmer (2007, p. 157ff.) differentiates between the social and content dimension 
of the term counterpublic and its different meanings: In the content dimension he 
distinguishes between counterpublic as counterdiscourses 42  (in German 
                                                
42 I adapt in this context Fraser’s (1990, p. 67) term of counterdiscourses. 
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Gegenthematisierung) and institutionalized alternative or movement media. 
Counterdiscourses refer to the “widening of discursive contestation” (Fraser, 1990, p. 
67) through the publicist inclusion of new perspectives, new opinions and the (re-) 
framing of issues, thus making social inequalities visible.43 These counterdiscourses are 
mainly bound to the ‘classical’ mass media public sphere. In the contrary, movement 
media are thought of as rivaling the mass media and thus extending the diversity with 
regard to alternative topics, opinions and evaluations (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 98f.). 
Additionally, the movement media’s aim is naturally also to mobilize their supporters. 
In the social dimension, counterpublics can refer to a specific public within the 
overarching public sphere or to cultural or media-dependent forms of practice 
(Wimmer, 2007, p. 157). The conception of counterpublics as their own specific publics 
is used by authors (Fraser, 1990; Wimmer, 2005) who propose that the public sphere is 
not one unified public but rather made out of numerous different publics (see also 
chapters 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.4). In this sense the counterpublic has two options: either 
extending the public sphere by engaging actively and critically within the public 
discourse or isolating itself and forming an autonomous public that functions as a ‘safe 
haven’ (Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1990; Negt & Kluge, 1993; Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 99; 
Wimmer, 2007, p. 160f.). The social or media-dependent forms of practice are highly 
connected with other forms of counterpublic communication since “there is no 
alternative communication without a social practice which determines and ratifies it.” 
(Couldry, 2003, p. 39). The practices can, for example, also include participation in 
marches or the visiting and organizing of counterpublic spaces like theaters or centers 
(Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 99; Stamm, 1988, p. 42). 
Based on this outline, I will now focus on Fraser’s (1990, 2007) seminal work on 
subaltern counterpublics to show how counterpublics can be defined.44 Her starting 
point is a critique of Habermas’ (2006 [1962]) concept of the public sphere from a 
feminist point of view (see also chapter 3.1.1). In her analysis, Fraser points out that the 
idea of one public sphere is neither realistic nor desirable since it silences minorities and 
diversity under the guise of unity. By referring to historical studies she emphasizes that 
there was not only the bourgeois public sphere which Habermas described but also 
                                                
43 As Wimmer (2007, p. 158ff.) points out this is also in line with Brecht’s (1967 
[1932]) radio theory, Enzensberger’s (1970) emancipatory media usage or Lovink’s 
(1992) megaphone model which all aim to empower citizens by giving them the option 
to voice their opinion. 
44 For a more in-depth analysis of different schools of thought regarding counterpublics 
see Wimmer (2007) or Nuernbergk (2013). 
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proletarian45 (i.e. working class) publics or “elite women’s publics” (Fraser, 1990, p. 
61). Instead of one public sphere there were and are numerous publics. As underlying 
power structures mark the classical public sphere, she argues that there can be no true 
deliberation since “proceeding as if they don't exist when they do […] does not foster 
participatory parity” (Fraser, 1990, p. 64). Marginalized groups and actors thus only 
have the possibility to retreat and form  
 
“subaltern counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinate social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.” (Fraser, 1990, p. 67, 
emphasis in original)  
 
Consequently, Fraser’s ideal of a public sphere consists of numerous publics so 
that deliberation is possible and exclusion and marginalization processes are minimized. 
These counterpublics are, however, not supposed to be autonomous like Negt and Kluge 
(1993), for example, envision but rather should influence and extend the public 
discourse. For Fraser (1990, p. 68) counterpublics have two main functions: “On the 
one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, 
they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed 
toward wider publics.” They can thus also be considered as a sense-making forum for 
the involved actors to also form and test their identities.46. Counterpublics are seen as 
inherently positive both for the marginalized groups as well as for society as a whole. 
However, it remains unclear which role the mass media play in Fraser’s concept, how 
media outlets could support the counterpublics, how the different publics are connected, 
how the publics can be measured or when a counterpublic can be considered integrated 
                                                
45 See also Negt and Kluge (1993) for a more detailed look at the proletarian public 
sphere which they contrast to Habermas’ (2006 [1962]) bourgeois public sphere and in 
which they describe how the working class was excluded. They thus propose that the 
working class should create a counterpublic to establish their own point of view in the 
public discourse and make their interests heard. 
46 The idea of a collective identity as a unifying and mobilizing element is integral in 
counterpublic theory (Rucht, 1994; Wimmer, 2007, p. 197). Closely connected is, in 
this context, the framing theory in which scholars have propagated that frames can 
foster identity building (Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1992). In this thesis I 
understand frames with Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 3) as “making sense of 
relevant events, suggesting what is at issue”, i.e. so-called “emphasis frames” 
(Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016, p. 6). Framing can be considered an especially 
important aspect in the context of the public sphere but also with regard to climate 
change communication in particular since “frames privilege certain meaning elements at 
the cost of others” (Ferree et al., 2002b, p. xii; see also chapter 6.3.3). 
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in the broader public sphere (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010, p. 24; Nuernbergk, 2013, 
p. 108).  
Based on Fraser’s (1990) concept of subaltern counterpublics and Oy’s (2001) as 
well as Wimmer’s (2007) differentiation of counterpublics and their meanings 
counterpublics can be broadly understood as publics which are created based on 1) 
exclusion or marginalization processes that are helpful in 2) shaping group identities, 
and which also have the 3) potential to extend public discourse and the public sphere in 
general through counterdiscourses, alternative media and social practices. 
Counterpublics, then, are mostly seen as positive for society. This notion can, however, 
be questioned. Indeed, with the rise of the Internet some scholars suggested that 
counterpublics could be understood from a less normative perspective in order to allow, 
for example, the analysis of unruly publics or extremist groups that do not adhere to 
democratic principles (Cammaerts, 2009; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015). In the next chapter I will thus focus on how the Internet changed counterpublic 
communication but also may have lead to a more fragmented public sphere. 
 
 
3.2.2 Online Counterpublics 
In accordance with the changes in the public sphere the Internet also brought about the 
formation of counterpublics and their impact on the broader public sphere has changed. 
Engesser and Wimmer (2009, p. 46) even go as far as to propose that counterpublics 
rely that heavily on digital communication that, as a result, they can no longer be 
thought of without it. They emphasize that the Internet’s characteristics of 
hypertextuality (i.e. the structural connection through links between different pages or 
domains), multimediality (i.e. presenting messages in various different media forms) 
and interactivity47 allow counterpublics to form new allegiances and make their 
messages heard quickly. Their argument is indeed quite compelling: whereas prior to 
the Internet counterpublics were forced to organize to make their messages heard in the 
mass media or publically (e.g. in movements or alternative media) they now need less 
                                                
47 Interactivity can be generally understood as “1) as an attribute of technical media 
systems […], (2) as an attribute of the communication process […], and (3) as an 
attribute of the perceptions of users” (Ziegele, Breiner, & Quiring, 2014, p. 1113, 
emphasis in original). In this thesis I focus on 2) with regard to the interaction of users 
to users. 
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organization to connect with sympathizers and can completely circumvent the mass 
media. Nuernbergk (2013, p. 265), however, adds that even though movements and 
counterpublics have now more options than ever before to promote their cause it is 
likely that they will still try to reach the traditional mass media outlets since these 
guarantee a wider reach and have more impact.  
Apart from this assessment, Wimmer (2007, p. 217) identified seven functions 
that new media offer for counterpublics: 1) articulation, 2) emancipation/identity 
building, 3) information/communication, 4) mobilization, 5) organization, 6) protest and 
7) subversion. One aspect that Wimmer does not fully include in this list but which 
seems extremely relevant in this context is the act of hacking.48 One reason for this may 
be that hacking is mostly illegal and thus cannot be included in a normative 
understanding of counterpublics within a democratic society and their functions. 
However, I posit that hacking has to be included from a more descriptive perspective 
since it is undoubtedly part of the online public discourse and has the potential to 
influence society and the public discourse.49 Additionally, in authoritarian countries 
hacking can be understood as a form of civil disobedience (O'Neil, 2014). 
But these opportunities for counterpublics also have to be seen against the 
background of new as well as old exclusion mechanisms the Internet introduced or 
reproduced: Probably the most prominent form of exclusion is, similar to the classical 
public sphere, nonobservance, for example through fragmentation or concentration (see 
chapter 3.1.3), which can be the product of not paying attention, not being able to pay 
attention due to a warped perspective that emphasizes corporate portals or commercial 
media (e.g. sponsored posts on Facebook or Instagram) but also of leaving someone out 
consciously (e.g. in the mass media but also on blog aggregators) (Dahlberg, 2005; 
                                                
48 Wimmer (2007, p. 218) mentions hacking in the context of protest and refers to 
Bieber’s (1999) understanding of specific acts of hacking as virtual sit-ins. This 
definition is somewhat limited since it leaves out other ways of hacking as leaking 
personal or confidential information, making websites inaccessible with DDOS attacks 
or stealing money or information. 
49 One relevant example is ‘Climategate’ (Gregory & Glance, 2013). This term refers to 
the illegal publication of several thousand e-mails that were written by climate scientists 
from the US and UK and which were published right before the highly anticipated 
climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009. They supposedly showed that the scientists lied 
and manipulated their data. The case as well as the allegations were discussed in the 
mass media heavily. However, these claims proved to be false as several committees 
relieved the scientists. Yet, the claim that Climategate proved that climate scientists 
would lie is still prevalent among climate skeptics (Gavin & Marshall, 2011; 
Grundmann, 2012) but has also influenced the public perception of climate science 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2013). 
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Webster, 2014; Zimmermann, 2006). Indeed, a very fragmented online discourse into 
potential echo chambers can also be seen with regard to counterpublics. Whereas 
Sunstein (2001; 2007) highlights that fragmentation and the formation of echo 
chambers can be harmful for society, echo chambers can also –depending on the case – 
be understood as counterpublics and, as such, with having an emancipatory and identity 
fostering character (Fraser, 1990; Nuernbergk, 2013). Echo chambers, then, are not 
necessarily harmful but it is important to understand the connections they still have to 
the other publics (see chapter 5).  
Another way in which critical and possibly counterpublic messages can be 
excluded online is through censorship and even though users often find creative ways to 
circumvent censorship, the knowledge that one is under observance can already alter 
one’s behavior and silence critical voices (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015; Stoycheff, 
2016; Warf, 2010). Additionally, there exist other forms that may be used to silence 
users online as, for example, (automated) moderation from the owners of a site (e.g. of a 
comment section) or by other users50 (Geiger, 2016). But exclusion can also manifest 
itself in more extreme forms online as, for example, harassment, which may even turn 
to cyberbullying or acts of hacking in order to publish information of personal 
communication (Mantilla, 2013; Shepherd, Harvey, Jordan, Srauy, & Miltner, 2015). It 
thus becomes evident that even though the Internet gives individuals and groups the 
chance to voice their opinion, form alliances and promote a cause, it also offers new 
ways to exclude and marginalize them. 
When taking a closer look at studies that focus on the relationship between 
counterpublics and public sphere there are a some interesting aspects to note:51 Maireder 
and Schlögl (2014), for example, analyzed the Twitter debate on women’s everyday 
experiences with sexism which were collected under the hashtag #Aufschrei (outcry). In 
their analysis they showed how the debate was initiated by a few feminist Twitter users, 
how it grew in size due to its highly relevant topic, how it was picked up by journalists 
who, then, wrote stories about the ongoing debate, but also how users tried to derail the 
debate through jokes or personal insults. These attempts by a few users were of no avail 
as the most influential German political TV talk show made it its main topic and invited 
                                                
50 On the social bookmark platform Reddit, for example, a comment that is disliked, i.e. 
downvoted, by many gets hidden 
51 Not all studies mentioned here analyzed counterpublics specifically. However, the 
appearance of civil society actors or minorities may indeed be an indicator for how open 
the mass media and other media like search engines are with regard to the inclusion of 
critical or marginalized voices. 
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one of the Twitter users who had initiated the debate to the show. Chadwick (2011), in 
this context, also echoes the potential impact social media platforms like Twitter can 
have on the news media discourse.  
In his study, Renninger (2015) takes a closer look at the asexual community on 
the social blogging platform Tumblr. He is able to show how asexuals have found a 
platform on which they were able to form their counterpublic and thus connect with 
like-minded users. However, since Tumblr is a public platform the asexual 
counterpublic is also under ‘attack’ by other users who try to marginalize them through 
insults and attempts at trolling. In his analysis of Tumblr he outlines several reasons 
why counterpublics such as feminists, asexuals and other movements may use the 
platform for their organization and communication, with the most prominent being that 
commenting is not incentivized at Tumblr as it is not a main feature and therefore 
comments can be more easily ignored (Renninger, 2015, p. 11f.). It is noteworthy that 
interactive features like commenting, which are usually seen as having a huge potential 
for the public sphere and journalism (Ruiz et al., 2011; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015), are 
here seen as detrimental.  
Jackson and Foucault Welles (2015) took a closer look at the case of how the 
Twitter hashtag #myNYPD, which was initially intended for marketing purposes and the 
promotion of the New York Police, was hijacked by counterpublic activists who, then, 
changed the subject to racial profiling and police brutality. In their analysis of Twitter 
users they conclude “that networked counterpublics are more diverse and inclusive than 
the mainstream public sphere“ (Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2015, p. 17). 
Even though this may be the case for social media sites like Twitter the question 
arises whether Downey’s and Fenton’s (2003, p. 199) hypothesis that the growth of 
counterpublics online would also make the mass media more open to counterpublic 
actors is backed by empirical results. However, neither Gerhards’ and Schäfer’s (2006) 
nor Zimmermann’s (2006) analysis point towards this direction. Gerhards and Schäfer 
(2006) compared the mass media’s reporting on human genome research with the top 
documents they found on search engines regarding the visibility of different actors. In 
their comparison, the authors conclude that the Internet was even more one-sided and 
less pluralistic than the print media and thus cannot be considered more democratic 
(Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006, p. 224). Zimmermann (2006, p. 180; 2007) agrees with this 
sentiment. In her analysis of the representation of actors online, which she also based on 
documents found on search engines, she states that the Internet cannot be considered 
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more democratic than the mass media since individuals are almost not represented and, 
in addition, anti-democratic actors are even more present than in the mass media. Even 
though a cause for concern, this also shows that the Internet offers marginalized groups 
the opportunity to speak out. 
Another way to look at the representation of actors online, which also takes the 
so-called ‘blogsphere’ into account, is through hyperlink analysis (Benkler, 2006; 
Pfetsch, Adam, & Bennett, 2013). Nuernbergk (2013, p. 577ff.) could, for example, 
show that the leftist counterpublic on Indymedia, even though it formed its own cluster, 
was not excluded from the broader networked public sphere and thus rejected the 
fragmentation hypothesis. Kaiser, Rhomberg, Maireder and Schlögl (in print) took a 
closer look at the Energiewende (i.e. the discourse surrounding Germany’s shift from 
nuclear to renewable energy sources) discourse in Germany and were able to show that 
albeit the political actors excluded themselves from the discourse, actors from the civil 
society and special interest groups were integrated by other social fields (e.g. the media) 
but also very active with regard to linking to other social fields.  
Nuernbergk (2013, 2014) also highlights the potential of follow-up 
communication to journalistic content in the blogosphere for counterpublics. In his 
analysis which was a combination of content and hyperlink network analysis of 323 
blogs he concludes that “network-based media like weblogs indeed offer a viable space 
for commentary relevant to a specific matter of public concern.“ (Nuernbergk, 2014, p. 
10) Another form of follow-up communication is commenting on a news story or on a 
blog post. In their analysis of comment sections of German news media outlets, Toepfl 
and Piwoni (2015) could show that supporters of the right-wing populist German party 
AfD were over proportionally active and suggested that the users transformed the 
comment sections into counterpublics. 
In general, it thus has to be noted that the Internet offers counterpublics a variety 
of possibilities to form and organize themselves, to communicate with others and also to 
reach the broader public sphere and the mass media with their counterdiscourses. 
However, this does not imply that they are also more visible in the mainstream public 
sphere since the Internet also allows for new ways of exclusion. Indeed, it is suggested 
in this chapter that echo chambers can also be understood from a counterpublic 
perspective. Consequently, I will suggest in the next chapter that counterpublics can be 
integrated into the networked public sphere concept. 
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3.2.3 Integrating Counterpublics in the Networked Public Sphere 
The integration of counterpublics in the networked public sphere seems – based on the 
understanding of the latter as it was established above (see chapter 3.1.4) – intuitive. 
Indeed, in a networked public sphere that is shaped by numerous publics of different 
size, organizational structure, societal impact and links to other publics, counterpublics 
can be considered to be a specific form of these publics. Based on the two previous 
chapters counterpublics can be defined as: 1) structured around a specific issue that is 
morally or politically polarizing (identity), 2) opposed to the dominant hegemony 
within this discourse (critical/counter), 3) marginalized and/or excluded from the 
dominant public discourse (exclusion) and 4) with its own influential media outlets 
(alternative media). 
Moreover, there are two important aspects to consider: first, the separation of 
counterpublics and publics and second, their normative character. The former refers 
both to the identification and confirmation of the ‘counter’ in ‘counterpublic’ (Asen, 
2000). Counterpublics are – quite literally – in opposition to the mainstream public 
sphere, are excluded from voicing their opinion and are often not represented in the 
mass media public sphere. As a reaction, they are forced to form outside the mainstream 
public sphere. Against this background, it seems imperative to take several levels of 
exclusion into consideration when talking about counterpublics and, more importantly, 
also to verify this empirically (see chapter 5). In this context, the concept of the echo 
chamber (Sunstein, 2001) can potentially52 be understood as an indicator for online 
counterpublics since they also often form around political or moral questions and 
usually stay within their group, thus fostering the group’s identity. 
The normative character on the other hand refers to the term’s close connection to 
social movements and oppressed minorities and their struggle to find recognition in the 
public sphere. With regard to online communication, however, there have not only been 
attempts to ‘de-normativize’ the public sphere concept (Benkler, 2006; Rauchfleisch & 
Kovic, in press; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015) but also the counterpublic concept 
(Cammaerts, 2009; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). Indeed, it offers a powerful theoretical 
                                                
52 This, naturally, depends on factors like the echo chamber’s size but also its identity 
and its political representation. Sunstein (2007, p. 116) suggests in an example that the 
case of 26% of US Americans only knowing arguments that are in favor of their 
political candidate but knowing none about their candidate’s opponent is a signal of an 
echo chamber. These, then, are naturally not counted here since they are not excluded 
from the political discourse or the mass media reporting.  
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framework that integrates processes of exclusion or counterdiscourses that happen 
online and, additionally, it allows for the integration of online phenomena such as echo 
chambers. I thus suggest that the concept should be used carefully and only for cases in 
which there is a clear break or polarization between mainstream and a marginalized 
faction that can be shown on several levels. However, it should also be applicable to 
problematic or ‘unruly’ publics that, for example, reject basic democratic principles 
since it is here, where the mentioned mechanisms are at work and it is also here where 
counterpublics form and try to widen the public discourse through several methods. 
Counterpublics, then, can – as Kleinen-von Königslöw (2010, p. 300) already 
suggested – be understood with reference to Gerhards’ and Neidhardt’s (1991) arena 
model and analyzed with regard to how well they are integrated in the “arena public”. 
This is also true for the different publics of the networked public sphere (Raupp, 2011, 
p. 78ff.). It has to be noted that a differentiation between audience on the one side and 
speaker on the other has to be reconsidered depending on the public. Whereas the 
classic mass media publics are still shaped by this differentiation, other publics that are 
characterized by more interactivity and produsage are not. 
This chapter, then, shows how counterpublics, as climate skeptics in Germany, 
can be integrated in the networked public spheres as a special case that can also be 
identified empirically (c.f. echo chambers) and that counterpublics will be able to 
spread their messages more visibly online through new forms of communication. Since 
the research question in this thesis deals with the question whether and to what extent 
counterpublics can be integrated in the networked public sphere Kleinen-von 
Königslöw’s (2010) dimensions for integration are presented to analyze this integration 
empirically. In the next chapter I will focus on the new forms of communication, 
namely blogs and comment sections, as facilitating media for these publics and will 
show how these can be understood, what opportunities these offer for counterpublics 
and how these can be integrated in the networked public sphere. 
 
 
3.3. Blogs, Comment Sections and the Public Sphere 
The concept of the networked public sphere is especially interesting when thinking 
about the Internet and how, where and why people form publics since it allows for an 
integration of different forms of communication. In this chapter I will focus on two very 
 43 
prominent forms that are closely connected to the networked public sphere and which 
will play an important role in this thesis’ empirical part: blogs and comment sections. I 
will also take current research on both forms into consideration to show how people use 
these forms to establish new publics. 
 
 
3.3.1 Blogs & Current Research 
The hopes for a more democratic Internet and a more inclusive public sphere are closely 
connected to weblogs (Benkler, 2006; Koop & Jansen, 2009). Indeed, weblogs, or 
blogs, which were initially thought of as some form of online diary gave users the 
opportunity to voice their opinion for free and without restraints (e.g. Bieber, 2006; 
Blood, 2000; Neuberger, Nuernbergk, & Rischke, 2007; Nuernbergk, 2013; Schmidt, 
2006b, 2011; Wallsten, 2008). When blogs were first introduced in the late 1990’s the 
norm were mostly static homepages (Blood, 2000; Schmidt, 2006b). Accordingly 
Benkler (2006, p. 216f.) contrasted blogs with classical homepages and emphasized that 
blogs have extended the Internet in two ways: firstly through their technical potential 
which makes the Internet “writable” (Benkler, 2006, p. 216) which means that people 
can now write at any time and as often as they want about any issue (ranging from 
political to private) and secondly, that blogs also empower the audience by giving them 
the opportunity to speak up through the introduction of comment sections. This mixture 
of blogging, commenting and answering previous comments creates an “end product 
[that] is a weighted conversation, rather than a finished good.“ (Benkler, 2006, p. 217) 
Other prominent characteristics of blogs are their reverse chronological order of 
regularly updated posts which can contain different kinds of media like videos, images 
or sound files (Blood, 2000). In this sense, they can be considered as a combination of 
classical homepages and discussion boards that even though “based on a similar 
technological foundation allow for numerous different practices” (Schmidt, 2011, p. 27, 
own translation). For Schmidt (2006a, p. 40; 2006b, pp. 117-146) three major 
characteristics unite these practices: they are authentic since they often reflect the 
blogger’s personality, dialogue orientated as they foster follow-up communication in the 
comment sections and also on other blogs, and decentralized as they are a mixture of 
interpersonal and public communication with varying reach.  
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One major practice that also made the Internet’s underlying networked character 
more visible is the act of linking to other sites. In general, there are three kinds of links 
on a blog: the classic permalink in a text which refers to another site (e.g. another blog) 
and which can be seen as both ephemeral and dynamic and as a proxy for a broader 
discourse (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Schmidt, 2006b), the link in a blogroll which is a 
comparatively stable link list in which links can be considered as a recommendation or 
symbol of allegiance within a community (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Koop & Jansen, 
2009) and the trackback links which are automated messages which appear in the 
comment section under a blog post and which signal that another blog has linked to the 
post and thus helps bloggers to track the follow-up communication to their posts 
(Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 227; Schmidt, 2006b, p. 49). The sum of these links, i.e. the 
system of constant linking and re-linking, forms a broader network of topics and 
communities, the so-called “blogosphere” (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Wallsten, 2007).  
The term blogosphere is used in several ways: as an umbrella term that includes 
all different kinds of blogs (Benkler, 2006; Herring et al., 2005) but also as a more 
specific description of blogs which, for example, can form around political issues 
(Benkler et al., 2015), national discourses (Etling et al., 2010), entertainment 
(Chittenden, 2010), social issues (Harp & Tremayne, 2006) or science (Bonetta, 2007). 
These blogospheres, then, can be even more differentiated, for example, based on their 
political ideology or scientific topic (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Elgesem, Steskal, & 
Diakopoulos, 2015; Hargittai, Gallo, & Kane, 2007; Sharman, 2014).  
Consequently, the blogosphere, especially the political blogosphere, has been in 
the center of academic interest for quite some time. Coming from a public sphere 
perspective it seems especially important to take a closer look at the relevance of blogs 
in Germany to assess if counterpublic actors use blogs in order to expand the public 
sphere. Whereas in the USA blogs are widely established and are read roughly by over 
30 percent of Americans (Statista, 2016) the blogosphere in Germany and especially the 
political one is stuck “in first gear” (Eckert, Chadha, & Koliska, 2014). According to 
the 2015 ARD/ZDF online study 8 percent of the German online users read blogs 
regularly (Frees & Koch, 2015, p. 372).53 Nevertheless, Neuberger (2012, p. 45) was 
                                                
53 It is likely though that these numbers will rise slowly in the future since 15 percent of 
the 14-29 year olds are reading blogs regularly, thus doubling the general percentage 
(Frees & Koch, 2015, p. 372). It is also worth mentioning that the numbers differ from 
survey to survey. Neuberger (2012, p. 43), for example, showed that almost 33 percent 
of German Internet users used blogs at least once a month. That, however, does not 
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able to show in a survey that 19,2 percent of the German population counted blogs as 
journalistic outlets. But do blogs – according to Benkler (2006) – in fact widen the 
public sphere by giving a diverse set of actors the chance to speak up? The answer to 
this question is a mixed one (Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 245ff.). Studies show, for example, 
that not all blogs are equal but that there are so-called “A-list blogs” that are linked to 
heavily by other blogs and can thus be considered especially prominent and influential 
within the blogosphere (Ekdale, Namkoong, Fung, & Perlmutter, 2010; Herring et al., 
2005; Trammell & Keshelashvili, 2005; Wallsten, 2007). However, most blogs are not 
from the “A-list” but rather focus on a variety of topics by numerous bloggers. Lörcher 
and Taddicken (2015, p. 264) for example, point out that blogs that are written by 
climate scientists can even be considered expert publics. Other studies, too, point out 
the different ways blogs are being used to extend the public sphere. One prominent 
example are the so-called watchblogs that focus on the mass media’s reporting and 
correct mistakes or call out unethical behavior and thus serve a “critical function” 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 423f.) for the public sphere. And several authors were able to show 
that blogs can be used to counter the mainstream discourse by users from counterpublics 
who are using blogs to communicate, discuss or network and, occasionally, to sway 
public opinion (Benkler et al., 2015; Engesser & Wimmer, 2009; Jackson & Foucault 
Welles, 2015; Nuernbergk, 2013; Renninger, 2015). 
In sum, scholars agree that blogs offer users the opportunity to form new publics 
outside the mass media public and are thus an integral part of the networked public 
sphere (Benkler, 2006; Neuberger, 2009; Nuernbergk, 2013; Schmidt, 2013). Indeed, 
the opportunity for citizens to circumvent the mass media and publically post (political) 
opinions and information and engage in deliberative discourse with other users can be 
understood as actively contributing to the networked public sphere’s information and 
orientation functions. Closely connected to blogs are comment sections which have also 
gained scholars’ attention in the last year and on which I will focus next. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
change the general consensus between scholars regarding the German blogosphere 
(Eckert et al., 2014; Katzenbach, 2008; Meinel, Bross, Berger, & Hennig, 2015; 
Nuernbergk, 2013). 
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3.3.2 Comment Sections & Current Research 
Comment sections – similar to blogs – were seen as a way of getting more users to 
participate in online deliberation and as such contribute to the networked public sphere 
(Benkler, 2006; Dahlberg, 2011; Ruiz et al., 2011). Indeed, comment sections offer 
users similar opportunities to react to an article (on a news media site, a blog or an 
online retail shop) as blogs but also offer the opportunity to discuss further (potentially 
unrelated) issues with other users (Ksiazek, Peer, & Lessard, 2016). Comment sections 
can be considered as one of the most used forms of user generated content and public 
online participation54 (Trost & Schwarzer, 2012, p. 95; Weber, 2013).55 One reason for 
this is also that most news outlets – in addition to blogs – offer the opportunity to 
comment directly on their articles. Friemel and Dötsch (2015, p. 151), for example, 
show in their literature review that whereas only 46 percent of major German news 
outlets had comment sections in 2007, this number grew to 75 percent in 2012. Against 
this background, the hopes that were associated with comment sections seem reasonable 
since they enable a fast, easy and (depending on the site) anonymous way of 
deliberation. And yet, the hope for a civil and more deliberative discourse in the 
comment sections has faded in the last years with multiple studies concluding that 
comment sections rarely meet the high requirements for deliberative discourse (Coe, 
Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Collins & Nerlich, 2014; Dahlberg, 2001; Freelon, 2013; 
Papacharissi, 2004).56  
                                                
54 Both Weber (2013) as well as Ziegele, Breiner and Quiring (2014) took a closer look 
at the factors that may foster participation – similar to news factors (Galtung & Ruge, 
1965). So called “discussion factors” were “controversy, unexpectedness, 
personalization, and uncertainty” as well as “[l]ength, position, the news medium itself, 
and the news story topic” whereas “incomprehensibility and negativity” had a negative 
effect on the likelihood of commenting (Ziegele et al., 2014, p. 1129, emphasis in 
original). 
55 A recent representative survey for Germany (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 
2015, p. 158) shows that 29 percent of the participants have at least once written a 
comment under a journalistic article and 36,9 percent have at least once written a 
comment under a blog post or on a discussion board. 
56 Another aspect that potentially thwarts deliberation in the comment sections is 
astroturfing. According to Hoggan and Littlemore (2009, p. 36) astroturfing refers to 
activities by a “fake grassroots organization animated by a clever public relations 
campaign and a huge budget”. With regard to comment sections this means that it is 
mostly unclear who is participating in a debate and with which motives. This, naturally, 
violates the idea of an open and honest discourse by authentic users. Cho, Martens, Kim 
and Rodrigue (2011) could, for example, show that astroturfed messages about climate 
change could lead to more uncertainty about climate change and its anthropogenic 
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Even though online comments are often not compatible with a general 
understanding of a civil and constructive debate and even forced some news outlets to 
close their comment sections for some topics or in general (Hille & Bakker, 2014; 
Santana, 2016), they take place constantly all over the Internet – and also have an effect 
on readers or users who participate in the discussion.57 Anderson et al. (2013), for 
example, found in their study that incivility in the comment sections can influence58 a 
reader’s perception of the article and make a complex scientific topic such as 
nanotechnology seem more risky than stated in the article. This is also in line with 
Houston, Hansen and Nisbet (2011) who show with an experiment that user comments 
may have an effect on the user’s perception of bias in online news. And Lee (2012), by 
conducting an online survey, could identify that some users may misattribute the 
information they read in the comments to the article and thus confuse the source. 
Additionally, Hsueh, Yogeeswaran and Malinen (2015) found that prejudiced comments 
influence the writers of comments to write more prejudiced comments themselves; an 
effect which may lead to a more polarized debate. Friemel and Dötsch (2015, p. 165) 
add in their comparison of reader and user perception of Swiss online comments that 
even though the comment sections tend to be more conservative than the general reader 
“[n]either readers nor writers of comments are aware of the bias and consider comments 
as a valid indicator for the opinion of all news site users.” 
But can comment sections that empower users to discuss issues be considered as 
publics in their own right? In an analysis of blog posts and their comments during the 
time before the Bundestag elections in 2005, Albrecht, Hartig-Perschke and Lübcke 
(2008, p. 112) came to the conclusion that even though there was discussion between 
different blogs the main discussions took part in the comment sections. And Wojcieszak 
and Mutz (2009) note that studies that looked for a discursive deliberative political 
discourse may have looked at the wrong places (i.e. the classical political spheres like 
political blogs or news sites) and show with a survey that most discussions that cross 
political camps take place in supposed non-political online groups where political issues 
                                                                                                                                          
cause. However, up to now there is no empirical way to identify ‘artificial’ comments 
within comment sections from a researcher’s point of view even though this is gradually 
changing (Abokhodair, Yoo, & McDonald, 2015; Menczer, 2016). 
57 This is in line with research that indicates that cues like user ratings can influence our 
perception of product (Flanagin & Metzger, 2013; Flanagin, Metzger, Pure, Markov, & 
Hartsell, 2014). 
58 It has to be noted, though, that their regression model only explained 17 percent of the 
readers’ risk perception (Anderson et al., 2013).  
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come up randomly. In a comparison of letters to the editors and online comments about 
Jena Six59 McCluskey and Hmielowski (2011, p. 314) explicate that “the promise of 
online reader posts to bring additional views into public discourse on pressing social, 
cultural and political issues, as the posts clearly offered greater differences in opinion 
expression on the Jena Six events than did the letters to the editor.” Meyer and Carey 
(2014, p. 213) add to this literature with their findings from a survey of Internet users 
who state that one of the most important aspects for commenting is the “virtual sense of 
community”, thus echoing one of the networked publics’ key characteristics (c.f. Boyd, 
2010). 
Springer, Engelmann and Pfaffinger (2015, p. 799) note that online comment 
users can contribute to the input/throughput/output stages in the public sphere (see also 
chapter 3.1.2) in several ways: “to the input, by expressing their own opinions; to the 
throughput, by interacting with others; and to the output, by creating consensus or 
dissent on the interpretations of journalists, the mediated statements of actors, and/or the 
remarks of other users.” Indeed, the amount of public communication and –occasionally 
– deliberation that takes place in comment sections as follow-up communication to an 
article, as new discussion among users and as their potential influence points towards 
the assessment that comment section can be considered as being constitutive for the 
formation of publics. Based on Schmidt’s (2013) differentiation of different online 
publics60 Lörcher and Taddicken (2015, p. 264) understand comment sections as mass 
media induced publics.61 Toepfl and Piwoni (2015), too, understand comment sections 
as separate publics to the mass media and also show in a next step how counterpublics 
can ‘conquer’ these publics in order to make their voices and opinions heard. In this 
context, I propose that comment sections can be understood as media induced publics 
that can be characterized as both responsive (due to their direct follow-up 
communication to the initial media stimulus) as well as interactive (due to their 
                                                
59 Jena Six refers to the severe punishment of six African-American high school 
students in Jena, Louisiana in 2007/2008 that became a “symbol of racist treatment of 
African-Americans“ (McCluskey & Hmielowski, 2011). 
60 Schmidt (2013, p. 41ff.) differentiates between different arenas within the public 
sphere: the mass media arena, the expert arena (e.g. scientific journals), the 
collaborative arena (e.g. Wikipedia) and the personal arena (e.g. Facebook). 
61 They differentiate between mass media arena, expert arena (blogs by scientists), 
discussion arena (discussion forums) and mass media induced arena (comment sections) 
(Lörcher & Taddicken, 2015, p. 264ff.). It has to be noted though that these categories 
are not selective: whereas the articles of the mass media outlets and their comments are 
separated, blog posts and comments are both included in the discussion arena.  
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discursive structure that can evolve a topic or bring up new issues), as potentially 
influential (to both readers and writers) and as embedded within the networked public 
sphere due to the user’s linking practices. 
 
 
3.3.3 Blogs and Comment Sections in the Networked Public Sphere 
In the last two chapters blogs and comment sections were presented as two new forms 
of online communication that facilitate the formation of new publics by users and that 
they are closely connected with Benkler’s (2006) idea of a networked public sphere 
that, at best, can be “a boon to individual autonomy and freedom, which will break elite 
strangleholds on democratic discourse and draw diverse interests and talents into a 
common arena.” (Etling et al., 2010, p. 1226) Indeed, both blogs and comment sections 
potentially give Internet users the possibility of broadening the public sphere by giving 
them a voice and a space for deliberation. But it was also shown that this promise is 
rarely fulfilled. Instead we can see that blogs are often mass media-focused, even when 
they are hosted by counterpublic actors, and that comment sections do rarely meet the 
deliberative standard within discussions. 
However, when comparing blogs and comment sections with the characteristics 
Boyd (2010, p. 26ff.) outlined for networked publics (persistence, replicability, 
scalability and searchability; see also chapter 3.1.4) and keeping Dahlgren’s (2005, p. 
148) definition of the public sphere as the “constellation of communicative spaces in 
society that permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates […] and also the 
formation of political will” in mind, it seems clear that both blogs and comment 
sections can give users the opportunity to form their own publics within the networked 
public sphere. Based on the three tiers of the public sphere outlined by Gerhards and 
Neidhardt (1991), Gerhards and Schäfer (2010, p. 146) place blogs on the level of the 
“public events public sphere”. I propose, however, that this differs from case to case and 
between encounter and public events public sphere. Whereas blogging has become 
increasingly easier and, as such, also more popular with time and platforms like Tumblr 
or Blogger have little organization prerequisites (compared to getting an e-mail address, 
for example), a blog’s societal impact is highly dependent on its user base. This, of 
course, also counts for media-induced publics where comments on a mass media site 
can be considered to be potentially more impactful than, for example, on a blog. 
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3.4 Summary: Networked Public Sphere and Counterpublics 
Probably one of the most popular verdicts when it comes to the Internet and the public 
sphere stems from Papacharissi (2002, p. 23) who came to the conclusion that “the 
internet presents a public space, but does not yet constitute a public sphere.” As the 
previous chapters show, this verdict has to be revised for several reasons. Indeed, it can 
be argued that a) the networked public sphere is closely connected to the mass media 
public sphere and, as such, does not necessarily have to fulfill all functions the mass 
media public sphere has to but rather brings a more inclusive and yet diverse set of 
actors and voice to the ‘table.’ Additionally, the Internet also influenced the mass media 
and eroded the journalist’s gatekeeping monopoly through new communication forms 
like blogs and comment sections.  
I further b) agree with Rauchfleisch and Kovic (in press) who propose that the 
public sphere’s main functions are identity, agenda setting, control and criticism and, 
finally, deliberation. As the previous chapters on the networked public sphere, blogs and 
comment sections have shown, these functions are – sometimes more, sometimes less – 
fulfilled within the networked public sphere and can also be adjusted to counterpublics. 
Indeed, by taking a less normative stance it becomes clear that identity building is an 
inherent part of online communities (Boyd, 2010), that online publics have the potential 
to set the agenda (Chadwick, 2011; Maireder & Schlögl, 2014) and fulfill the control 
and criticism function (Benkler et al., 2015; Habermas, 2006). Even deliberation, which 
is perhaps the most ambitious as well as academically tested function, can be identified 
in some media induced publics (Collins & Nerlich, 2014; Ruiz et al., 2011). Finally, c) 
the networked public sphere can be considered as more inclusive than the mass media 
public sphere as it accounts for numerous publics and counterpublics who try to make 
their voices heard. 
Against this background, it has to be noted that the networked public sphere has 
several problems like fragmentation or polarization processes on the one and 
concentration and homogenization on the other hand. The question, however, remains 
of how to measure whether a counterpublic can be integrated in the mainstream public 
sphere and to what extent. To analyze this question I first look at the different public’s 
affordances for counterpublics, i.e. how easily counterpublics can access each public to 
voice their opinion (see Table 2). Since counterpublics are mostly excluded from the 
mass media their potential to voice their opinion is low and can mostly be done through 
newsworthy acts of protests (see chapter 3.2.1). In comparison, social media publics and 
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media induced publics are openly accessible for counterpublic actors and thus their 
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of 
Counterpublicity 
Potential for Integrating Counterpublics Societal 


















High High Low/Medium Low 
Table 2: Publics and their potential for acts of counterpublicity, integration of 
counterpublics and societal impact (own depiction) 
 
To measure the different publics’ potential to integrate counterpublics I adapt 
Kleinen-von Königslöw’s (2010) criteria. Since these criteria were established for the 
mass media and not for the Internet and counterpublics respectively a few changes have 
to be made (cf. Kaiser et al., forthcoming; Nuernbergk, 2013). Nuernbergk (2013, p. 
340), for example, understands monitoring governance more generally as 
monitoring/transparency. Monitoring is understood here as observing society in general 
with the assumption that it can already be considered somewhat integrated if 
counterpublics and mainstream publics observe the same events. This step allows for a 
more general understanding of the networked public sphere that goes beyond the 
political public sphere and thus allows for the integration of climate topics which, even 
though they include climate politics, are not a political topic per se. Naturally, the mass 
media’s potential for monitoring society can be considered high since this is one of its 
main functions (Ferree et al. 2002a; see chapter 3.1.2). Yet, social media and media 
induced publics are more difficult cases since they all allow for the monitoring of 
society both through original information as well as mass media induced follow-up 
communication but also do not have to (see chapter 3.3.3). Since there are no 
comparable professional structures in place for these two types of publics but their 
potential for integration can be high for one case and low for another their potential can 
be considered low/medium. 
The category similarity of discourses refers mostly to the frames that are being 
used in different publics (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010, p. 77). These frames are here 
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understood exclusively as counterpublic frames since it can be assumed that the more 
counterpublic frames are within the mainstream’s discourse, the more integrated it is. 
The more frames that can be attributed to a counterpublic, then, that can be found in the 
mainstream publics point towards a similarity of mainstream and counterpublic 
discourses. The potential for counterpublic frames within the mass media publics, then, 
can be considered low since counterpublics are not part of the mainstream public and if 
they are only to some extent. Social media publics, however, are more open to 
counterpublic frames as counterpublic actors are able to create a blog or a Twitter 
account and use it for counterpublic communication. But this does not guarantee that 
counterpublic frames are actually used or even heard since social media publics also 
have the potential for polarization and fragmentation (e.g. Adamic & Glance, 2005; see 
chapter 3.1.3) which seldom allow for communication across the gap and, then, negate 
the possibility for a similar discourse. I thus suggest that their potential for integrating 
counterpublic frames can be considered low/medium. In comparison, media-induced 
publics offer counterpublics the opportunity to participate in the debate directly (e.g. on 
comment sections) and promote their frames so that others, even though they might 
disagree, have to see them (e.g. Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). Their potential for a similar 
discourse is thus high. 
The dimension connectivity is here understood as the structural connection via 
hyperlinks (c.f. Kaiser et al., forthcoming; Nuernbergk, 2013) or in the case of social 
media as interaction between actors (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). So connectivity refers to a 
conscious act of attribution distribution (Kaiser et al., in print) that could, potentially, 
connect mainstream publics and counterpublics. Even though the mass media public has 
the potential to include hyperlinks to refer to counterpublic actors they rarely do so 
(Nuernbergk, 2013) and thus the potential for connectivity is low. In contrast, social 
media publics have a medium potential for connecting the mainstream public with the 
counterpublics. Indeed, one of the social media’s main features is the connectivity 
between actors (e.g. blogs or user accounts). They thus offer counterpublic actors the 
possibility to connect with actors from the mainstream via links (trackback function on 
blogs) or directly via a mention or a reply (e.g. on Twitter) which makes it harder to 
ignore them even though this is still possible. Media induced publics, in comparison, 
connect actors directly with each other as they appear, for example, in one discussion 
thread of a comment section thus making it harder for mainstream actors to ignore 
counterpublic actors. Thus, their potential for connectivity is high. 
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The last dimension collective identity refers to the issue of in-group/out-group 
relations, i.e. that there exist two sides: the mainstream perspective and the alternative 
counterpublic perspective (c.f. Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010, p. 78; Nuernbergk, 2013, 
p. 340). I understand identity in this context as the underlying feeling “that they belong 
together” (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 40) based on their acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change or their rejection of it. In general, the potential for a collective identity 
when talking about counterpublics is low. Neither the mass media nor social media 
publics offer counterpublic actors the potential to be a part of the publics since they are 
often excluded from them. Their enclaves or echo chambers, then, can be considered to 
be the space in which they form their identities but these do not have the power to 
influence the mainstream publics in seeing counterpublics as part of their collective 
identity (see chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In media-induced publics, however, the 
opportunity can be assumed to be higher, as counterpublic actors are potentially more 
involved in the debates with other users which, then, could lead to the other users seeing 
them as part of their imagined community and thus the ingroup (Anderson, 2006; see 
also Friemel & Dötsch, 2015). Even though the potential is still higher than with the 
other publics, it can still be considered low/medium since counterpublics and their 
identities are still in opposition to the mainstream public, thus making forming a 
collective identity especially hard. 
Finally, the societal impact of the different publics has to be considered. Even 
though the Internet fostered new forms of communication and, closely connected, 
publics, the mass media can still be considered to be the most influential public within 
the networked public sphere (cf. Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Neuberger, 2009; 
Nuernbergk, 2013). The potential impact of social media is comparatively low. But 
since it has been shown that they can act as corrective, and even set the agenda on 
occasion, their influence can be considered to be low/medium (Chadwick, 2011; 
Maireder & Schlögl, 2014). Media-induced publics are in contrast less influential, even 
though it has been show that they do have an impact on readers and other users 
(Anderson et al., 2013; Friemel & Dötsch, 2015). Their societal influence is thus low. 
Based on this differentiation I will focus on the categories similarity of discourses, 
connectivity and collective identity in this thesis. The dimension monitoring is already 
heavily influenced by my decision to look at media events (Dayan & Katz, 1992). Since 
these have been shown to draw much attention (Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013) it 
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can be assumed that both mainstream as well as counterpublic focus on these, thus 
making it the baseline for this thesis. 
The concept of the networked public sphere thus offers scholars both the 
opportunity to integrate different forms of communication in a theoretical framework 
but also to analyze the counterpublic’s integration in more empirical ways than before. 
The studies that are presented in this thesis thus have to be seen against this backdrop of 
the networked public sphere and counterpublics and will focus on the outlined 
dimensions of integration. In the next chapter I will outline the case of climate change 




4. Climate Change Skepticism 
Climate change is not only a highly important and urgent issue, it is also an issue that 
has the potential to lead to a polarized public sphere with the ‘climate mainstream’ on 
the one and the ‘climate skeptics’ on the other side (Elgesem et al., 2015). Even though 
polarization is a potential problem for a plethora of issues, climate change is an 
especially important and, perhaps, unique case of polarization since a broad societal 
movement – both nationally and internationally – is needed to mitigate climate change 
and/or to adapt62 to its multiple consequences (Giddens, 2008; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-
Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007, p. 8ff.).63 Additionally, this polarization is also a demarcation 
between the scientific consensus that climate change is caused by humans on the one 
hand and the rejection of this consensus on the other (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, et al., 
                                                
62 Mitigation in this context refers mostly to the reduction of CO2 emissions in order to 
stop or lessen climate change, whereas adaptation refers to regional, national but also 
international efforts to adapt to climate change’s potential impact (e.g. temperature rise, 
extreme weather, rising sea levels, etc.) (Peters & Heinrichs, 2005, p. 203ff.). It is 
noteworthy that even though adaptation measures are nowadays seen as important 
aspect of climate change politics they were seen for some time in the 1990s and early 
2000s as “taboo” (Pielke, Prins, Rayner, & Sarewitz, 2007, p. 597). This, in part, may 
also be due to skeptics’ claims that mankind has always adapted to their surroundings 
and also can adapt to climate change (Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015). 
63 Reasons for political inaction may be: “fear of electoral protest, close relationship 
with industry […], a focus on economic growth, and the short-term priorities of 
government which are linked to its limited period in office.” (Lorenzoni et al., 2007, p. 
446) 
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2010; Cook et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013). It is against this background, that some climate 
scientists even grow tired of democracy as Stehr (2015) observes as they see democracy 
as being too slow to fight climate change appropriately.64 This radicalization may, to 
some extent, also refer to climate skeptics’ attempts to seed doubt and slow down 
political progress (Lockwood, 2010).  
In this context, the case of Germany is especially interesting. Whereas climate 
skepticism is more popular in the USA or Australia, skeptics are a small minority in 
Germany (Metag et al., 2015) and are rarely represented by the mass media 
(Grundmann & Scott, 2014). Online, however, they are able to voice their opinion in 
absence of the mass media’s gatekeeper and do so actively (Lörcher & Taddicken, 
2015). In the following, I will first define the label ‘skeptic’, then focus on the current 
research on climate skepticism with regard to their attitudes and what frames they use, 
to then propose that climate skeptics can be considered a counterpublic within the 
German networked public sphere. 
 
 
4.1 Terminology of Skepticism 
Before taking a closer look on the literature about climate skepticism it seems necessary 
to first take the discussion regarding the labeling of climate skepticism into account 
(e.g. Anderegg, Prall, & Harold, 2010; Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Grundmann, 2015; 
Howarth & Sharman, 2015; Jaspal, Nerlich, & van Vuuren, 2015; McCright, 2007; 
O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010; Rahmstorf, 2005; Van Rensburg, 2015).65 Indeed, the issue 
on how to refer to climate skeptics is a complicated one that is discussed on the 
scientific, political but also societal level and, as such, has the potential to even further 
the polarization of the different camps (Howarth & Sharman, 2015).  
Perhaps the most important aspect when talking about labeling societal groups is 
that these labels tend to be mostly over-generalizations that artificially unite a variety of 
different backgrounds under one ‘cause’ and, at the same time, suggest a clear 
separation between in- and out-group that, most likely, does not exist but may lead to 
                                                
64 Lavik (2015), for example, argues from a philosophical point of view that climate 
denial should be made illegal (see also Stehr (2015) for arguments against this idea and 
Schmidt (2015) for a more in-depth insight into the connection between moral and 
climate change).  
65 See for a an overview Howarth and Sharman (2015). 
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biases and prejudices (Galinsky, Hugenberg, Groom, & Bodenhausen, 2003; Sutton, 
2010). Additionally, the labels themselves can already be considered frames that signal 
a common identity or a clear position (Ferree et al., 2002b, pp. xv-xvi; Pan & Kosicki, 
2001). Howarth and Sharman (2015, p. 239, emphasis in original) thus add that labels 
“actively construct reality, rather than just reflect it”. 
Against this background, it seems necessary to present the more prominent labels 
that are being used to describe people who question climate change or that mankind is 
responsible for it. Indeed, as several authors would note, this description of skeptics is 
an oversimplification since the skeptic camp can be differentiated into several camps 
and being skeptical of one aspect does not mean that one is skeptical of another 
(Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Engels et al., 2013). Anderegg et al. (2010), for example, 
establish three types: the skeptic, the contrarian and the denier. Boykoff and O’Neill 
(O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010) are critical of these labels and echo the prominent remark 
that the positive connotation of ‘skeptic’ would imply that skeptics are skeptical in the 
scientific sense even though this is mostly not the case.66 The term contrarians in this 
context is a reference to McCright (2007) who understands contrarians as persons or 
groups who are extremely vocal about climate science and its consensus and have 
financial ties to conservative think tanks or the fossil fuel industry (O’Neill & Boykoff, 
2010). O’Neill and Boykoff (2010, p. E151) further emphasize that the term ‘denier’ 
which is used for people who deny climate change “inappropriately link[s] such views 
with Holocaust denial.” Victor (2014, p. 2ff.) also opposes the term denier and suggests 
industry shills (who get paid for seeding doubt), skeptics (scientists) and hobbyists 
(people who are active online, e.g. on Twitter or in the blogosphere) instead. From a 
public sphere perspective none of these terms – except skeptics – seem particularly 
inclusive. Whereas denier evokes offensive images, contrarians or shills presumes a 
monetary motive and hobbyists downplays the actors’ potential knowledge and 
involvement.  
Another method scholars use for understanding climate skepticism is through the 
identification of different strains of skepticism: Rahmstorf (2005), for example, 
distinguishes between trend, attribution and impact skepticism and thus emphasizes that 
                                                
66 Indeed, the insinuation that climate skeptics are skeptical about climate change or 
climate science in a scientific way, i.e. in an open-minded, evidence-driven and yet 
critical way, can be seen as the main problem for many with regards to the label skeptic. 
Torcello (2016, p. 3) in this context proposes to call it “pseudoskepticism” and argues 
that it is rather connected with “(a) ignorance of the scientific process and (b) 
ideologically motivated reasoning (as opposed to the exercise of faith).” 
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there are a) different camps and b) that there is a difference whether one questions 
climate change’s existence (trend), the anthropogenic aspect (attribute) or climate 
change’s impact. Engels et al. (2013) add the doubt about the so-called consensus 
between climate scientists which they call consensus skepticism. By keeping the 
skepticism in the term and further differentiating it, this approach seems more inclusive 
as the other terms mentioned above, since skeptics is both a self-description67 as well as 
an ascription. 
However, the skeptic side is only one of the two. Thus the question arises: how to 
call the other side, i.e. those who are convinced that climate change is happening and 
that mankind is responsible for global warming? Howarth and Sharman (2015, p. 244) 
note that skeptics have several names for the other side including “alarmist, warmist, 
believer or catastrophist.”68 Yet, these seem equally excluding as some of the labels 
mentioned above. One prominent label that is often used, and which refers mostly to the 
scientific consensus but also the societal backing, is the term ‘mainstream’ (Anderegg, 
Prall, Harold, et al., 2010; Engels et al., 2013; Howarth & Sharman, 2015; Neverla & 
Schäfer, 2012). Howarth and Sharman (2015, p. 245, emphasis in original) remark that 
mainstream is a classic example for self-labeling that “helps to see that the notion of a 
mainstream is problematic, as it not only fails to adequately specify who is captured 
within that mainstream, but it also immediately frames all those who disagree as an 
outsider.” However, this label is especially interesting from a public sphere and 
counterpublic theory point of view as it also signals the underlying power relations with 
a clear in- and out-group. 
The labels ‘climate skeptic’ and ‘mainstream’ are thus used throughout this thesis 
for several reasons: the term ‘skeptic’ is not only a self-description but – despite all the 
debate around it – is also used prominently in academia, politics and society. It can thus 
                                                
67 A climate skeptic German blog, for example, calls itself Science Skeptical. See also 
Hobson and Niemeyer (2013) for a more in-depth discussion of the skeptics’ self-
description. 
68 Indeed, Giddens (2008, p. 6) differentiates between three positions: “The battle 
between the sceptics and the main body of scientific opinion continues, with each 
tending to rubbish the other’s arguments. However, there is a further divergence of 
opinion today, between the mainstream and authors and researchers who think climate 
change poses even greater, and more urgent, threats than is ordinarily acknowledged. 
These, whom I shall call the “radicals”, argue that […] it is already too late to avoid 
dangerous climate change. We had best concentrate most of our energies preparing to 
adapt to it and cope as best we can.” Studies on the climate change discourse online, 
however, were not able to identify this third camp (Elgesem et al., 2015; Sharman, 
2014; Williams et al., 2015). 
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be considered the most integrative label when talking about skeptics. Additionally, it is 
also not inherently negative or condescending in its framing69 and thus not as excluding 
as denier or contrarian. And, finally, even though labels in general and more so in this 
case are controversial they also fulfill a generalizing function that allows further 
research of the public discourse (Ferree et al., 2002b, pp. xv-xvi). ‘Mainstream’, on the 




4.2 Current Research on Climate Skepticism 
Climate change skepticism is a prominent topic for scholars around the world70 that 
gained popularity over the last years and, as such, has been highlighted in different 
academic fields ranging from environmental sciences (Farmer & Cook, 2013), 
philosophy (Biddle & Leuschner, 2015), anthropology (Connor, 2010), sociology 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011b), political science (Corry & Jørgensen, 2015; Goeminne, 
2012), communication science (Schäfer, 2015a), economics (especially tourism studies; 
e.g. Hall et al. (2015)), educational studies (Legates, Soon, Briggs, & Monckton of 
Brenchley, 2013), criminology (Brisman, 2012) to psychology (Stoll-Kleemann, 
O’Riordan, & Jaeger, 2001).71 In this section, I want to focus on a communication 
science perspective72 and outline the current research on who is more likely to be a 
skeptic and where and how skeptic messages are framed and published in the ‘classical’ 
mass media and online media. These findings are imperative for the assumption in this 
thesis that skeptics can be considered a counterpublic in Germany. The following 
chapters thus focus on their attitudes and positions (4.2.1), their representation in the 
                                                
69 Even though it may be used that way. 
70 Even though most of the studies presented here stem from Europe, USA or America, 
there are some studies that focus on Brazil (Jylhä, Cantal, Akrami, & Milfont, 2016), 
China (Liu, 2015), Africa (Dorsey, 2007) or Russia (Forbes & Stammler, 2009). 
71 It has to be noted that the differentiation between disciplines, albeit somewhat 
artificial since some authors can be counted under more than one discipline, mostly 
refers to the journals or books the authors have published in.  
72 Research on climate change skepticism communication is in this sense a part of the 
bigger field of climate change communication. See for a general overview of climate 
change in the media Schäfer and Schlichting (2014) and for a more specific overview 
about online climate change communication Schäfer (2012). 
 59 




4.2.1 Who is a Climate Skeptic? 
As outlined above, the number of skeptics in a society differs from country to country, 
definition to definition, but also from survey to survey73. In the USA or Australia, for 
example, climate skepticism is more prevalent than in Germany or Central Europe 
(Engels et al., 2013; Metag et al., 2015). When Metag, Füchslin and Schäfer (2015), for 
example, replicated the well-known Global Warming’s Six Americas study 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Howe, 2013) they were not able to 
identify the most skeptic category ‘dismissive’. However, they identified 10 percent 
within their representative survey as ‘doubtful’ about climate change, whereas in the 
USA both the dismissive as well as the doubtful accounted for 13 percent each (Metag 
et al., 2015, p. 14). These findings regarding a low amount of skepticism in Germany 
are also in line with Engels et al. (2013) who wanted to know how prevalent trend, 
attribution, impact and consensus skepticism are in Germany. They found that 7 percent 
are skeptical about climate change, 5 percent about its impact, 7 percent about 
mankind’s role and 8 percent about the scientific consensus and added that “only 19% 
of respondents indicated ‘do not agree at all/somewhat disagree’ to one or more 
dimensions.” (Engels et al., 2013, p. 1023) 
However, the question who these skeptics actually are remains. The answer to this 
is especially well known for the USA where several studies have focused on the issue. 
Scholars were, in this respect, able to show that especially conservatives were more 
likely to be skeptical about climate change (Bliuc et al., 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011a). McCright, Dunlap and Marquart-Pyatt (2016) present in an analysis of 
                                                
73 One YouGov survey, for example, that was issued by the DPA (German Press 
Agency) in 2011 found that 27,5 percent of Germans do not believe in climate change 
and that an additional 15,4 percent were uncertain (questionnaire and results are 
available to me). The question, however, was phrased highly suggestive: “Do you 
actually believe in global warming after these two cold winters?” (original: Glauben Sie 
eigentlich nach den zwei kalten Wintern noch an die globale Erwärmung?) By 
emphasizing the cold winters and using the term ‘global warming’ in the same sentence 
it is almost surprising that only 27,5 percent of the respondents answered with ‘no’ and 
the numbers are hardly a robust indicator for the amount of climate skeptics in 
Germany. 
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Eurobarometer data similar results for Western Europe but not for Eastern Europe. In 
contrast, Engels et al. (Engels et al., 2013) could not find a connection between a 
conservative attitude and skepticism in their study for Germany but emphasize at the 
same time that German skeptics are more likely to oppose renewable energies. Some 
studies also identified a potential gender gap, i.e. that men are more likely to be skeptic 
than women (Engels et al., 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). In addition to a 
conservative stance, some studies were also able to establish a connection between 
climate skepticism and the support of the free market (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a) or 
the endorsement of conspiracy theories (Lewandowsky, Cook, et al., 2015; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2015). Matthews (2015) inquired in this context 
who is actually writing skeptic comments. He analyzed 154 comments by skeptics in a 
thread that asked for their background and found that skeptics differed in the degree of 
skepticism (lukewarm to strong) but also that the users who answered were highly 
educated (46% had an academic degree), ‘converted’ at some point to skepticism and 
were often politically motivated. 
As most of these results show climate skepticism is connected to more than just 
doubts about climate science but is rather rooted on a deeper, societal level and can be 
considered to be part of their identity.74 This is also echoed by Bliuc et al. (2015, p. 1) 
who then propose that the divide between skeptics and the mainstream cannot be 
explained by politics alone but rather by cultural polarization and a divide of identities 
and thus a “socio-political conflict.” These findings emphasize that climate skeptics are 
often in opposition to the mainstream and that climate skepticism is rooted in a deeper 




4.2.2 Climate Skepticism in the Mass Media 
Against this background it has to be asked where and how skeptics are presented in the 
public sphere. This question is closely connected to the concept of framing and, as such, 
several studies have taken a closer look at how climate change in general and climate 
                                                
74 Ojala (2015) remarks in this context that climate skeptic parents can also influence 
their children to be more skeptical. 
 61 
skepticism in specific is framed in the mass media, which impact journalistic routines75 
have but also which role journalists and other actors play (Boykoff, 2011; Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2004; Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Hornschuh, 2008; Rhomberg, 2012; 
Schäfer, 2015a; Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014). Schäfer (2015a, p. 854ff.) differentiates 
between four broad frames that are prominently used in the media by numerous actors: 
“anthropogenic climate change as a global problem”, “scientific uncertainty”, 
“economic development” and “ecological modernization”. Especially the frame of 
scientific uncertainty is interesting with regard to climate skepticism. Several studies76 
were able to show that it is heavily used by skeptics who see it as an opportunity to cast 
doubt on climate science “through the practice of interjecting and emphasizing 
controversy or disagreement among scientists” (Zehr, 2000, p. 90). Antilla (2005), for 
example, found that climate science was framed in the US reporting as “valid science”, 
“ambiguous cause or effects”, “uncertain” or “controversial”. However, the frame 
uncertain science has gradually lost its importance in the public debate (Schäfer, 2015a; 
Shehata & Hopmann, 2012).77 Schmid-Petri et al. (2015) adapted Rahmstorf’s 
differentiation of skepticism and identified that about 30 percent of the US coverage on 
climate change had skeptical elements. This finding is in line with a previous study by 
Painter and Ashe (2012). Schmid-Petri et al. (2015) also emphasize that even though 
outright denial of climate change has become less frequent, more subtle forms have 
become more prominent. These forms of skepticism, then, also need to be identified.  
Whereas climate skepticism is relatively prevalent in the mass media’s reporting 
in the USA, UK or Australia78, there are only few studies that took a closer look at 
skepticism in the German mass media coverage. Hornschuh (2008), for example, was 
                                                
75 Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) could show in a study on the US coverage on climate 
change that the journalistic routine of balanced reporting, i.e. giving both sides of the 
story an opportunity to voice their opinion, resulted in a skewed representation that 
suggested that climate skeptics are more prevalent in society and climate science than 
they actually were and that skeptic positions are equal to the expertise of climate 
scientists. 
76 See for example: Antilla (2005); Boykoff (2007); McCright and Dunlap (2000); 
Painter (2012); Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, and Pidgeon (2011); Zehr 
(2000). 
77 Boussalis and Coan (2016) note in their analysis of documents by skeptic think tanks 
that skepticism about climate science is getting more prominent over the years for 
skeptic public relations. This, then, may indicate that the mass media may have adapted 
to the climate skeptic PR and ignore their framing of the uncertain climate science. 
78 Painter (2013), for example, compared the climate change coverage in the USA, UK, 
Australia, France, India and Norway and found that the skeptic usage of the uncertainty 
frame was used the most in Australia and the USA. 
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able to find the uncertain science frame but also noted that it is barely used. Similarly, 
Grundmann (2007) compared the German and US coverage on climate change with 
regard to prominent skeptic actors and found that climate skepticism is more prominent 
in the USA whereas in Germany skeptic actors are almost non-existent. In a similar 
study, Grundmann and Scott (2014, p. 232) compared the coverage in the USA, France, 
UK and Germany and concluded that skeptics “are much more visible in the USA and 
France compared to Germany and the UK.” Lörcher and Taddicken (2015) took a closer 
look at the German mass media’s online coverage of climate change and whether there 
was doubt regarding climate change’s existence, mankind’s responsibility, impact 
evaluation and climate science’s uncertainty or trustworthiness but also concluded that 
skepticism is rare in the mass media’s reporting.  
This chapter shows that climate skeptics differ with regard to visibility from 
country to country. Since I am especially interested in Germany, it has to be noted that 
skeptics are almost not represented in the mass media. This, then, can be seen as another 
sign for the formation of a skeptic counterpublic outside of the mass media. However, 
up to now there has been no study that explicitly focused on the frames and their 
frequency in the German mass media. Consequently, this thesis will close that gap and 
look at how visible skeptic messages are in the mass media public sphere (see chapter 
6.3). As counterpublics have new opportunities to make their voices heard online, I will 
shed light on the current research on climate skepticism online in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.2.3 Climate Skepticism Online 
The research on climate skepticism online can broadly be differentiated between studies 
that employ network analysis in order to identify communities and how these are 
connected with each other (e.g. hyperlink or social web analysis) and studies that look 
where and how skeptics voice their opinion on climate change (e.g. comment sections, 
blogs or social web).  
Sharman (2014), for example, analyzed the linking practices of skeptic blogs 
according to their blogrolls and was able to identify three especially prominent blogs 
that mostly focus on climate science in the English-language climate discourse. She thus 
proposes that these blogs “are not only acting as translators between scientific research 
and lay audiences, but, in their reinterpretation of existing climate science knowledge 
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claims and critique of scientific institutions, are acting themselves as alternative public 
sites of expertise for a climate sceptical audience.” (Sharman, 2014, p. 167) In a similar 
study, Elgesem, Steskal and Diakopoulos (2015) looked at the communities English-
language climate blogs formed through hyperlinks and, in combination with a topic 
modeling analysis, which topics were discussed in theses communities. They were able 
to identify several communities, which only consisted of either skeptic or mainstream 
blogs (which they called ‘accepter’) and which mostly dealt with political issues. They 
only found one community that bridged this divide and in which the main topic dealt 
with climate science. The authors concluded that disagreement over climate politics 
seems to be more divisive than climate science. Both Williams et al. (2015) as well as 
Pearce et al. (2014) took a closer look at whether skeptics and the mainstream interacted 
with each other on Twitter and if so, how they interacted. Both studies showed that 
Twitter users mostly interacted with like-minded users and that the climate discourse on 
Twitter is also highly polarized. However, both studies were also able to find small 
communities in which exchanges across the gap happened and where skeptics and 
mainstream users interacted. 
Although Jang and Hart (2015) used Twitter as a research object, too, they were 
more interested in the issue frames that were used in tweets regarding climate change. 
In their analysis of 5.7 million Tweets from American, British, Canadian and Australian 
users which were collected over two years, they were able to show that climate 
skepticism is not only more prevalent in conservative regions but also that skeptics 
favored using the term ‘global warming’ over ‘climate change’. Hellsten and 
Vasileiadou (2015, p. 603) took a closer look at the event dubbed Climategate and were 
able to identify how blogs set the agenda of the mass media, but whereas blogs framed 
the case as scientific fraud the mass media mostly described it as a “smear campaign of 
science”. In an analysis of user comments on tabloid sites before and after Climategate, 
Koteyko, Jaspal and Nerlich (2013) showed how climate science, which before was a 
side topic, was then one of the most discussed issues and closely connected to skeptic 
frames such as scientific uncertainty or the politicization of climate science. In a similar 
study the same authors identified three major themes in the skeptic comments that dealt 
with disparaging climate scientists and science, denying mainstream users legitimacy 
due to faulty science and suggesting that climate science had shady and financial 
motives (Jaspal, Nerlich, & Koteyko, 2013). 
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In an analysis of German user comments, Lörcher and Taddicken (2015, p. 276) 
found that climate skepticism is prevalent in the comment sections of the mass media, a 
weather forum and a skeptic blog but differs from site to site. Whereas on Spiegel 
Online and Wetter Online the perception of climate change is mostly accepted, i.e. users 
stand for the mainstream position, climate science is seen more ambivalently. On the 
skeptic site, Eike and on Welt.de comments are even more skeptical about climate 
science. The two sites differ with regard to the perception of climate change: where 
Welt.de is ambivalent about its existence and mankind’s influence, Eike is more 
skeptical. However, they conclude that climate skepticism is not as prevalent as other 
studies would suggest (Lörcher & Taddicken, 2015, p. 278). Assuming that users who 
read some of these comments and other user-generated content, Porten-Chée and 
Eilders (2015) wanted to know if German skeptics who monitored these debates were 
more likely to voice their opinion than others. However, this was not the case and, 
indeed, “individuals who viewed themselves as part of the minority were even more 
willing to speak out in public than those who viewed themselves as part of the 
majority.” (Porten-Cheé & Eilders, 2015, p. 149) 
When taking these findings into account it becomes obvious that the Internet 
helped skeptics in finding alliances, getting their voice heard but also in setting the mass 
media’s agenda. It is also evident, however, that climate skepticism in Germany is an 
under-researched field. In the next chapter, I will propose that climate skeptics can be 
considered their own counterpublic in Germany. 
 
 
4.3 Climate Skeptics as a Counterpublic in Germany 
As the last chapters have shown climate skepticism in Germany is –in comparison to 
other countries– relatively rare. Indeed, skeptics are neither very present in polls nor in 
the mass media’s reporting on climate change and it is telling that Porten-Chée and 
Eilders (2015) mostly refer to them as minority and not as skeptics in their study. But 
studies from other countries show – and Lörcher and Taddicken’s (2015) suggest that 
this is also the case for Germany – that skeptics are highly active and, for example, 
establish own blogs and create a community around their climate skeptic identity, but 
also post on social media platforms like Twitter and are especially vocal in the comment 
sections of the mass media and climate blogs. 
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The question however remains as to whether skeptics can be considered a 
counterpublic in Germany. Admittedly, understanding the phenomenon of climate 
skepticism as a counterpublic seems problematic at first sight as counterpublics are 
regarded as being closely connected with social movements that fight for acceptance, 
visibility and inclusion, i.e. counterpublics are mostly understood to have an 
emancipatory character and are thus mostly seen positively in the literature. Yet, against 
the background of Downey and Fenton’s (2003) proposal that counterpublics should 
also extend to radical groups and recent demands that the public sphere should be seen 
from a more functionalist and less normative perspective (Rauchfleisch & Kovic, in 
press), I propose that climate skeptics can be considered a counterpublic. Indeed, 
German skeptics are a minority in Germany that is excluded from the mass media and 
thus are not part of the broad public discourse. In addition, they have established 
alternative media in which they can voice their opinion without potentially being 
excluded by members from the mainstream. 
However, I also suggest that even though these arguments point towards skeptics 
being a counterpublic this has also to be tested empirically on several levels. In the 
following, I will divide the overarching research question in this thesis into three more 
concise research questions and describe how these will be answered empirically. 
 
 
5. Interim Conclusion, Research Questions & Methods 
The networked public sphere is a complex theoretical concept that describes how 
numerous publics are connected to each other through the structural means of the 
Internet. It highlights the potential for new communities, which can form around issues 
or platforms, for information diffusion through network ties as well as online debates 
and for agenda setting processes that circumvent the mass media altogether or influence 
it. At the same time, however, the networked public sphere is not to be seen as a 
replacement of the mass media public sphere but rather as a further development that 
connects new publics with ‘old’ ones. It thus emphasizes the mass media’s relevance for 
the public sphere but also posits that it is not the only visible and influential public 
sphere anymore. In this context I introduce counterpublic theory to propose that 
counterpublics can also be theoretically integrated in the networked public sphere but 
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have to be understood as specific publics that have to be identified both theoretically as 
well as empirically.  
Against this background, my overarching research question regarding the 
integration of counterpublics is situated. Integration is operationalized here as similarity 
of discourses, connectivity and collective identity (Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2010). By 
using these three dimensions I am able to highlight the “agonistic” (Mouffe, 1999) 
struggle between mainstream and counterpublic on several levels and shed light on the 
difficult relationship between mainstream and counterpublic. 
As a next step I present climate skepticism in Germany as a highly relevant and 
peculiar case that can be analyzed through the lens of counterpublic theory and that it is 
lacking in research. Counterpublic theory in this context is an especially interesting way 
to understand the debate between mainstream and skeptics since counterpublic theory 
does not frame it as an issue of deliberation or knowledge/ignorance but rather as a 
social conflict between different sides against the background of “structural diversities 
and dominant consensus structures of public spheres as a whole” (Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015, p. 483). Whereas other studies often looked for diverse comments and a 
reciprocal debate this theoretical background also allows the interpretation of the 




In a first step it seems essential to understand which role climate skeptics play within 
the German online discourse on climate change. The underlying assumption here is that 
if climate skeptics are truly a counterpublic the exclusion mechanisms that were visible 
in other studies (Elgesem et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2015) should also be visible –or 
perhaps even more so– in the German case where climate skeptics are not part of the 
‘classical’ public sphere. Nuernbergk (2013), for example, could show that 
counterpublic blogs often posted to the mass media but the mass media rarely linked to 
the counterpublic blogs, thus signaling their exclusion. In order to analyze how well 
integrated climate skeptics are with regard to what Kleinen-von Königslöw (2010) calls 
connectivity I propose to conduct a hyperlink network analysis to understand how 
climate skeptic websites and blogs are connected to each other and the mainstream 
climate sites. I thus want to answer the following questions:  
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RQ1: How is the German climate change online discourse structured and what 
role do climate skeptics play in it? Can we observe, for example, patterns 
of fragmentation or polarization? 
 
In a next step it seems necessary to take a closer look at the mass media. As it was 
noted in chapter 4.2 a systematic frame analysis of the German mass media’s climate 
reporting is lacking up to now. However, the framing of an issue is essential for a 
similar discourse and the baseline for a counterpublic’s identity (Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2010; Nuernbergk, 2013; Snow & Benford, 1992; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). 
Additionally, the mass media can still be considered to be one of the most influential 
publics within the networked public sphere but, at the same time, could also be more 
open for counterpublic voices due to the Internet’s gatewatching and agenda setting 
processes (Hellsten & Vasileiadou, 2015; Nuernbergk, 2013; Wimmer, 2012). By 
looking for climate skeptic frames within the mass media I am thus looking for an 
empirical foundation for taking a closer look at the discourses’ similarity (Kleinen-von 
Königslöw, 2010). In the second paper I am thus interested in: 
 
RQ2: What climate skeptic frames can be identified in the German mass 
media’s reporting on climate change and how prominent are these? 
 
In a final step it seems necessary to focus primarily on the climate skeptics 
themselves. Whereas in the first paper the main question deals with their structural 
connectivity within the online discourse and the second focuses on skeptic frames in the 
mass media’s coverage, the third should take the places climate skeptics ‘go’ to online 
into consideration, whether they stay on skeptic sites or also argue and interact outside 
their potential echo chambers. Since several studies showed that skeptics are especially 
active in the comment sections and Lörcher and Taddicken’s (2015) study was based on 
a somewhat close definition of climate skepticism and limited with regard to the amount 
of analyzed comment sections, a further and in-depth content analysis of comment 
sections seems necessary. When keeping Kleinen-von Königslöw’s (2010) dimensions 
of similarity of discourses, connectivity and collective identity in mind the analysis of 
the online comments should be focusing on the visibility of skeptics in different 
comment sections and the skeptical frames they use. This is regarded necessary since it 
has already been shown that not all skeptics are skeptical about the same things. Finally, 
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the question is if and how mainstream users react to skeptics. The third research 
question is: 
 
RQ3 How visible are climate skeptics online in the comment sections of the 
German mass media and several climate blogs? What frames do they use 
and how do users from the mainstream react to them? 
 
Paper Focus Method Dimension(s) of 
integration 
Alliance of Antagonism - Structural 
connection 
- Hyperlink network 
analysis 
- Connectivity 
Questioning the Doubt - Framing - Explorative 
qualitative content 
analysis 
- Similarity of 
discourses 










- Similarity of 
discourses 
- Connectivity 
- Collective Identity 




To tackle these research questions and the overarching question regarding the 
integration of counterpublics in the networked public sphere, several methods will be 
combined (see Table 3). The first question will be answered with a hyperlink network 
analysis to identify communities and calculate centrality metrics to identify possible 
fragmentation or polarization effects (Halavais, 2008; Park, 2003; Vincent, Jean-Loup, 
Renaud, & Etienne, 2008). This is a well-known method in the information sciences 
that also grew in popularity in the communication sciences over the last few years 
(Nuernbergk, 2013, p. 327ff.). The second question, on the other hand, will be answered 
with a qualitative-explorative content analysis to identify emphasis frames. These 
frames consist of several so-called ‘idea elements’ which can be considered the smallest 
unit within a frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; see also chapter 6.3.3). This is a 
popular method within sociology and communication science to identify frames within 
public communication which can then be used for a quantitative analysis (Ferree et al., 
2002b; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006; Rhomberg & Kaiser, 2015). Consequently, to answer 
the third question a qualitative-quantitative analysis based on the identified frames will 
be conducted to show frequencies as well as statistical correlations that allow for more 
 69 
general inferences about the relationship between the frame usage, the users and the 
comment sections (Diekmann, 2010; Früh, 2015; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). 
By using digital methods as well as qualitative and quantitative methods this 
thesis aims to unveil the structural network context, the qualitative content aspect as 
well as the actual frequency and structural discourse patterns and to show how these are 
connected to each other (Franke & Wald, 2006; Lindner, 2010). By using this multi-
method approach to analyze the skeptic counterpublic’s integration in the networked 
public sphere I am also able to contribute to the debates surrounding echo chambers in 
the public sphere. But whereas most studies only looked at the structural connection (or 
lack of) this thesis takes several layers into account (i.e. hyperlinks, frame usage, user 
visibility, interaction). In the next step I will present the three case studies that were 
conducted based on these assumptions. 
 
 
6. Case Studies 
The case studies that I will present here are structured around the research questions 
outlined above. The first study will focus on the German climate online discourse based 
on a hyperlink network analysis. The second will focus on the skeptic frames that are 
used in the German mass media. And the third will then look for climate skepticism in 
several comment sections of the mass media and climate blogs. 
 
 
6.1 Study: Alliance of Antagonism: Counterpublics and Polarisation 
in the German Online Climate Change Discourse79 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Climate change is a controversial and even polarizing issue for many reasons. There is 
no single political solution for tackling climate change and its associated challenges, 
and it is unclear what economic consequences a solution may entail, or whether it is 
                                                
79 This study was conducted and written together with Cornelius Puschmann. 
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scientifically wiser to adapt to global warming incrementally, or attempt to mitigate it 
altogether. The notion that climate change is a dangerous and consequently urgent issue 
that threatens society is increasingly accepted internationally (Schmidt et al., 2013). 
Consequently, political parties, grassroots activist organizations, charities, companies, 
as well as scientific and religious institutions, fight climate change on a local, national, 
and transnational level. And yet there is a vocal minority within both the global and 
national climate discourses that questions climate change or even denies its existence – 
so-called ‘climate skeptics’. This is even more prominent online where skeptics are able 
to form communities in which they can validate and strengthen each other’s opinions 
and arguments. Even though much is known about the skeptics’ framing of climate 
change, their demographics and industry ties, there is presently little research on their 
standing within society and the types of coalitions that skeptics form (e.g. Elgin, 2015; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2000). This, too, holds true for climate discourse in general, which 
is shaped by the actors mentioned above, all of whom aim to make their voices heard in 
the public sphere in order to define how climate change is discussed (Anderson, 2009). 
To fully understand conflicting framings of the same issue, a structural perspective is 
needed, since it enables us to identify different factions, as well as to see the tension 
between mainstream and outlier positions. In this paper we accordingly focus on the 
overarching research question: How is online climate change discourse structured? 
Since this question is relatively broad, we focus on the case of the German-
language climate change discourse and conduct a hyperlink network analysis that allows 
us to identify coalitions, associations, and opponents within it. We combine this 
approach with a content analysis which allows us a more confident interpretation of the 
network’s structure. We choose this specific case for several reasons: it offers us both a 
national and a transnational perspective (Germany, Austria and Switzerland); there 
exists a broad consensus within these countries that climate change is happening, 
consequently a wide range of involved actors acknowledge climate change as such but 
disagree on potential counter-measures; and, additionally, the climate skeptic groups 
constitute in our reading constitute counterpublics. Accordingly, our overarching 





RQ1: What is the relationship between the ‘mainstream’ public sphere(s) and 
the climate skeptic counterpublic with regards to reciprocity and 
inclusion? 
 
RQ2: What is the relationship between different kinds of actors and topics with 
regards to clusters and potential coalitions? 
 
By answering these questions we will both offer an insight into the highly 
polarized German-language climate discourse and describe a particular national debate, 




6.1.2 Climate Change and the Internet 
Since climate change is an abstract and complex issue that we cannot experience 
directly, we are highly dependent on information and opinions received through the 
mass media and online sources (Schäfer, 2012). Consequently, the public debate on 
climate change is hotly contested as there is not only a debate between actors from 
different societal fields who want to promote their respective positions (Anderson, 
2009). As information is a key resource in these debates, significant research focuses on 
the involved actors, the messages they are trying to send, how they are represented by 
the media and, more recently, how these actors are connected with each other. 
Climate scientists in particular enjoy a questionable prominence within the 
climate discourse as both their work as well as their private lives are frequently under 
public scrutiny. When e-mails by climate scientists were leaked right before a climate 
summit in 2009 – an incident dubbed ‘Climategate’ – journalists and skeptics were 
quick to cast climate research in doubt, though no evidence for scientific misconduct 
could be found (Grundmann, 2012). The role of climate scientists within politics, 
however, and if, where and how actively they communicate online, interact with 
journalists or if they donate to environmental causes are still aspects of academic 
interest (e.g. Bromley-Trujillo, Stoutenborough, & Vedlitz, 2015). In his meta-analysis 
on climate change communication online Schäfer (2012: 3) concludes that “climate 
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scientists and scientific institutions from the field do not seem to be the major players in 
online climate communication.” 
This stands in stark contrast to the way non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
utilize the new opportunities the internet offers to them with regards to different 
channels, ways of campaigning, potential national and transnational alliances and a 
wide reach to inform and mobilize users (e.g. Ackland & Gibson, 2004; Shumate & 
Dewitt, 2008). Politicians, on the other hand, seem to prefer conventional modes of 
communication when talking about climate change. And yet little is known regarding 
politicians’ online communication on climate change (Schäfer, 2012). Hyperlink studies 
show that governmental actors tend to link among each other and disregard other 
societal fields. Elgin (2015), for example, found that particular institutions tend to 
preferentially link within their own field, forming distinct clusters. As we will argue, 
establishment and counterpublic differ markedly in their make-up of actors, with the 
establishment cluster dominated by institutions and the counterpublic cluster dominated 
by individuals and small, loosely-knit groups.  
 
 
6.1.3 The Online Public Sphere and Counterpublics 
The theoretical concept of the public sphere has been shown to be an especially useful 
framework since it allows for a normative evaluation, a descriptive analysis of 
communication relationships online, and can be productively combined with hyperlink 
network analysis (Benkler, 2006; Papacharissi, 2002; Rogers, 2002). The internet has 
reinvigorated the idea of a virtual space which has the potential to empower the civil 
society and give previously excluded minorities a voice (Dahlberg, 2011; Downey & 
Fenton, 2003). 
Classical conceptualizations of the public sphere strongly rely on the work of 
Jürgen Habermas who proposes the need for a strong civil society, for an alert mass 
media, and a critical counterpublic so that a working public sphere can be created and a 
public opinion can be formed (Habermas, 2006[1962], 2008b). Albeit Habermas’ work 
is still seen as inspiration for many online scholars, the idea of what constitutes a public 
sphere has been critically revised. Whereas classic public sphere concepts tried to 
conceptualize the relationship between politics, mass media and civil society and 
focused on the political public sphere (e.g. Fraser, 1990; Habermas, 2006[1962]; Peters, 
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1993) more recent attempts define the public sphere as an amalgam of communication 
on different platforms with shifting roles and interaction among actors from various 
societal fields (e.g. Benkler, 2006; Neuberger, 2014; Papacharissi, 2002). 
The online public sphere, often times also called networked public sphere 
(Benkler, 2006; Nuernbergk, 2014), emphasizes the network character of the internet 
and its influence on all societal actors, the mode of communication and traditional 
understanding of roles (Neuberger, 2014). As Benkler et al. (2015, p. 3) point out, the 
networked public sphere describes “the range of practices, organizations, and 
technologies that have emerged from networked communication as an alternative arena 
for public discourse, political debate, and mobilization alongside, and in interaction 
with, traditional media.” For Boyd, networked publics “are simultaneously (1) the space 
constructed through networked technologies and (2) the imagined collective that 
emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice.” (2010, p. 
39) The authors both emphasize the network’s social dimension as well as its 
technological basis. Consequently, it is now widely acknowledged that there is not one 
public sphere but rather multiple publics – some smaller, some larger, some local, some 
transnational – that are (loosely) connected and have the potential to influence each 
other (e.g. Bakshy, Rosenn, Marlow, & Adamic, 2012; Chadwick, 2011).  
One major point of criticism about the classic public sphere concept deals with the 
exclusion of minorities or unpopular opinions and the possible formation of a 
counterpublic (Downey & Fenton, 2003; Fraser, 1990; Mouffe, 1999). Since these 
groups are excluded from and/or do not want to be heard in the public sphere they 
retreat to a safe space where they can voice their opinions, exchange arguments and 
build a counterpublic of their own that stands in stark contrast to the hegemonic public 
sphere. Since counterpublics touch upon questions of polarisation and fragmentation 
(Habermas, 2008b) one major question deals with the counterpublic’s identity and its 
value for democracy. Counterpublics are often reduced to minorities that seek to change 
society and democracy for the better, but are not represented in the public debate (e.g. 
Chávez, 2011; Dahlberg, 2011; Fraser, 1990). However, problematic movements like 
Neonazi and other radical groups also seek representation in public discourse, despite 
their opposition to democracy (Cammaerts, 2009; Downey & Fenton, 2003; Toepfl & 
Piwoni, 2015). We consequently propose that counterpublics do not only include 
progressive social movements but also potentially problematic movements. But as Asen 
(Asen, 2000, p. 426) points out, it is instrumental not to confuse a multiplicity of 
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publics with counterpublics. In this paper, we consequently understand a counterpublic 
as an (1) issue-specific public since publics often form around issues (Benkler et al., 
2015, p. e.g. ) that (2) opposes the hegemonic view and is (3) excluded by the 
mainstream and/or (4) excludes itself from the mainstream in favor of an enclave. We 
will next discuss whether climate skepticism can be considered a counterpublic. 
 
 
6.1.4 Climate ‘Skepticism’ and its Potential as a Counterpublic 
The rift between ‘skeptics’ and what we will call ‘mainstream’ in the remainder of this 
paper has been the topic of several studies (for a summary Howarth & Sharman, 2015). 
It has, for example, been shown that skeptics are usually politically more conservative 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011b), tend to be more open for conspiracy theories 
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, et al., 2015), adapt their narratives quickly according to 
ongoing events (Lewandowsky, Risbey, & Oreskes, 2015), are not only questioning 
climate change itself but also climate science (Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015) and that some 
skeptical think tanks have ties to energy companies (McCright & Dunlap, 2000).  
A central point of contention when talking about climate skepticism is the 
terminology itself. Naturally, ‘skepticism’ is something positive; especially in science 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Consequently, some scholars are hesitant in calling ‘skeptics’ as 
such and prefer terms like contrarians or deniers (Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015, p. 3). Even 
though we agree with Howarth and Sharman (2015) that labeling a position is 
problematic we are in line with Kaiser and Rhomberg (2015) who argue that the term 
‘skeptics’ seems to be the most inclusive and less offending label. In the same vein we 
will use the term ‘mainstream’ for the other side of the debate which agrees upon the 
findings of the IPCC and whom the skeptics prefer to label deprecatingly as ‘alarmist’. 
But can climate skeptics be considered a counterpublic? According to Asen’s 
(2000, p. 427) reminder that counterpublics also have to recognize their exclusion and 
articulate it in a way this, naturally, differs from country to country. In the USA, for 
example, climate skepticism is more popular within the public and among conservative 
politicians than in Germany, where the Green party is a major political force (e.g. 
Boykoff, 2011; Engels et al., 2013). In the German-language climate discourse which 
includes Germany, Austria and Switzerland climate skepticism is almost invisible – at 
least in the media (e.g. Brunnengräber, 2013; Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015). But as 
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Lörcher and Taddicken (2015) point out, skeptics are more active online. Since we 
understand counterpublics as (1) issue-specific and (2) opposing the hegemonic view 
we tend to understand skeptics in the German language networked public sphere as a 
counterpublic. However, we also define counterpublics as (3) excluded by the 
mainstream and/or (4) by themselves in favor of an enclave. But as we are not able to 
test these two factors theoretically, we will test them empirically in this analysis. 
 
 
6.1.5 Hyperlink Networks as Indicators for Polarization and Counterpublics 
Contested issues such as climate change lend themselves particularly well to the 
function of an ideological dividing line, with a faction on each side of the issue. Many 
studies of blogging have been concerned with community formation, that is, with how 
individuals who are otherwise unacquainted become involved in discussions with each 
other, and with how these individuals express their group identity (Adamic & Glance, 
2005; Huffaker & Calvert, 2005). The potential of blogs for supporting broader public 
deliberation of societal issues has also been widely discussed in the literature, with 
mixed conclusions (Koop & Jansen, 2009; McKenna & Pole, 2004; Wright, 2012). 
Several authors argue that the participating of bloggers in debates on climate change 
influences not only the public agenda, but may impact the mainstream media as well 
(Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). 
Due to their decentralized and informal nature, social media mesh well with the 
values and organizational needs of both individuals and grassroots social movements 
that operate outside the political mainstream (Castells, 2004). In a hallmark study of 
polarization in political blogs, Adamic and Glance (2005) were able to characterize the 
behavior of the two camps, finding that conservatives linked to each other more 
frequently and in a denser pattern. They conclude that they encountered a “divided 
blogosphere” (p. 43), with the likelihood of bloggers from each faction linking to site 
from the other faction considerably lower than external links. Marlow (2004) argues 
that links between blogs act as a proxy to social structure, and that blogroll links in 
particular are indicators of popularity and allegiance, while permalinks reflect influence 
more closely. And Ackland and O’Neil (2011) find compelling evidence that hyperlink 
structures correlate with discourse frames in a social network study of 161 
environmental organizations’ homepages. 
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The majority of studies that examine blog discourse using a network analysis 
approach base their assessments on hyperlink data taken from within posts. Frequently 
that data is scraped from blogs automatically using software to facilitate and scale up 
the data collection process. Lists of links manually curated by website owners 
(blogrolls; cf. Bross, Hennig, Berger, & Meinel, 2010) are often excluded from these 
analyses, and there is also a surprising paucity of discussion in the scholarly literature as 
to their function. McKenna and Pole (2004) trace the origins of blogrolls to 
programmers linking to each other’s online journals in the late 1990s, when 
standardized software for publishing blogs was not widespread and such link exchanges 
functioned as a gift and recognition culture. Marlow (2004) argues that that blogroll 
links should be interpreted as explicit signs of endorsement. For Koop and Jansen 
(2009) blogrolls are indicative of more long-term and ideological allegiances, rather 
than ephemeral signals that identify informative resources which play a role in relation 
short-term issues only. Conversely, both Ackland and Gibson (2004), and Adamic and 
Glance (2005) take on a more negative view, remarking that blogroll links have a 
tendency to become stale, in contrast to ‘fresh’ permalinks used in a blog post, which 
are considered to be more up to date, and accordingly characterize ongoing 
communicative interaction more reliably that blogrolls do. The authors suggest that 
more current discourse is better captured by post hyperlinks, rather than blogrolls. Blog 
rolls appear to be less suitable for studies of ongoing communication on particular 
individual issues, but should act as reliable indicators of ideological allegiances between 
active contributors to the well-established online debate on climate change by virtue of 
their comparable longevity. Sites that act as resources without themselves contributing 
are absent from our data, as are sites that appear only on a selective set of issues for a 
short time, but are not regularly involved in climate change debates. What we retain is 
therefore a core graph of actors in German-language climate change discourse.  
 
 
6.1.6 Data and Methods 
Our study consists of a content analysis of websites and a network analysis of the 
hyperlinks that connect them. The dataset was compiled manually in July 2015 
following links on websites’ blogrolls, using snowball sampling. As the initial starting 
point, four German climate blogs were chosen based on previous research on the 
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German-language climate discourse (e.g. Krauss, 2012; Lörcher & Taddicken, 2015).80 
We only added websites that were included in a site’s blogroll or link list but restricted 
ourselves to (1) German-language sites, that (2) had a blogroll or link list and dealt with 
(3) climate to some extent (indicated by a tag, the site’s (sub-)title, or the title of a 
recent post). A manual approach was chosen because web crawlers have limitations 
with regard to counting false positives (e.g. traffic counters from scripts) as regular 
links. Manual collection also seemed more appropriate for our research questions, 
which stress the roles of links as an instrument for signaling affiliation. By following 
links from the website science-skeptical.de we arrived at a network initially consisting 
of 9,871 nodes connected by 16,608 edges which also included the other three starting 
points. We then filtered this network to include only those nodes with at least one 
reciprocal connection with another node. The resulting network consists of 257 nodes 
connected by 985 edges. Despite filtering in the described fashion, the filtered graph is 
still directed, as not all connections within the graph are reciprocal. We consider mutual 
blogroll or linklist links to be a particularly salient indicator that the blog or site is a 
participant in the wider online debate on climate change, in contrast to a resource that is 
widely linked without contributing actively. Many sites with a relevance to climate 
change issues, but without an active role in the debate, such as the website of the IPCC 
and Wikipedia, fall within this category. Filtering allowed us to focus on those actors 
that actively contribute to the discourse and that are recognized by others as doing so, 
which we believe suggests their overall relevance to public debate on climate change. It 
also reduced the size of the graph to a level that facilitates both visual inspection and 
manual classification. 
After filtering, we proceeded by coding the websites in the dataset by the 
following properties: topic (the major and overarching topic of the website/blog as 
identified by the header, sidebar, and keywords provided), the site’s stance (whether the 
site qualified as mainstream, skeptical or undefined/unclear in its position on climate 
change) and who the content creators behind the sites are. The analysis was carried out 
by two coders (Krippendorff’s alpha for all categories >= .9). In what follows, we 
compare the network graph to a randomly generated network to contextualize its 
properties, then discuss its characteristics and point out three relevant clusters within the 
                                                
80  These sites were two climate skeptic blogs (eike-klima-energie.eu; science-
skeptical.de) and two mainstream blogs (klima-der-gerechtigkeit.de; 
globalklima.blogspot.de). 
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network. Finally, we examine the relation of actors, topics and stance towards climate 
per the content analysis and relate this to the network structure.  
 
 
6.1.7 Results: Comparison of the Climate Network with a Random Graph 
A challenge when analyzing network data is that any statistical comparison requires a 
baseline. In order to evaluate the macro-level structural properties of a network, 
presenting it side by side with other examples can be illustrative. In the following, we 
conduct a comparison of the climate website network with a simulated graph that has a 
number of nodes and edges similar to the empirical network. The direct comparison 
reveals the degree of polarization present in the empirical network compared to one that 
is shaped purely by structural properties determined by an algorithm that determines its 
shape (see Figure 1 for both graphs). We generate the random graph via the Erdős-
Rényi model (ER), calculated via the igraph library for R (cf. Csardi & Nepusz, 2006). 
While fitting is required for any algorithm to approximate an empirical network, we 
present a probabilistic network to provide an analytical baseline to which the climate 
network graph can be compared.  
 
 
Figure 1: Climate website network graph (left) and Erdős-Rényi random graph (right), both 
with 257 nodes and 985 edges. Blue nodes represent climate ‘mainstream’ websites, red 
nodes represent climate ‘skeptical’ sources. Circles represent individuals, squares 
represent institutions. See Table 1 for full network statistics 
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Visual inspection of the empirical climate network together with the ER graph 
highlights a number of properties that are relevant to its characterization (see Table 4). 
The two graphs differ markedly in their mean distance and diameter, with the empirical 
network exhibiting much higher values for both metrics. The degree distribution of the 
two graphs also differs, with the climate network exhibiting considerable skew, and a 
higher global clustering coefficient. The perhaps most notable attribute of the blog 
network is its level of polarization, reflected structurally by three distinct clusters 
connected by a small number of bridging nodes with high betweenness centrality. Hu, 
Thulasiraman, and Verma (2013) propose a polarization score calculated by subtracting 
the mean betweenness centrality from the maximum betweenness centrality of the graph 
and dividing the result by the mean. The resulting polarization score is considerably 
greater for the website graph, with the random ER graph trailing far behind. 
 











257 985 2 3 6.23 17 .27 11.71 
random 
network 
257 985 4 4 4.19 9 .03 2.23 
Table 4: Core network statistics for the climate change website network and for the 
simulated graph. Nodes, edges and diameter represent absolute counts, indegree and 
outdegree are median values, all other figures represent mean values 
 
The degree distributions of the graphs further illustrates their respective 
differences and the non-random characteristics of the climate network graph (see Figure 
2). The ER graph has a normal degree distribution as a result of its random assignment 
of edges, i.e. for most nodes the number of edges is close to the mean. This sets it apart 
from many empirical networks that have heavy distribution tails. The climate website 
graph has a left-skewed distribution that reflects a few sites with very high degree, 






Figure 2: Histogram of degree distributions in the website graph (light red) and the Erdős-
Rényi random graph (light blue) 
 
Examining the degree distributions in concert with the local clustering coefficient 
distributions of the four networks further emphasizes the high level of polarization in 
the climate network. The website graph exhibits an essentially flat distribution curve 
and a far greater range of clustering coefficients (see Figure 3). The ER has what 
resembles a power law distribution, with very few sites exhibiting a high degree of 
clustering, while most nodes have a low local clustering coefficient. 
Like a citation graph, the climate network superficially has properties similar to a 
scale-free network in terms of its degree and clustering coefficient distribution, but 
different in respect to its high degree of polarization. What is more, assortatively its 
clusters form along the mainstream-skeptical line as well as in relation to a homophily 
among similar types of actors (scientific organizations, NGOs, public institutions, 




Figure 3: Density plot of the local clustering coefficient distributions in the website graph 
(light red) and the Erdős-Rényi random graph (light blue) 
 
 
6.1.8 Results: Centralization and Assortativity of the Climate Network 
In the following, we discuss the climate website network’s meso-level properties 
together with the results of the content analysis in more detail (see Tables 4 and 5, as 
well as Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the relation of climate ‘mainstream’ (blue) and 
climate ‘skeptical’ (red) websites. Circles represent individuals, while squares represent 
institutions like the Federal Environmental Agency or the German Aerospace Center 
(DLR). The graph reveals not only a polarization along the climate change mainstream 
and skeptical stance divisions, but also internal divisions in the mainstream section 
(upper left and upper part of the graph). While the largest cluster in the upper left 
section consists largely of institutions (science organisations, political parties, 
government institutions, NGOs), the slightly smaller upper cluster consists of a mixture 
of grass-roots NGOs and small, informal groups. The tendency for websites to associate 
themselves with other sites of the same faction or actor type is statistically reflected in 
the network’s assortativity in relation to these variables (Newman, 2002). While a site’s 
topic is non-assortative (0.02), the website network is both strongly assortative for 
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faction (0.46) and actor type (0.43), while the random graph is close to zero on both 
counts (0.04 and -0.02).  
In Figure 1, the upper cluster in the website graph is the climate activist cluster. It 
is characterized by climate change activists who band together in local initiatives 
opposed to issues such as coal mining, nuclear power or power grid expansion. Several 
of the blogs within the cluster promote climate camps in order to inform and mobilize 
citizens. Moreover, the cluster is politically left-leaning, with ties to the Green Party, the 
German left party Die Linke but also to the politically radical Antifa movement. This 
cluster is remarkable compared to the remainder of the mainstream faction due its 
combination of radical leftist as well as more moderately civil society and political 
parties banding together for the common cause of environmental protection.  
 
Table 5: Network statistics and centrality metrics for groups of actors (a) and stances (b) 
 
Climate network Nodes Indegree Outdegree Weighted 
Degree 
Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector 
..by actor type 
(assortativity: 0.43) 
       
individual 60 3.32 4.02 7.33 5.04 633.14 0.09 
group 19 6.47 4.79 11.26 4.86 2203.24 0.17 
individual scientist 6 1.50 1.50 3.00 6.36 156.72 0.01 
scientific organization 40 5.78 5.12 10.90 5.44 1351.11 0.30 
political party 5 2.40 5.00 7.40 4.65 308.99 0.03 
government 31 4.03 4.10 8.13 6.23 1349.53 0.10 
NGO 53 3.60 3.26 6.87 6.40 1118.89 0.06 
media 5 5.00  2.40 7.40 5.76 4349.02 0.11 
business 22 2.00 2.18 4.18 5.37 851.10 0.03 
church 10 1.80 2.50 4.30 7.69 622.49 0.01 
unclear 6 1.33 4.83 6.17 4.60 384.88 0.04 
..by stance 
(assortativity: 0.46) 
       
mainstream 172 3.67 3.65 7.31 6.07 1155.85 0.11 
skeptical 70 4.56 4.54 9.10 4.88 1176.65 0.12 
undefined/unclear 15 2.33 2.67 5.00 4.84 356.53 0.06 
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The upper left cluster, by contrast, consists of scientific and large public 
institutions, companies and NGOs committed to climate change in one of several ways. 
It is politically mainstream and represents the interest of socioeconomic elites. The 
interlinking between actors from science and administration has been shown in other 
hyperlink studies before (cf. Elgin, 2015: 238) and underlines the close connection 
between these societal fields that can be explained by the political relevance of climate 
change research. Additionally, this relates to previously described assumptions about 
the shaping of the public sphere. Peters (1993), for example, proposed the idea of a 
center and a periphery within society, with political actors in the center and actors from 
civil society at the periphery. This is echoed by our results on the online public sphere 
of climate change discourse, with civil society actors at the fringes of our network and 
institutions closely connected at the network’s core. We therefore call this cluster 
climate institutional.  
In marked contrast to the mainstream faction, the climate skeptical cluster is 
dominated by individuals. It consists of several climate skeptic blogs that focus on 
climate science, climate politics but also associated issues like energy politics and 
environmental protection. Additionally, there are also individual bloggers who combine 
climate skepticism with a range of other issues, from the perpetrated marginalization of 
smokers, xenophobia, racism and ‘men’s rights’ to conspiracy theories on issues such as 
so-called chemtrails and the global monetary system. An air of general antagonism 
regarding what is perceived to be ‘political correctness’ or the majority opinion is 
common, with many sites linking to non-mainstream news sources as evidence for their 
claims (e.g. PI-news.de). The most prominent sites, such as Science-Skeptical or EIKE 
are –even though skeptical– comparatively moderate and focus on climate topics. The 
insularity of the skeptic cluster is highlighted by a lack of moderating individual voices 
outside of the institutional cluster, within which virtually all references are faction-
internal.  
In summary, climate change is a largely technocratic and managerial issue in the 
climate mainstream faction and a lighting rod for political mistrust and antagonism in 
the climate skeptical individualist cluster. The climate activist camp is even further 
away from the climate skeptics than the institutional cluster, largely because of its 
politically opposed outlook. Table 5 presents core statistics and centrality measures for 




6.1.9 Results: Relations of Actor, Topic and Stance Groups 
In a second step, we focus our attention on the network properties of edges between 
different actors and topics, as well as the mainstream and skeptical camps, as they result 
from the manual content analysis. Table 6 shows the relation between the dimensions of 
stance and actor type. It shows that climate skeptics are over-proportionally likely to be 
individuals, while scientific organizations, government administration and NGOs are 
uniformly in the mainstream faction. The picture for news websites and political parties 
is more mixed, though they are only a few cases in both categories. 
 
 
individual group scientist sci orga pol party gov NGO media business unclear church 
mainstream 10 4 6 40 3 30 47 2 20 0 10 
skeptical 42 13 0 0 2 0 4 3 1 5 0 
undefined/ 
unclear 8 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 
Table 6: Contingency table of node counts by factions (mainstream-skeptical) and actors 
 
Table 7 shows the relationship of stance to website topic. This reveals that most 
mainstream sites are in the climate change or environment category, while the skeptics 
are particularly numerous in ‘general interest’ and politics. This emphasizes the 
different conceptualizations of the type of issue that climate change constitutes for the 
two camps, with it serving as a building block of identity politics to the skeptical 




politics science economy society climate change energy environment general interest 
mainstream 4 8 4 6 100 11 33 6 
skeptical 16 1 0 4 15 5 2 27 
undefined/unclear 3 0 0 3 0 2 1 6 
Table 7: Contingency table of node counts by factions (mainstream-skeptical) and topics 
 
Finally, how do the different types of actors and factions relate to each other in 
terms of linking patterns? Table 8 shows the number of edges grouped together by types 
of content creators, while Table 9 shows the same aggregate linking data for the 
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factions. To assess these combinations in relative terms, we can compare them with 
















Table 8: Number of edges between actor types by frequency 
 
observed and expected combination frequencies. This reveals that scientific 
organizations, NGOs and individuals link to their own respective group twice to three 
times as often as chance would predict.  
This pattern also holds for combinations such as public administration linking to 
science. Conversely, the approach also reveals which combinations should be more 
frequent in a random network. Random pairing would predict that individuals link to 
scientific organisations much more often than they do. Scientific organisations also 
hardly link to NGOs and individuals do not link to public administration websites. The 
situation is somewhat less extreme with other actors, but the tendency to link to actors 
of the same time is notable and echoes previous findings (Elgin, 2015; Shumate & 
Dewitt, 2008). This has relevant implications for both the study of online publics and 
climate change discourse. Institutional actors and individuals form clusters, suggesting 
that the mainstream-skeptical split is further exacerbated by a tendency among actors to 
Rank Types of edges (content creators) Edges observed Edges expected 
1 science -> science 154 49 
2 individual -> individual 119 52 
3 NGO -> NGO 118 35 
4 individual -> group 68 26 
5 public administration -> science 57 30 
6 group -> individual 43 22 
7 public administration -> public administration 43 15 
8 science -> public administration 40 26 
9 group -> group 26 12 
10 unclear -> individual 18 8 
11 NGO -> public administration 18 30 
12 individual -> NGO 16 48 
13 business -> public administration 15 6 
14 business -> business 13 3 
15 church -> church 13 0 
16 public administration -> business 13 3 
17 public administration -> NGO 13 28 
18 NGO -> group 11 16 
19 individual -> media 10 5 
20 church -> NGO 10 5 
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talk amongst themselves. While government institutions cannot link to individual blogs 
that articulate extreme political views, the resulting balkanization of the debate seems 
problematic.  
 
Rank Types of edges (mainstream-skeptical) Edges observed Edges expected 
1 mainstream -> mainstream 607 408 
2 skeptical -> skeptical 270 108 
3 undefined/unclear -> skeptical 35 14 
4 skeptical -> undefined/unclear 29 13 
5 skeptical -> mainstream 19 197 
6 mainstream -> skeptical 14 197 
7 mainstream -> undefined/unclear 6 22 
8 undefined/unclear -> mainstream 5 26 
Table 9: Number of edges between factions (mainstream-skeptical) by frequency 
 
The status of skeptics as a counterpublic is highlighted by the distribution of inter-
faction links between the two camps. Both camps are much more likely to link to others 
of the same conviction as their own, but skeptics are even more likely to do so than are 
mainstream sites. This points towards the isolation of skeptical voices in relation to 
other views. Additionally, there are a few mainstream sites within the skeptic cluster but 
no skeptic sites within the mainstream thus also showing that skeptical and individual 
viewpoints rely on mainstream and institutional voices in order to frame their criticism 
(e.g. by having an own section within their blogrolls called ‘alarmists’), while 
mainstream actors legitimate themselves through reference to scientific authority. 
Indeed, when looking at the climate activist cluster and its linking pattern it seems that 
for most civil society actors the question whether climate change is real has been 




The goal of this study was to show how the German-language online climate discourse 
is structured. We were particularly interested in the network’s polarisation compared to 
other networks, its clusters and the role climate skeptics play. In order to do so we 
conducted a hyperlink network analysis of German-language climate-websites based on 
blogrolls and link lists that can be seen as a proxy for allegiance.  
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We are able to show four noteworthy results: First, we show that climate skeptics 
form a counterpublic within the German-language climate discourse since they are an 
issue-specific, public that challenges the hegemonic view and that gets excluded from 
the mainstream but also isolates itself further. Skeptic websites are mostly created by 
individuals who only link rarely to more established and more moderate actors. Second, 
the skeptic counterpublic is not restricted to voices pertaining to climate change but, 
more importantly, forms an alliance of antagonism with other extreme factions such as 
misogynists, racists or conspiracy theorists, i.e. radical positions which are also not 
represented in society’s general discourse. What all these factions seem to have in 
common is a contempt and antagonism for what they perceive to be political correctness 
or do-gooders. Even though the connection between climate skepticism and conspiracy 
theories has been made before (e.g. Lewandowsky, Gignac & Oberauer, 2015) our 
study is, to our knowledge, the first which shows the structural connections between 
climate skeptics, conspiracy theorists and other somewhat problematic factions. We are 
thus also able to answer Downey and Fenton’s (2003) question “do links lead to a 
greater sense of solidarity between similar but distinct radical groups?” (p. 199) 
somewhat positively. However, it remains to be seen whether it is possible to change 
this cluster’s “antagonisms” into “agonism” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755). Third, we are able 
to show that political and scientific actors are closely connected to each other but 
mostly ignore the other actors and also do not try to connect with actors from the wider 
civil society. Even though not surprising, it is interesting to note since these linking 
patterns show who political and scientific institutions deem noteworthy or as an 
authority (mostly these links also are connected with project fundings) – and who not. 
One hope in this respect were individual blogs by scientists which could have connected 
science and civil society. And although scientific blogs like Klimalounge were very 
much linked to, they themselves tend to not associate with other sites by blogrolls most 
of the time and thus actually emphasize the rift between politics and science and the 
civil society. And fourth, we identify a climate activist cluster that neither deems 
scientific institutions or blogs nor climate skeptic actors as relevant. It is inherently 
political and beyond the question if climate change is happening and rather focus on 
what society has to do to counter it. 
However, this study also has some limitations. Due to our decision to crawl the 
blogrolls and link lists manually it is possible that not all link lists or blogrolls have 
been included (e.g. because the website was down or the link lists were well hidden). 
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We are nevertheless confident that our network represents the German-language online 
discourse on climate change accurately since our manual snowball crawl method 
allowed us to extensively follow the links until the sites were not about climate change 
or in German anymore and thus draw a much clearer border than a webcrawler could 
have done. Additionally, our study design does not allow us to make more precise 
statements about the different framings of climate change skepticism within the skeptic 
counterpublic. We agree with Fraser (1990), however, who suggests that counterpublics 
are “spaces of withdrawal and regroupment” and may serve as “bases and training 
grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics” (p. 68). But as 
counterpublics often try to extend the public sphere by making their voices and opinions 
heard (Wimmer, 2007) we feel that more research is needed that takes a look at the 
different types of skepticism both within the skeptic and mainstream clusters. As Toepfl 
and Piwoni (2015) point out comment sections on news websites may also be ideal 
spaces for counterpublic action and Lörcher and Taddicken (2015) add that skeptics are 
indeed present in the German-language comment sections. Finally, we were also 
surprised by the coalitions climate skeptics formed with other radical and 
democratically somewhat more problematic groups. Since we stopped our crawl at sites 
that did not deal with climate change we were only able to get a glance at the broader 
coalition of ‘antagonism’. More research is needed to shine a light at the structures and 
framings of this cluster due to its democratically problematic unruly alliance. 
 
 
6.2 Interim Conclusion: ‘Alliance of Antagonism’ 
In the paper ‘Alliance of Antagonism’ we were able to show that the skeptic 
counterpublic and the mainstream are only loosely connected. Indeed, it can be posited 
that skeptics form an echo chamber (Sunstein, 2001) since there are only few 
mainstream actors in the skeptic community and skeptics form a close-knit community. 
This, then, also shows that skeptics are barely integrated in the German networked 
public sphere with regard to the dimension of connectivity. In the next chapter I will 
thus focus on the mass media’s reporting to see if skeptic frames can be found within 




6.3 Study: Questioning the Doubt: Climate Skepticism in German 
Newspaper Reporting on COP1781 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The public debate—both online and offline—on climate change is hotly contested. Not 
only do scientists, industry lobbyists, policy-makers, non-governmental organizations, 
or journalists publicly struggle to establish their particular perspectives on the issue, 
there is also an ongoing battle between so-called “alarmists” and “skeptics” (Antilla, 
2005). Alarmists are, in this case, people who—supposedly—“blindly” advocate the 
concept of anthropogenic climate change, whereas the word “skeptics” is used to 
describe those who question climate change, human caused global warming or the 
greenhouse effect. Given that so many different positions on climate change exist, this 
dichotomy is an artificial over-generalization and yet it helps to describe the constant 
conflict, which repeatedly forces people, and even scientists, to first acknowledge that 
human made global warming is indeed happening before they are able to criticize a 
specific scientific paper or a climate policy (cf. Pielke, 2013). One could even argue that 
the debate is rather combative: Krauss (2012), e.g. calls his analysis of the German 
climate blogosphere Extension of the Combat Zone and Mann’s (2012) popular book on 
the subject is titled The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars.  
Naturally both interests and positions will find their way into the public debate 
and may affect climate politics and public opinion. For example, in 2009, Australia’s 
Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, called the idea behind anthropogenic climate change 
“crap” (Readfearn, 2014). However, these discourses differ from nation to nation. In the 
USA, for example, climate change skepticism is more prominent in the media’s82 
reporting than in Germany or the UK (Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Painter & Ashe, 
2012). In Germany especially, skeptics and skeptical topics are almost non-existent in 
the mass media (Grundmann, 2007; Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Hornschuh, 2008; 
Peters & Heinrichs, 2008). Consequently we do not really know much about German 
skeptics. There are indeed some cross-national analyses on climate skepticism in the 
                                                
81 This study was conducted and written together with Markus Rhomberg. 
82 We use media in this context as a synonym for the news media. Even though these 
include both radio and TV, for this paper we specifically focus on newspapers and their 
respective online outlets.  
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news media, but most of them ignored Germany (cf. Painter, 2013; Painter & Ashe, 
2012).  
Yet German climate skeptics exist. Two surveys show that there is a stable 
minority of 25–30% that do not believe in the notion of climate change or mankind’s 
responsibility for it—or at least question it (Hna.de, 2011; Spiegel.de, 2010). A more 
recent study found that there were about 5–19% of skeptics in Germany (Engels et al., 
2013). The authors concluded that German skeptics cannot be “explained” by their 
educational background, but found that it “correlates with less support of renewable 
energy sources” (Engels et al., 2013, p. 1018). And Brunnengräber (2013) proposes in 
his analysis that “all signs support that climate change skeptics in Germany are gaining 
ground and connect their climate skepticism with other topics such as the 
Energiewende83” (p. 47, own translation). Given that climate skepticism has been 
connected to the public’s (in)action on carbon-reducing behavior and a lack of support 
for climate policies (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011; 
Whitmarsh, 2011)—and that other studies did not look at the way skeptics frame their 
arguments in particular—a closer look at the German public climate debate is needed. 
This holds especially true since the mass media are responsible for most of what we 
know about scientific issues—and consequently climate change (Hjarvard, 2008; 
Luhmann, 2000; Neverla & Taddicken, 2012). Thus it is important to research the 
German media’s reporting on climate change, specifically focusing on critical 
undertones, confusing statements, and unquestioned skeptical arguments as we do not 
really know what arguments German skeptics employ. Consequently we ask in the 
analysis at hand: What skeptical frames are being used by the German news media in 
their climate change reporting?  
In order to fill this research gap and to shed light on the question of how climate 
skepticism is shaped by the media, we conducted an explorative content analysis of the 
German media’s coverage of one “critical discourse moment” (Carvalho & Burgess, 
2005): the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Durban, South Africa, in 2011. By using this method 
we aim to demonstrate (1) how skeptical arguments and critical undertones are reported 
and (2) identify possible skeptical frames. This paper is structured as follows: First, we 
define and frame the term “climate skepticism” by conceptualizing skepticism and 
                                                
83 “Energiewende” describes the politically enforced transformation from fossil fuel to 
renewable energy sources and literally translates to “energy turn.”  
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differentiating it from other terms such as “contrarians” and “deniers”. Second, we take 
a closer look at the framing concept and provide a brief literature review on the 
skeptical framing of climate change in the news media. Third, we address this study’s 
methodology by introducing our two-step content analysis approach and specify the 




6.3.2 Theoretical Framework: Conceptualizing Climate Skepticism  
In order to analyze climate skepticism in public debate we first have to define what is 
understood by climate change skepticism and who is seen as a skeptic. Skepticism is a 
very broad and vague term, which can be both used as praise or rebuke (Ditto & Lopez, 
1992). Arguing from a scientific background, the negative connotation of the word 
skeptic might seem particularly strange as skepticism can be interpreted as a scientific 
core value. In this study nevertheless, this term is favored, since there are a variety of 
names which all try to describe different developments in various tones. The most often 
used terms skeptic, contrarian and denier all describe different aspects and are a 
constant topic of discussion, which not only touches upon questions of different types of 
skepticism but also whether some terms or labels even foster the exclusion of skeptics 
and thus reinforce the debate’s polarization (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, et al., 2010; 
Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Howarth & Sharman, 2015; O’Neill & Boykoff, 2011). 
Although the possible differentiation between these terms seems sensible, their 
distinction is empirically problematic since the boundaries are so fluid. Thus, a more 
promising approach is not to focus on the people but rather on the arguments, and to 
differentiate between the different types of climate change skepticism.  
In his brief analysis the climate scientist Rahmstorf (2005) identified three kinds 
of skepticism: questioning (1) climate change’s existence (trend skepticism), (2) 
mankind’s influence (attribution skepticism), and (3) the consequences of climate 
change (impact skepticism). Whereas Rahmstorf is mostly concerned with the 
arguments which cast doubt directly on climate change, other researchers stress the 
importance of public (mis)trust in the scientific consensus (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, et al., 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b; 
Whitmarsh, 2011). Skeptics not only doubt climate change but also those who study and 
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publish about it. Some skeptics went as far as to claim that the thousands of emails 
which were leaked in 2009—an event called “Climategate”—were proof of a 
conspiracy by climate scientists—a claim refuted by several investigations but which 
stuck within skeptic circles (for a summary see Maibach et al. (2012)). Consequently 
Engels and her colleagues (2013) added a fourth skeptic category: the scientific 
consensus on anthropogenic climate change (consensus skepticism).  
Although these categories could also lead to ambiguities (Howarth & Sharman, 
2015) they are more distinct and already empirically tested (Engels et al., 2013; Painter 
& Ashe, 2012; Poortinga et al., 2011). In this paper, climate skepticism is therefore 
understood as either the questioning of the existence of climate change, its 
anthropogenic cause, its dangerous impacts or the science behind it, or any combination 
of these factors. Naturally, this is a basic and somewhat lacking definition that can be 
explained by (1) the skeptics’ fragmentation— some skeptics deny anything that 
remotely seems like climate change (e.g. the greenhouse effect), some accept climate 
change as a reality but deny the human influence on it and some do not know and do not 
care and thus favor the position which does not imply that they have to change 
themselves (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001)—but since we are (2) interested in all 
potential skeptical arguments in a supposedly skeptic-free country’s public discourse, 
we deliberately chose a broader definition thus allowing us to collect more arguments. 
Hence the heuristic term “skeptic” is used, which subsumes many different positions 
and is therefore the most viable for this study’s explorative approach.  
 
 
6.3.3 Framing Climate Change  
The concept of framing is as popular as it is “scattered” (Entman, 1993, p. 51). 
Consequently, there exist several definitions and methods of how to capture the essence 
of framing. However they all share the basic idea that framing describes how a topic or 
a piece of information is presented and/or processed (cf. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 
2007). In a prominent definition by Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 3) framing is 
defined as “making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue”. Scheufele and 
Tewksbury (2007) add the underlying assumption that “how an issue is characterized in 
news reports can have an influence on how it is understood by audiences” (p. 11). Since 
the way information is framed by the media has consequences for the audience, it is 
 93 
imperative to look at the framing of controversial topics. This holds true for climate 
change where different actors (e.g., politicians, scientists, and lobbyists) are trying to 
circulate their frames and messages (Nisbet, 2009; Schlichting, 2012).  
Even though information about climate change and its skepticism appear in the 
public sphere in a variety of ways including conversations, panel discussions, weblogs, 
or social web services as Twitter or Facebook, the mass media remains the most 
prominent forum (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006). Media content is an important factor for 
the salience of an individual’s interpretation of an issue and is especially critical for the 
complex (and at times abstract) issue of climate change (Rhomberg, 2012).  
One can view policy issues as, in part, a symbolic contest over which 
interpretation will prevail (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). To make sense of these policy 
debates, audiences use frames provided by the media as interpretative shortcuts 
(Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006; Nisbet, 2009). As climate change skepticism is a minority 
attitude both in science and society, message framing in the media is one instrument 
skeptics use in order to impact society (Anderegg et al., 2010; Engels et al., 2013).  
A substantial number of studies have identified skeptical elements with regard to 
climate science (or climate change in general) in media coverage (Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004; Painter & Ashe, 2012; Trumbo, 1996; Weingart, Engels, & Pansegrau, 2000; 
Zehr, 2000). Many of these studies used frame-analysis to establish patterns of 
argumentation toward climate change. Analyzing 141 environmentally skeptical books 
from 1972 to 2005, Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman (2008, p. 354) found four prominent 
frames84: (1) environmental problems are not being taken seriously and “scientific 
evidence documenting these problems” is being dismissed, (2) hence environmental 
policy is not necessary, (3) while “environmental skepticism endorses an anti-
regulatory/anti-corporate liability position that flows from the first two claims,” and (4) 
if environmental policies were enforced it would threaten “Western progress.” Antilla 
(2005, p. 344) found four distinct frames within the US newspaper coverage of climate 
science: it was either framed as “valid science,” as having “ambiguous cause or effects,” 
as “uncertain science” or as “controversial science.” Albeit the valid science frame was 
the most prominent, Antilla suggested that the amount of critical or skeptical frames 
was enough to confuse the readers. The uncertain science frame has been found in 
several studies on climate coverage (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Painter, 2013; Zehr, 
                                                
84 In their study they call them themes instead of frames. Within our broad 
understanding of frames, however, we are able to imply them in our definition.  
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2000, 2009). Hence Shehata and Hopmann (2012) expected to find the scientific 
uncertainty frame in the USA and Swedish press coverage of the Kyoto and Bali 
conferences as well. However they were surprised by the total absence of this frame in 
their analysis, a result they explained with the climate summit’s very “specific news-
reporting context where the problem definitions are clearly institutionally defined” 
(Shehata & Hopmann, 2012, p. 188).  
Regarding content, there are further reasons why the mass media are 
acknowledging and thus mentioning skepticism on a (more or less) regular basis. Zehr 
(2000), for example, did not only find that the uncertainty frame is a salient topic in the 
media’s coverage but also highlighted that it is mostly presented as a conflict. The 
reason for this is twofold: conflict has a high news value (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) and 
can be interpreted as showing both sides of a topic (Palfreman, 2006). In this context 
news value is understood as the combination of several factors (e.g. frequency, 
unambiguity, or proximity) which are inherently part of an event but which reporters 
may also add or emphasize to make their story more interesting (Schulz, 1976). The 
factor negativity (e.g. conflict) is relevant since it offers an explanation to the question 
of why skeptics and their arguments are mentioned or even appear in news reports as 
experts although they are occasionally not qualified to do so: it shows that the topic is 
controversial (Brossard, Shanahan, & McComas, 2004; Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Lahsen, 
2005; Schulz, 1976). This supposed controversy also creates the sometimes misleading 
image of balance. This is especially problematic since 97% of the scientific community 
supports the notion of an anthropogenic climate change (Anderegg et al., 2010). 
Although Boykoff (2007) found that the amount of “balanced” reporting on climate 
change was decreasing in the USA, “balance as bias” (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004) is still 
an issue (Getler, 2012; Peach, 2012). It is moreover worth mentioning that there are 
national differences with regard to journalistic norms such as objectivity and inherently 
balance: the norm of balance is much more prevalent in the US news media than in 
Europe, for example Germany (Hanitzsch, 2007; Weaver, 1998).  
 
 
6.3.4 Method  
Even though there have been a variety of studies on media reporting of climate skeptic 
frames internationally, most studies in Germany did not specifically look for climate 
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skeptic frames (Brüggemann & Engesser, 2014; Grundmann, 2007; Grundmann & 
Scott, 2014; Hornschuh, 2008; Peters & Heinrichs, 2008; Post, 2008). In order to find 
these elements we conducted a two-step content analysis of the German news media’s 
reporting on COP17. This empirical content analysis approach was twofold by first 
using a qualitative coding process and then followed-up with a quantitative content 
analysis of the media debate. As O’Mahony and Schäfer (2005, p. 104)(2005, p. 104) 
put it: “The methodological bridging of these two traditions is urgently required” 
(Ferree et al., 2002a; Hajer, 2003).  
The first empirical step consisted of an explorative approach in order to identify 
clear statements, so-called idea elements (cf. Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), which we 
understand as issue-specific statements within media texts and thus are the smallest unit 
of our analysis (cf. Weßler, 1999). Working step by step, idea elements will be 
identified in the media then aggregated to frames, which, in a third step, will be 
abstracted to media packages. Each idea element is attached to one frame and each 
frame is attached to one media package. A media package “has an internal structure. At 
its core is a central organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, 
suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). The packages provide 
meaning to an issue. In order to capture such framing by actors and journalists 
(Brüggemann, 2014; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006) we focused on the prevalent arguments 
within the text and how the frame was evaluated.  
This inductive process generates a map of discourse content, which provides a 
matrix for the second coding step, a quantitative-statistical content analysis of the media 
discourse. This approach is a well-tested method in attempts to analyze public debates 
in both sociological and communication studies (Ferree et al., 2002; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006).  
We decided to analyze German newspapers (including their respective online 
outlets) since 76% of the German population access these in order to read the news 
(Statista, 2014). We therefore chose the daily newspapers (as well as their online 
editions) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Die Welt, 
die tageszeitung (taz), the daily business newspaper Handelsblatt, the weekly 
magazines Der Spiegel and Die Zeit and Germany’s largest tabloid, Bild85.  
                                                
85 Bild is not only Germany’s largest newspaper, i.e. with the highest circulation rate, 
but also its most-visited news website (Meedia.de, 2012). 
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The international event COP17 in Durban was selected for two reasons. First, 
there were crucial events surrounding the conference which ensured a vital debate, such 
as Canada leaving the Kyoto Protocol; the extension of the conference for two more 
days due to the participants’ inability to agree on specific terms; the alliance of poor 
countries with the European Union, and the general evaluation that the conference’s 
final results were a letdown. Second, COP17 was an important international “staged 
event” (Dayan & Katz, 1992) with climate change as the main topic “where an 
enormous amount of knowledge production, economic lobbying, civic activism, and 
bargaining gravitate around potentially consequential political decision making” 
(Kunelius & Eide, 2012, p. 267). Studies have shown that big international events like 
climate conferences, which qualify as “critical discourse moments” (Carvalho & 
Burgess, 2005, p. 1466), directly influence the amount of reports the news media 
publish on climate change, which in turn provides the possibility to study more 
thematically relevant articles than usual (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 2012). We note 
that Takahashi (2011) as well as Shehata and Hopmann (2012) found little to no 
skeptical frames in their respective studies on climate conference reporting and the 
latter hypothesized that this might be due to a specific kind of framing which was the 
result of the conferences (p. 188f.). Learning from these results we opted for a broader 
definition of climate skepticism and a similarly open keyword search consisting of the 
words “Durban + Klima*”.86  
The articles used in this study were collected from databases such as LexisNexis 
and the newspapers’ official archives. The time period was set to range from two weeks 
prior to two weeks after the conference and spanned from 14 November 2011 to 25 
December 2011. After having collected all articles and removing the duplicates the 
sample consisted of a total of 379 articles for coding. For the first and explorative step 
of the content analysis a random sample of 25% (n= 95 articles) was carefully analyzed 
in order to find skeptical statements with regard to climate change or climate science. 
These statements were not limited to a quantitative threshold or the person voicing them 
in order to include journalists’ evaluations as well, but rather only to the issue. This 
means that all statements that could be interpreted as skeptical were added at first. This 
was in order to not overeagerly discard possible frames and additionally to present the 
                                                
86 This search string which translates into “Durban + Climate*” was the one we used for 
LexisNexis and thus our guide for the other archives, although it has to be mentioned 
that the online archives we used differed with regard to search operators. Additionally 
to LexisNexis we used the online archives of Handelsblatt, FAZ, taz, and BILD. 
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variety of skeptical elements within the German news media’s reporting on COP17. 
These specific statements from the articles were then thematically clustered and 
transformed into more general idea elements. We counted idea elements only once per 
article, since it has been established that one time is enough to establish one’s framing 
in a news article (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006). The idea elements were then grouped 
together with thematically similar statements. These were then clustered into 
overarching frame and media packages, which we applied to a codebook87 (cf. Gamson 
& Modigliani, 1989; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006). Additionally we also added further 
prominent idea elements from the literature which we thought were important and 
which were not present in the first step such as “the Greenhouse effect doesn’t exist” 
(e.g. Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013; Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Then three coders read 
and coded all 379 articles.88  
 
 
6.3.5 Results  
Contrary to Shehata and Hopmann (2012) as well as Takahashi (2011) we identified 
skeptical statements within the German news media’s reporting on COP17 in Durban. 
Within our sample (N= 379) 52 articles with 122 statements qualified as skeptical. Thus 
almost 15% of all articles on COP17 included skeptical idea elements. These 122 
skeptical statements could then be aggregated into 31 idea elements that could be 
assigned to seven frame packages (see Table 1). These frame packages were then 
clustered into two overarching media packages, linking skepticism with (1) the 
phenomenon of climate change and (2) climate science. We found 38 articles with 
skeptical elements regarding the phenomenon of climate change, 28 with skeptical 
elements regarding climate science, and 14 that included both media packages.  
 
Idea elements  
As stated above, each frame consists of multiple idea elements. Due to this paper’s 
explorative nature it is important to demonstrate how we chose our relevant statements, 
                                                
87 These not only asked for already existing idea elements and frames but also contained 
open variables for possible new ones. 
88 In order to assess the inter coder reliability we did a pretest in which Krippendorff’s 
alpha between the three coders was .67 or higher for all categories—a value which we 
deemed to be acceptable (Gerhards, Offerhaus, & Roose, 2007; Schäfer, 2008). 
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which we then clustered into idea elements and frame packages. The first step was the 
identification of relevant statements, which were skeptical of climate change or climate 
science. In order to not too eagerly dismiss statements, we marked each relevant phrase 
in each article and then created a list of all these sentences. After discussing each case in 
a group, we then carefully discarded each idea element, which was not relevant to the 
topic of climate skepticism—e.g. skeptical statements which questioned the potential of 
climate conferences or specific political initiatives—and then looked for similarities 
within our list for purposes of merging (Table 10).  
The list of quotes that served as the basis for creation of the idea elements 
consisted of statements in the articles, such as the following:  
 
(1) “Republicans call climate change a hoax and adjust their politics to the coal 
and oil industry.” (Der Spiegel, 17 December 2011)    
(2) “As long as the paradigm of human induced climate change predominates— 
which is the case despite of rising scientific doubt.” (Die Welt, 14 December 
2011)    
(3) “But will global warming lead to a disaster? The end of the world seems to 
be delayed.” (Die Welt, 28 November 2011)    
(4) “Last year the argument that there would be no more snow was buried under 
deep layers of snow—even in the metropolitan area of Munich.” (SZ, 5 
December 2011)    
 
These quotes were then transformed into more concise directed idea elements, 
which nevertheless maintained their argumentative idea89:  
 
(a) the denial of climate change  
(b) questioning its existence  
(c) questioning its relevance 
(d)   indication that the current weather does not fit with climate change.  
 
                                                
89 Other examples for the transformation from a statement to an idea elements are: “The 
sun is supposedly to blame” (Die Welt, 28 November 2011) which got translated into 
“the sun is the main factor” or “The spokesmen of the climate catastrophe which rule 
the public, treat dissenters similar to like deviationists are treated in Stalinist parties” 
(Die Welt, 28 November 2011) which got transformed into “climate science oppresses 
critics.” 
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The most prominent idea elements we found in our sample were “questioning 
climate change’s existence” (n= 12) and “questioning mankind’s influence” (n= 10). 
Another two “popular” idea elements were the “denial of climate change” (n= 8) and 
the idea that “CO2 is not to blame” (n= 8). Most of the idea elements (n= 80) were 
found in the print media’s reporting, whereas only 42 idea elements were found in 
online articles.  
 
 












Existence Denial of climate change 8 
Questioning climate change’s existence 12 
There is no global warming/warming has paused 6 
Current weather indicates no warming 4 
Causes Questioning mankind’s influence 10 
Sun is the main factor 5 
Greenhouse effect doesn’t exist 1 
CO
2
 is not to blame 8 
Cosmic rays are one main factor 1 
Impact Climate change’s impact won’t be so bad 5 
Climate change will have positive consequences 5 
There won’t be bad consequences with adaptation 1 
Nature will adapt to climate change 1 
Climate change’s impact is unclear 2 
Climate 
Science 
Politicization Climate science is used by politics 6 
Climate science has political goals 4 
Uncertainty Climate science doesn’t know much 3 
Climate science’s about climate change is decreasing 3 
Climate models are not reliable 1 
Climate scientists are hiding uncertainties 1 
Climate sciences is wrong about climate change 2 
Alarmism Alarmism may lead to fatalism 2 
Climate scientists are using scare tactics 7 
Climate scientists exaggerate their findings 5 
“Conspiracy” There’s no consensus within climate science 2 
Climate science oppresses critics 3 
Climate scientists are all in cahoots 3 
“Climategate” showed that climate scientists are 
dishonest 
5 
Climate scientists have their own agenda 2 
Climate scientists modified their data 2 
Climate scientists ignore the usual quality standards 2 




Frame Package Media Total 
SZ FAZ Welt taz Handels- 
blatt 
Spiegel Zeit Bild  
Climate 
Change 
Existence 5 2 1 1 0 3 13 1 26 
Causes 2 4 5 0 0 0 3 0 14 
Impact 1 0 4 0 1 0 2 0 8 
Climate 
Science 
Politicization 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 8 
Uncertainty 1 2 4 0 0 1 2 0 10 
Alarmism 1 4 6 0 1 1 0 0 13 
“Conspiracies” 0 5 4 1 0 2 3 0 15 
Total  10 19 26 2 2 9 25 1 94 
Table 11: Usage of Skeptical Frame Packages by Media Outlets 
 
Frames and media packages  
We then clustered the established idea elements into frame packages to identify “the 
central organizing idea” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). This meant identifying a 
common denominator for the idea elements such as for example (1) the denial of 
climate change, (2) questioning its existence, (3) questioning its relevance, (4) saying 
that there is no global warming, and (5) indication that the current weather does not fit 
with climate change. As all of those idea elements were skeptical of climate change on a 
broad and fundamental level we established the frame “skepticism with regards to 
climate change’s existence.” This was indeed the most used frame within our sample 
(n= 26), followed by arguing that there are “conspiracies” within climate science (n= 
15) and skepticism with regard to the “causes of climate change” (n= 14) (Table 11).  
When looking at the different media outlets it is rather obvious that the most 
“skeptic” outlets are the conservative daily Die Welt, which used skeptical frames 26 
times and the liberal weekly Die Zeit (n= 25; including their respective online outlets). 
Whereas Die Welt’s results can be explained due to their conservative editorial stance 
(cf. ideology and climate skepticism: Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; Painter & Ashe, 
2012), it is rather surprising that the liberal Die Zeit used skeptical frames 25 times 
within their reporting with the existence frame being the most used (n= 13). The latter 
can be explained due to several articles published both in print and online which 
explicitly covered the topic of climate skepticism, such as the article “Unreasonable 
skeptics” (own translation; published on 8 December 2011) which listed several 
prominent skeptic arguments which the guest authors who were climate scientists then 
refuted. The conservative daily FAZ is the third “largest” user of skeptical frames (n= 
19). The tabloid Bild, in contrast, only used one skeptical frame (regarding the existence 
of climate change), which is noteworthy since Boykoff (2008) found in his analysis of 
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the UK tabloid press that the tabloids preferred to provide skeptics more room to speak 
compared to the quality papers. 
After having shown how we generated frame packages from idea elements, the 
next step was to identify overarching topically relevant media packages. When we are 
examining frames such as “existence of climate change,” “causes of climate change,” 
and “impact of climate change” and compare these with other frames such as 
“conspiracies within climate science” it is rather obvious that there is a stark difference: 
the first three deal with the phenomenon of climate change whereas the latter focus on 
the subject of climate science. Hence we established two overarching media packages. 
The first media package deals with the questioning of the phenomenon of climate 
change and the second with skepticism with regard to climate science.  
 
Evaluation of climate skepticism  
In addition to the identification of skeptic statements we also looked for how those 
statements were evaluated, because albeit a text may imply a skeptical statement this 
does not necessarily mean that it also gets evaluated positively. Since all the idea 
elements were directed and skeptical in nature (e.g. there is no global warming), a 
positive evaluation would be backing up a skeptical statement whereas a negative 
evaluation would be refuting it. For example, the tabloid Bild only used one skeptical 
idea element within its reporting in which it questioned the existence of climate 
change—a statement which it then evaluated negatively in the next sentence by saying 
that climate change does in fact exist (bild.de, 1 December 2011). In general 50% of the 
idea elements (n= 61) were evaluated positively, thus favoring the skeptical message. 
But it is also worth noting that 39.3% of the idea elements were evaluated negatively, 
hence questioning the skeptical arguments. Only 10.7% were not evaluated clearly, i.e. 
ambiguous.90 The frame “skepticism with regards to the phenomenon of climate 
change” was evaluated equally (30 negative idea elements, 11 neutral, 28 positive), 
whereas the media’s reporting on climate science was more skeptical (18 negative, 2 
neutral, 33 positive).  
                                                
90 A journalist from Die Welt, for example, wrote about climate change’s anthropogenic 
cause: “Even the question of mankind’s share in climate change, that is the question of 
guilt, can’t be discussed.” (28 November 2011) Even though the anthropogenic root was 
questioned the reporter did not claim outright that mankind was not responsible for 
climate change. Thus the statement was coded as unclear. 
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The above mentioned difference between Die Welt and Die Zeit is more obvious 
when looking at the evaluation of the established idea elements: Of all 40 idea elements 
which Die Welt used none were evaluated negatively, 4 neutrally and 36 positively. 
Thus the newspaper can be interpreted as supportive of skeptical ideas. Die Zeit on the 
other hand evaluated only 2 of 32 idea elements positively, while remaining neutral on 3 
and negating 27. Whereas Die Welt mainly discussed the causes of climate change (n= 
14), Die Zeit focused on the existence of climate change (n= 16).  
The conservative FAZ evaluated skeptical idea elements—similar to Die Welt— 
rather positively: 14 of their 23 idea elements were evaluated positively, two neutrally 
and seven negatively. The statement that climate scientists are alarmist, for example, 
was used four times and was evaluated positively in three of those cases. The liberal 
newspaper SZ evaluated six idea elements positively as well as six negatively with the 
most positively evaluated skeptical idea element being that the current weather indicates 
that there is no climate change (n= 4; three times positively, one times negatively).  
With regard to the evaluation of frames it is interesting to see that most of the idea 
elements of the “existence of climate change” frame were evaluated negatively (n= 18), 
with seven neutrally and five positively. The “causes of climate change,” however, were 
evaluated rather positively (n= 16), with three being neutral and six positive. Another 
frame worth mentioning was the “alarmism” frame, which was evaluated rather 
positively (n= 11) with only three idea elements being evaluated negatively.  
We then searched for correlations between different factors, for instance if a 
specific idea element significantly correlates with articles published by the conservative 
daily Die Welt or whether an article published by the liberal weekly Die Zeit correlates 
with an idea element being evaluated negatively. Although for both cases (and several 
others) a weak or strong significance was found there was no notable correlation (p > 
0.3). These results reflect the phenomenon that there were few articles in which 
skeptical statements were stated and that some of the 52 pieces were especially 
“skeptical” (e.g. the Zeit article in which several skeptical myths got debunked) thus 
effectively uniting most of the idea elements in them. In fact, 15 articles were 






In summary this study was able to show that the German news media’s reporting on the 
COP17 in Durban included a set of skeptical statements with regard to climate change 
and climate science. Almost 15% of all articles on COP17 in the selected media outlets 
dealt with climate skepticism or included skeptical arguments. While we were surprised 
by the amount of skeptical arguments, we did not identify a specific underlying 
skeptical “narrative” but rather found these statements to be rare, scattered and 
occasionally even used as explanation and not as argument. One article, for example, 
attempted to explain why the USA was not more actively involved in the conference 
talks and then continued to discuss the fact that there are still American politicians who 
do not believe in global warming. Even though the results echo Hornschuh’s (2008, pp. 
141–153) analysis of the German climate change discourse— as well as other studies 
(Grundmann, 2007; Grundmann & Scott, 2014) that only found isolated skeptic 
arguments—our results indicate that the amount of skeptical arguments slowly but 
steadily increased over the years.91  
Our results also suggest that there is a slight correspondence between the political 
leaning of a media outlet and the use of skeptical frames. Whereas the conservative Die 
Welt is rather skeptical about climate science but more so of climate change and its 
causes, the liberal Die Zeit tends to make skeptical statements about climate change 
(e.g. about the phenomenon of climate change) and climate science (e.g. about the 
“conspiracy” within climate science) but then harshly refutes those and explains why 
those arguments are wrong. This finding of a possible ideological gap is echoed by the 
international research on countries such as the USA or Great Britain where the 
difference between liberal and conservative media is more distinct than in Germany 
(Carvalho, 2007; Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2012; Painter & 
Ashe, 2012).  
These results show that in order to get a broader picture of the media discourse, it 
is important to not only look at the frequency of statements but also at the journalist’s 
evaluation of these statements. This study could therefore not only show how often 
frames are used, but also how those frames are being evaluated by the media outlets. It 
                                                
91 Hornschuh (2008, p. 151, own translation) calls the relative amount of articles which 
include skeptical arguments “marginal” and found “ca. 40 out of several hundred 
articles” in the FAZ in a time frame over five years. We, in comparison, found 52 
articles (although in six newspapers) over a time frame of roughly a month, six articles 
appearing in FAZ. 
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is thus interesting to keep in mind that idea elements that were skeptical of the 
phenomenon of climate change were evaluated rather equally (30 negative, 11 neutral, 
28 positive), whereas the media’s reporting on climate science was more skeptical (18 
negative, 2 neutral, 33 positive). This could, for example, indicate that some climate 
journalists (especially conservative ones) are more skeptical about climate scientists 
than about climate science, i.e. that reporters do not necessarily question the results but 
rather how scientists frame them (alarmism) or treat skeptical colleagues 
(“conspiracy”). Another, more likely, interpretation would be that it is perhaps more 
socially acceptable to cast doubt on climate scientists than climate science itself. One 
reason for this mistrust in climate science may, to some extent, be due to Climategate. 
As Maibach and colleagues (2012) point out Climategate had a negative influence on 
some parts of the American public (both population and media). Since Climategate was 
referred to directly five times and the conspiracy frame 15 times, it is possible that this 
was also the case in Germany.  
Interestingly we did not find any “genuine” German skeptical idea elements or 
frames. Instead the idea elements we did find were similar to other international 
research on this topic (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2000; Painter 
& Ashe, 2012; Zehr, 2000). We thus conclude that climate change skepticism is a 
transnational Western phenomenon, which might become embedded in the respective 
national context92—the frames, however, remain the same.  
Although we found skeptical frames within the German news media’s reporting 
on COP17 it has to be noted that these elements are rare and unequally distributed and 
thus hard to interpret. Germany’s biggest tabloid Bild, for example, which is both 
sensationalist and controversial and thus theoretically a prime suspect for climate 
skepticism, was—surprisingly—free of skeptical frames, whereas its “bigger sister” Die 
Welt93 contained skeptical elements in over 17% of its articles. Skepticism—although it 
may be rising slowly—thus can still be seen as a fringe phenomenon in Germany. It 
also is worth noting that it sometimes only gets mentioned in order to reject it instantly 
and establish the narrative of anthropogenic climate change. It can thus be asked 
whether those who are engaged in the climate debate (journalists, scholars, politicians, 
etc.) might overestimate the skeptic’s popularity and by using and negating their frames, 
                                                
92 In Germany, for example, where Brunnengräber (2013) proposes the possible 
connection between skepticism and Energiewende. 
93 Both are owned by Axel Springer SE. 
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6.3.7 Conclusion  
This explorative study’s results shed light on the German news media’s reporting on 
COP17 in Durban. Our analysis was able to show that skeptical elements do exist 
within the German news media’s reporting. In terms of future research, given that we 
chose to neglect the actors in favor of a more in-depth approach, the next step would be 
to not only identify frames but also contextualize them with prominent actors and search 
for potential cluster networks. We also only looked at the print and online news media. 
Further research should also take into account both television news and communication 
via social networks. As different studies on alternative media have shown, skeptical 
views are particularly discussed on the Internet in media outlets and forums, which do 
not rely on a journalistic gatekeeper, but are more dependent on user-generated content 
and an active community (cf. Carvalho, 2010; Lockwood, 2010). Also more global 
research on climate change skepticism is needed (especially in South America, Africa, 
the Middle East, Russia and to some extent Asia) to further understand what arguments 
are used to hinder the global fight against dangerous climate change (Schäfer & 
Schlichting, 2014).  
Another important aspect for future research is the phenomenon of defeatism 
(Heyd, 2011; Lo, 2014) which subsumes arguments which are not skeptical per se but 
which can be strategically used to promote inaction (prominent examples would be “we 
can’t do anything about climate change anyway”; or “if we reduce our CO2 emissions 
the economy will suffer”) and which may indeed be more significant than one might 
think, seeing that this line of thought is less controversial and can be used more easily in 
the public debate.  
Recently, Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) described something similar using the 
category “social/behavioral skepticism” which included climate change fatigue. Heyd 
(2011, p. 7) even suggests that “defeatism or fatalism in view of climate change may 
lead to worse consequences than are already to be expected” and proposes that 
defeatism may be connected to complacency (p. 9). We thus believe that in future 
research the connection between defeatist as well as skeptical frames and their effect on 
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people should be looked at closely, not only to understand how these may contribute to 
inaction but also how these arguments may be countered.  
 
 
6.4 Interim Conclusion: ‘Questioning the Doubt’ 
In the paper ‘Questioning the Doubt’ we were able to show that the skeptic 
counterpublic and the mainstream are only loosely connected with regard to similarity 
of discourses. Even though we identified skeptic frames, these were rare and were often 
also questioned or rejected by the journalists. This, then, adds to the results of the paper 
‘Alliance of Antagonism’ as we find that skeptics are also barely represented in the 
mass media and thus they are excluded from the mainstream on two levels. In the next 
chapter I will therefore focus on comment sections as a form of user-generated content 
as I have established that these offer new opportunities for counterpublic actors to make 




6.5 Study: Public Spheres of Skepticism: Climate Skeptic Online 
Comments in the German Networked Public Sphere 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The idea of an online public sphere in which issues can be discussed freely and openly 
by citizens has been a constant topic of discussion in academia (e.g. Dahlberg, 2001, 
2011; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010). Based on the promise of a power free, equal, open, 
more inclusive and deliberative discourse the Internet was supposed to strengthen the 
public sphere and democracy (Benkler, 2006; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Papacharissi, 
2002). Especially the potential for deliberation turned out to be a false hope with several 
empirical studies stating an overall poor discourse quality in the web (e.g. Freelon, 
2013; Papacharissi, 2004) and with Sunstein (2001) even suggesting that deliberation 
among equally minded groups could lead to a more fragmented and radicalized public 
sphere. 
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Others, however, saw this fragmentation as an opportunity for minorities to form 
spaces in which they are able to speak freely and without fear of oppression: the so-
called counterpublics (Castells, 2007; Dahlberg, 2011; Downey & Fenton, 2003). These 
counterpublics can be best understood as places which are in opposition to the 
hegemony (Dahlberg, 2007). Even though theoretically and empirically prominent, few 
studies have looked at the intersection where mainstream public and counterpublic meet 
(Dahlberg, 2007, p. 839). And yet the discursive struggle between mainstream public 
and counterpublic may offer new perspectives on exclusion processes within the public 
sphere and how counterpublics are trying to make their voices heard (Nuernbergk, 
2013). In this paper I suggest that this struggle is more likely to be found in comment 
sections than in the mass media (c.f. Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). To analyze if and with 
which framing counterpublics are trying to make their voices within these 
‘battlegrounds of contestations’ heard this paper focuses on the case of climate 
skepticism in the German networked public sphere. 
Indeed, there are few topics that are as long-term, universal, complex, abstract and 
important as climate change (IPCC, 2013). Even though it is scientifically largely 
undisputed that climate change is happening and caused by human activity (Cook et al., 
2013) the discourse is heavily polarized with the so-called ‘skeptics’ rejecting this 
mainstream position and promoting their denial of climate change (Elgesem et al., 2015; 
Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013; Sharman, 2014). The rift between mainstream and skeptics 
is especially drastic in Germany where the overwhelming majority accepts the theory of 
an anthropogenic induced climate change and where skeptic voices are rare in the media 
coverage and not represented by the political mainstream (Grundmann & Scott, 2014; 
Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015; Metag et al., 2015). In this paper skeptics are understood as 
a counterpublic that is active online. In this sense I am interested in the relationship 
between mainstream and counterpublic with regards to activity, how skeptics frame 
their message and how the mainstream reacts to these. By answering these questions 
empirical as well as theoretical conclusions will be drawn. In order to understand how 
skeptics may try to influence the public discourse online a qualitative-quantitative 
content analysis of 10,262 comments from four news sites and six climate blogs was 
conducted. Whereas the mass media outlines were chosen based on the literature the 
blogs were identified with a hyperlink network analysis thus combining digital with 
‘classical’ methods. 
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First, I will outline how counterpublics and the networked can be understood, 
integrated and how comments are relevant to this, then the case of climate change 
skepticism in Germany will be described. In the empirical part, the methods and results 




6.5.2 The Networked Public Sphere and Counterpublics 
One prominent source of inspiration when talking about counterpublics and the public 
sphere in general is Habermas’ (1996, p. 360) definition of the public sphere which he 
defines as “a network for communicating information and points of view“. By 
emphasizing both the communicative as well as the network character of the public 
sphere he foreclosed key aspects that scholars associate with today’s networked public 
sphere and which describe the interconnectedness of different online publics and, 
strongly linked, the change of roles, information diffusion, coalition building and 
political participation (Benkler, 2006; Benkler et al., 2015; Boyd, 2010; Neuberger, 
2014). Indeed, the networked public sphere can be described as “the range of practices, 
organizations, and technologies that have emerged from networked communication as 
an alternative arena for public discourse, political debate, and mobilization alongside, 
and in interaction with, traditional media.” (Benkler et al., 2015, p. 3) However, the 
Internet did not abolish the inequalities and oppression minorities faced in the real 
world but rather reproduced them online (Dahlberg, 2007; Downey & Fenton, 2003). 
Minorities and other marginalized or ‘problematic’ groups, for example, are often times 
still excluded from the mainstream discourse and may form a counterpublic as a 
reaction (Jackson & Foucault Welles, 2015; Leung & Lee, 2014; Renninger, 2015). 
The idea of counterpublics emphasizes the public sphere’s fragmented character 
and posits that there are marginalized alternative publics that are in opposition to the 
oppressing hegemonic discourse (Fraser, 1990; Mouffe, 1999). They usually form 
around complex social issues like women’s rights or social justice and are a reaction to 
social exclusion and represent their struggle to find their place within the public sphere 
(Fraser, 1990; Nuernbergk, 2013; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). This exclusion, however, 
has ambivalent consequences, as Fraser (1990: 68) remarks: “On the one hand, they 
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function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function 
as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics”. 
However, these assumptions often times draw on a normative perspective and 
thus exclude problematic marginalized groups (e.g. rightwing extremists) that do not 
aim to strengthen democracy or fight for a more equal and inclusive discourse (e.g. 
Nuernbergk, 2013). Against this background it is proposed to open up the term 
counterpublic in favor of a more inclusive understanding (c.f. Cammaerts, 2009; 
Downey & Fenton, 2003). 
A counterpublic is thus defined as (1) structured around a specific issue that is 
morally or politically polarizing, (2) opposed to the dominant hegemony within this 
discourse, (3) marginalized and/or excluded from the public discourse and (4) with its 
own influential media outlets (e.g. blogs, forums, etc.). The most prominent strategy of 
a counterpublic is to contest the hegemonic position and thus extending the public 
sphere (Dahlberg, 2007). This is mostly done through measures like establishing new 
frames, re-framing a story or setting new topics (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). As Snow and 
Benford (1992) point out framing is instrumental for a movement’s collective identity 
formation. Framing in this context can be understood as “making sense of relevant 
events, suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3) and is a widely 
used way of analyzing debates in the public sphere (e.g. Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010).  
In this sense counterpublics can be integrated into the networked public sphere as 
it emphasizes the loose or even fragmented and yet existing connection of publics 
online that nevertheless can potentially influence each other. It also includes different 
kinds of modes (e.g. comments, Tweets, etc.) and types of communication (e.g. 
weblogs, news media sites but also the associated comment sections) that are not as 
dependent from the mass media as prior conceptualizations of the public sphere 
(Benkler, 2006). Comment sections are especially interesting since they are one of the 
most popular forms of user generated content (Friemel & Dötsch, 2015, p. 151) and 
show the integration of two publics since they are directly connected to more influential 
publics as, for example, mass media sites (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010). In this paper 
comment sections are thus understood as associated publics that differ from the articles 
with regards to reach and access since they are less frequently read as the articles 
although they are on the same page (Friemel & Dötsch, 2015). 
Against this background, it is important to note that a growing body of research 
deals with the questions of who is actually writing these comments and what possible 
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effects these may have. Friemel and Dötsch (2015) found through surveys that 
commenters on Swiss news sites tend to be more conservative than the average reader 
and suggest that this may lead to a distortion of the perceived public opinion. Anderson 
et al. (2013) show that incivil user comments had an influence on the way readers 
perceived an article’s content – a finding that is in line with the impact user comments 
have on product evaluation (Flanagin et al., 2014). And Toepfl and Piwoni (2015) found 
supporters of the right-wing party AfD to be very active within the comment sections of 
news sites and suggested that they transformed the comment sections into 
counterpublics. In sum, it is obvious that online comments are an influential way to 
communicate one’s ideas that is also used by counterpublics as a way to counterargue 
the hegemony position and which is also happening on the debate on climate change.  
 
 
6.5.3 Climate Skeptics as a Counterpublic 
Much research has been dedicated to the subject of climate skepticism in order to get a 
better idea of who is more likely to question climate change and what frames are being 
used to do so. There are, for example, studies that point out that skeptics in the US tend 
to be politically more conservative and are in favor of the free market (Cook & 
Lewandowsky, 2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b) which, to some extent, is also true 
for European countries (McCright et al., 2016), that conservative news media tends to 
be more skeptic than the liberal (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005), that skeptic think tanks 
have ties to the corporate sector (McCright & Dunlap, 2000), that skeptics not only 
question the phenomenon of climate change but also climate science and adapt their 
framing to recent developments (Kaiser & Rhomberg, 2015; Lewandowsky, Risbey, et 
al., 2015) and are more open to conspiracy theories than others (Cook & Lewandowsky, 
2016). Additionally, the question of how to call skeptics is not only a reoccurring topic 
in academia (Howarth & Sharman, 2015) but also in skeptic circles (Elgesem et al., 
2015).94 
Whereas in the US climate change skepticism, even though a minority, can be 
considered part of the public discourse on climate change it is a fringe attitude in 
Germany. Engels et al. (2013, p. 1023) conclude in a representative survey that climate 
                                                
94 Even though a constant topic for discussion the label ‘skeptic’ was chosen over the 
less inclusive ‘deniers’ or ‘contrarians’. 
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change is generally accepted in Germany by the majority and that climate skepticism 
“has not spread widely across the population”. In addition, Metag, Füchslin and Schäfer 
(2015) find in a representative survey 10% of the Germans to be “doubtful” about 
climate change. Media content analysis offers a similar picture: Grundmann and Scott 
(2014), for example, were not able to identify climate skeptic statements within the 
German media coverage on climate change. In contrast, Kaiser and Rhomberg (2015) 
found skeptic frames within 7% of the German news coverage on the climate 
conference in Durban. This shows that in the general populace as well as in the mass 
media climate skepticism is rare and unpopular. Online, however, climate skepticism 
seems to be more prevalent in comment sections and climate skeptic websites (Lörcher 




Based on these theoretical assumptions and findings I propose six hypotheses that deal 
with the counterpublic’s exclusion and inclusion in comment sections of news sites and 
blogs. As climate skeptics are a minority in Germany (Metag et al., 2015) that rarely 
gets represented in the mass media (Grundmann & Scott, 2014; Kaiser & Rhomberg, 
2015) and which tends to be more prevalent online (Lörcher & Taddicken, 2015) I 
suggest: 
 
H1.1: Climate skepticism is more prevalent in the comment sections than in the 
general populace (10%). 
 
Since several studies from the US were able to show the connection between 
skeptics and a conservative political stance (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011b) it is further assumed: 
 
H1.2: Climate skeptic comments will be more frequent in the comment sections 
of the conservative media outlets Bild and Welt in comparison to the 
liberal Spiegel and Zeit. 
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The question, however, is what messages and frames skeptics will use in which 
public. Based on Fraser’s (1990: 68) suggestion that counterpublics are places for 
withdrawl and identity formation, Toepfl and Piwoni’s (2015) finding that 
counterpublic comments can differ between media types and prior research that shows 
that skeptics tend to adjust their framing quickly (Lewandowsky, Risbey, et al., 2015) it 
is assumed that:  
 
H2.1: Skeptics will be more skeptical about the phenomenon of climate change 
on skeptic sites compared to mainstream sites. 
 
As doubting climate change’s existence can be seen as a core value for skeptics 
that is also highly refuted by the mainstream and studies that show that skeptics also 
tend to cast doubt on climate science (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013), I posit: 
 
H2.2: Climate skeptics will be more critical of climate science in the 
mainstream comment sections than in the skeptic ones. 
 
Since counterpublics are excluded from the mainstream public sphere it can be 
assumed that the processes of exclusion and inclusion that constitute its state as 
counterpublic can be found in the online comments as well with regard to how members 
from the counterpublic are being treated. 
 
H3.1: Skeptical comments will be reacted negatively upon in the mainstream 
comment sections whereas they will be reacted positively upon in the 
counterpublic ones. 
 
Another way of measuring agreement and disagreement with a position can be to 
like or dislike a comment (if the sites implemented that feature) (Gerlitz & Helmond, 
2013). Since liking is a very convenient feature it can be assumed that even users who 
do not want to participate in a debate (e.g. skeptics who do not feel comfortable with 
sharing their opinion) might use it which could be a possibility for a counterpublic to 
show allegiance without actively having to debate the other side. I thus assume: 
 
H3.2: Skeptical comments will have more likes than mainstream ones. 
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6.5.5 Methods 
In order to answer the hypotheses a manual qualitative-quantitative content analysis of 
10.262 comments from ten comment sections was conducted. The comments were taken 
from the following German websites: the conservative news sites Bild.de (Bild) and 
Welt.de (Welt), the liberal news sites Spiegel.de (Spiegel) and Zeit.de (Zeit), the climate 
skeptic blogs Eike-Klima-Energie.eu (Eike) and Science-Skeptical.de (ScS), the climate 
“activist” blogs Klimaretter.info (Klimaretter) and Klima-der-Gerechtigkeit.de (KdG) 
as well as the climate science blogs Scilogs.de/Klimalounge (Klimalounge) and 
Klimazwiebel.blogspot.de (Klimazwiebel). 
The ten sites were selected based on a specific set of criteria for each the news 
media and the blogs. The news media outlets were selected based on the factors reach, 
journalistic stance and interactivity in the comment section so that a wide reach of 
different opinions could be collected. Additionally media outlets that guaranteed 
skeptical voices in their climate coverage were chosen based on the assumption that 
these are more likely to draw skeptics in the comment sections, too (Kaiser & 
Rhomberg, 2015). 
The blogs were selected on the basis of a hyperlink study95 of the German 
language climate discourse (Figure 4). By utilizing this method both the networked 
character of the public sphere as well as the network’s polarization can be shown. A 
network analyses identified a big mainstream administrative, one skeptic and one 
mainstream activist community. Since the most relevant websites from the mainstream 
administrative communities were sites by institutions that do neither offer a constant 
coverage nor interaction via comments, I focused on the skeptic and the activist 
communities. The sites were then selected by the following criteria: relevance 
(measured by indegree within the network), blog stance (activist, scientific or skeptic), 
topic (it had to mainly deal with climate issues), language (mainly German), activity 
(recent news updates) as well as interactivity (comment sections). The case of KdG was 
problematic since our network analysis showed it to be relevant within the German 
climate discourse and even though it is updated regularly it has a rather inactive 
community. It was thus compared with other possible blogs from the activist cluster but 
                                                
95 The hyperlink study was conducted in June 2014 and included all German language 
websites that dealt with climate issues. The crawl was done manually via snowball 
crawl that included blogrolls and linklists and started with the sites Science-Skeptical.de 
and Klima-der-Gerechtigkeit.de since both had sufficient blogrolls. 
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Figure 4: Hyperlink network of the German language climate discourse (communities 
identified with modularity; node size = Indegree; layout algorithm = ForceAtlas2) 
 
The relevant time frame was one week prior and one week after each IPCC 
working group’s meeting and report publication in 2013 and 2014 which amounted to 
36 days in total.96 The IPCC reports’ publications were chosen because it gave news 
outlets as well as blogs the opportunity to write about climate politics, climate science 
and other related topics. In order to get all relevant comments in these timeframes all 
mass media articles with the German versions of the search terms “climate*, "earth 
warming", "global warming", ipcc” were collected. In addition, all blog posts were 
                                                
96 The first time frame was between 21.09.2013 and 02.10.2013 (WG1), the second was 
between 23.03.2014 and 02.04.2014 (WG2) and the third was between 06.04.2014 and 
17.04.2014 (WG3). 
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included since the selected blogs are less active than the mass media and deal 
predominantly with climate change. This resulted in 382 articles.  
In the next step all comments were scraped from the websites with the tools 
Import.io (e.g. Spiegel, Zeit or ScS), DisqusScraper (den Tex, 2015); e.g. Welt, KdG) 
but also manually via scraping the Html code (Bild, Eike). This resulted in 16.289 
scraped comments. Since this study’s aim is to look for skeptical comments and how 
they were reacted upon the first 100 comments were used since a random sample does 
often times not allow a coder to see to which parent comment a user is reaction upon 
thus rendering this specific analysis impossible (c.f. Ziegele et al., 2014). So 10.262 
comments remained within the data set. 
These comments were then coded by five coders according to a codebook which 
was based on prior research on skeptic frames (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013; Kaiser & 
Rhomberg, 2015; Rahmstorf, 2005) from which the two overarching frames “skeptical 
of the phenomenon of climate change” and “skeptical of climate science” and their idea 
elements could be identified. These frames, often time called emphasis frames 
(Cacciatore et al., 2016), consist of idea elements that can be considered to be directed 
statements (e.g. ‘climate change does not exist’ or ‘mankind is not to blame for climate 
change’) that define a frame’s core (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2006; Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015). Krippendorff’s Alpha for this coding was deemed acceptable (>0.9 for formal 
variables and >0.7 for the content variables like comment stance and idea elements). 
 
 
6.5.6 Results: Skeptic Comments in Different Comment Sections 
In a first step all irrelevant comments (i.e. comments that did not touch upon climate 
issues) were sorted out in order to simplify the coding process and give the coders more 
time to focus on the comments that possibly contained climate skeptic content. Due to 
this precaution over 50% of the scraped comments could be discarded. The rest 
(n=4,425) remained in the sample. Interestingly, over 60% of the comments on Bild, 
Spiegel and Zeit were irrelevant for this study whereas the climate blogs had more 
relevant comments (except for ScS and Klimaratter) than the mass media outlets (see 
Table 12).  
However, this study’s main interest lies on how the climate skeptic counterpublic 
tries to make their voice heard on each platform and with what frames. The results show 
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indeed that climate skeptics utilize comment sections for their agenda: 42.8% of all 
relevant comments were skeptical of climate change or climate science, while only 
25.0% were promoting the mainstream perspective on climate change and climate 
science (Table 13). When taking all 10,262 comments in consideration 18.4% were 
skeptical and only 8.4% represented the mainstream position. Both numbers stand in 
strong contrast to the German populace in which a vast majority (about 70%) is 
concerned about climate change and only 10% are doubtful (Metag et al., 2015, p. 14). 
H1 can thus be confirmed. 
In a next step the focus will be on whether skeptics are more visible in the 
conservative media’s comment sections compared to the liberal’s. Indeed, climate 
skeptics are extremely active in the comment sections of Bild and Welt (see Table 13). 
Even though this could have been expected to some extent, the fact that roughly 75% of 
all relevant comments on each platform are skeptic is certainly surprising and shows 
how active skeptics are in associated mass media publics and that, even though Engels 
et al. (2013) were not able to establish a connection between a conservative political 
stance and climate skepticism this also seems to be the case for Germany. When 
comparing these numbers to the skeptic blogs of Eike and ScS it is noteworthy that most 
of the comments there are actually unclear, i.e. could neither be attributed to a 
mainstream, skeptic or ambivalent position. 
 
Outlet Irrelevant Relevant Total 
Bild (n=760) 67.9 32.1 100 
Spiegel (n=3,618) 67.6 32.4 100 
Welt (n=863) 41.1 58.9 100 
Zeit (n=1,948) 61.2 38.8 100 
Eike (n=1,311) 23.7 76.3 100 
ScS (n=789) 57.9 42.1 100 
Klimaretter (n=704) 74.3 25.7 100 
KdG (n=9) 11.1 88.9 100 
Klimalounge (n=79) 11.4 88.6 100 
Klimazwiebel (n=181) 14.9 85.1 100 
Total (n=10,262) 56.9 43.1 100 
Table 12: Relevance of Comments per Outlet in % (n=10.262) 
 
Another interesting finding is that the liberal news media outlets which are even 
more in line with the mainstream position as the conservative media outlets (Carvalho 
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& Burgess, 2005) have nevertheless a very active climate skeptic userbase. Especially 
Spiegel as Germany’s most active news comment forum97 is somewhat surprising in the 
divide between journalistic and user stance. It has to be noted that although the skeptics 
are vocal within Zeit’s comment sections they also have the most vocal users when it 
comes to the mainstream view. This also shows that the userbases of the sites differ 
notably both in the way they are skeptical but also in the way people promote 
mainstream ideas. In the same vein, the climate activist as well as climate science blogs 
had less skeptics and a more vocal user base that defended the mainstream perspective.  
Another aspect worth mentioning is the high amount of unclear comments. This 
can be explained with a silent consensus among both publics: the mainstream public 
does not deem it necessary to repeatedly state that climate change is happening and thus 
more comments are focused on more advanced issues. This seems to be happening in 
the skeptic counterpublic as well. Except where on the mainstream sites the users seem 
to take climate change as granted, on skeptic sites the users seem to take climate change 
denial as the bottom line and thus prefer talking about their disdain about specific 
climate policies or energy topics but not really adding why they are against it. This 
explicit lack of stating one’s ‘allegiance’ may also explain the amount of skeptics within 
the media publics since skeptic users may actually perceive this general neutrality or 
indifference as invitation for stating their opinions. 
 
Type Outlet Position of Comments 
Mainstream Ambivalent Skeptic Unclear 
Conservative 
Media 
Bild (n=244) 15.6 0.0 74.6 9.8 
Welt (n=508) 11.0 0.8 76.8 11.4 
Liberal Media Spiegel (n=1,173) 26.1 0.4 41.8 31.7 
Zeit (n=755) 34.7 2.6 31.4 31.3 
Counterpublic 
blogs 
Eike (n=1,000) 6.8 0.9 38.0 54.3 
ScS (n=332) 4.8 2.1 46.1 47.0 
Climate activist 
blogs 
KR (n=181) 37.6 1.1 17.7 43.6 
KdG (n=8) 25.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 
Climate science 
blogs 
KL (n=70) 42.9 0.0 15.7 41.4 
KZW (n=154) 31.2 6.5 11.7 50.6 
Total (n=4,425) 20.2 1.3 42.8 35.7 
Table 13: Position of Comments per outlet (n=4,425) 
 
                                                
97 Users from Spiegel wrote about 53% of the 16,298 comments. 
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The difference between the outlets is getting even more visible when comparing 
their means (Table 14). Unsurprisingly, the climate skeptic blog ScS has the most 
skeptical comment section, closely followed by the conservative media outlet Welt, the 
skeptical blog Eike and the tabloid Bild. Indeed, there is no significant difference 
between these four sites when comparing their means, thus suggesting that they form a 
skeptical ‘cluster’ in which skeptic users are equally vocal. This is also true for the 
contrasting mainstream position where two closely connected cluster can be identified 
which consist of Zeit, Klimaretter, Klimalounge and Klimazwiebel. Interestingly 
Spiegel’s comment section (and, expectedly, KdG) differs significantly from all other 
ones which most likely can be explained with its popularity and more diverse userbase. 
Now that the amount of skeptic comments on each platform has been established 
and H1.1 and H1.2 could be confirmed the next step is to take a closer look on how the 
users frame their skeptic positions. 
 






/ -.09 .43* .70* -.03 -.12 1.01* 1.66* 1.12* 1.05* 
Welt 
(Mean: 2.74) 
.09 / .51* .79* .06 -.04 1.10* 1.74* 1.21* 1.14* 
Spiegel 
(Mean: 2.23) 
-.43* -.51* / .28* -.45* -.55* .58* 1.23* .69* .62* 
Zeit 
(Mean: 1.95) 
-.70* -.79* -.28* / -.73* -.83* .31 .95* .42 .35* 
Eike 
(Mean: 2.68) 
.03 -.06 .45* .73* / -.10 1.04* 1.68* 1.15* 1.08* 
ScS 
(Mean: 2.78) 
.12 .04 .55* .83* .10 / 1.13* 1.78* 1.24* 1.17* 
Klimaretter 
(Mean: 1.65) 
-1.01* -1.10* -.58* -.31 -1.04* -1.13* / .65* .11 .04 
KdG 
(Mean: 1.0) 
-1.66* -1.74* -1.23* -.95* -1.68* -1.78* -.65* / -.54* -.61* 
Klimalounge 
(Mean: 1.54) 
-1.12* -1.21* -.69* -.42 -1.15* -1.24* -.11 .54* / -.07 
Klimazwiebel 
(Mean: 1.61) 
-1.05* -1.14* -.62* -.35* -1.08* -1.17* -.04 .61* .07 / 
Table 14: Mean comparison of skepticism in each outlet’s comment section (1 = 
mainstream, 2 = ambivalent, 3 = skeptic). * represents significant differences between 
means (<0.05). Significances have been calculated with the Games-Howell test. 
Highlighted cells show similarity, red represents skeptic and blue mainstream positions. 
For this comparison all unclear comments have been discarded. 
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6.5.7 Results: Climate Skeptic Frames 
To answer H2.1 and H2.2 it is important to look at the frames that are being used in the 
comment sections and whether these comment sections differ notably from each other. 
It was assumed that skeptics will be more skeptical about climate change in their own 
counterpublic whereas they will promote less controversial skeptical frames about 
climate science in the mainstream comment sections.  
Based on this assumption, the similarities between the mass media and skeptic 
blogs are surprising (see Table 15). Only on Zeit (52.8%) and ScS (56.3%) is doubting 
climate science more prevalent than questioning climate change. On Bild (53.0%), Welt 
(54.1%), Spiegel (53.8%) and Eike (62.5) however skeptics were more dismissive of 
climate change. 
 
Type Outlet Frames 
Climate Change Climate Science Other Total 
Existence Causes Impact Politiciza
tion 






10.7 33.5 8.8 5.9 16.2 18.0 7.0 0.0 100.0 
Welt 
(n=603) 





11.1 33.7 9.0 5.4 22.3 10.8 7.8 0.0 100.0 
Zeit 
(n=381) 






13.1 40.1 9.3 3.6 18.7 9.1 6.1 0.0 100.0 
ScS 
(n=229) 










KL (n=16) 6.3 18.8 18.8 0.0 37.5 18.8 0.0 0.0 100.0 
KZW 
(n=25) 
24.0 16.0 16.0 4.0 32.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 100.0 
Total 12.5 32.6 8.6 6.3 21.3 11.7 6.9 0.1 100.0 
Table 15: Skeptical Frames per Comment Section in % (n=2,945) 
 
There are nevertheless differences between the comment sections: there are, for 
example, only three comment sections (Klimaretter, Klimalounge, Klimazwiebel) in 
which the Climate Change’s Causes frame (e.g. users voiced their doubts about 
mankind’s influence or claimed that CO2 is not harmful) is not the most popular one. 
On these three sites Climate Science’s Uncertainty (e.g. users claimed that climate 
science was not a “real” science or that the data is not reliable) was more heavily used 
which may be explained with the three blog’s focus on climate science and/or politics.  
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In comparison, the skeptic users on Zeit seem to be more critical of Climate 
Science’s Uncertainty but also its Alarmism. When taking into consideration that Zeit 
was also the only news media comment section which had more mainstream than 
skeptic comments this may suggest that the skeptics on Zeit are aware of their discourse 
minority and thus try to be more subtle by questioning climate science. This, however, 
could also be explained with the fact that Zeit is a rather elite and liberal magazine as 
well as news site and thus may attract more subtle or ‘light’ skeptics. 
When comparing the mass media with skeptic blogs some differences are 
obvious: On Eike, for example, the users are very skeptic about climate change’s causes 
and especially so about CO2 which they often times label as good for the planet. In 
comparison, the users of ScS tend to question climate science. This is not surprising as 
the blog’s main focus lies on science (the others being politics, climate and energy). 
These clear differences between the leading German skeptic blogs may suggest that 
there is some kind of ‘labor sharing’.  
In general, H2.1 and H2.2 have to be discarded. Even though there are slight 
differences between the comment sections with regards to frames used, the 
counterpublic comment sections differ not significantly from mainstream comment 
sections like Bild, Welt or Spiegel. However, on Zeit, KR and KL skeptics tend to be 
more critical of climate science instead of climate change. 
 
 
6.5.8 Results: Exclusion and Inclusion of Skeptics  
In order to look at possible exclusion and inclusion effects within the comment sections 
one not only has to look at what skeptics are saying but also how other users react to it 
and how the comments are liked by other users. The first important thing to note is that 
of the 4,425 relevant comments within the sample 2,504 were a direct reply to another 
comment and roughly half of them (n=1,378) were a direct response to a skeptic 
comment. In general the reactions were mostly either corrective (i.e. the users corrected 
the skeptics and often went into great detail as to why they were wrong) and less so 
critical (i.e. the users dismissed the skeptics’ comments or made fun of them).98 
                                                
98 The reaction types were inductively extracted and discussed during the coder schools 
and had a Krippendorff’s alpha >0.7. 
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As shown in Table 16 there is a difference between each site’s comment section. 
This gets especially obvious when looking at the sites that have a lot of skeptic 
comments like Bild, Welt, Eike or ScS. On all four sites users seem to be supportive of 
skeptics. ScS, even though a skeptic blog, is the least friendly of the sites. In fact 22% of 
all reactions across all sites were comments of agreement. Naturally, only few of those 
(3.6%) were also written by users from the mainstream faction that, for example, agreed 
sarcastically with the skeptic user, tried to build a bridge for further discourse or 
misread the skeptical comment. 
It is also noteworthy how different Eike and ScS are when it comes to more 
negative responses to skeptic comments. Whereas on Eike few comments are critical of 
other skeptics, users on ScS are more negative of other users. This, however, is not due 
to users from the mainstream who want to ‘take the fight’ to the skeptic blogs but rather 
due to other skeptics who may potentially be too soft for the others or who may not 
understand certain scientific principles. Generally speaking, 25% of all reactions on 
Eike were from mainstream users whereas on ScS only 11.3% were written by them. 
This suggests that even in their own echo chamber skeptics are confronted with 
criticism and tough questions both from users from the mainstream but also their own. 
 
Type Outlet Reaction to skeptical comments Total 
critical correcting appealing to 
authority 
questioning consensual agreeing 
Conservative 
media 
Bild (n=108) 38.9 13.0 0.0 3.7 0.9 43.5 100.0 
Welt (n=144) 30.6 24.3 0.0 7.6 1.4 36.1 100.0 
Liberal media Spon (n=500) 38.4 37.0 0.6 4.6 5.3 14.1 100.0 
Zeit (n=226) 10.4 59.5 11.3 6.3 4.5 8.1 100.0 
Counterpublic 
blogs 
Eike (n=234) 11.1 41.9 0.0 8.5 6.0 32.5 100.0 
ScS (n=134) 30.6 24.6 3.7 3.7 9.0 28.4 100.0 
Climate activist 
blogs 
Klimaretter (n=24) 25.0 37.5 0.0 29.2 4.2 4.2 100.0 
Climate science 
blogs 
Klimalounge (n=4) 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Klimazwiebel 
(n=12) 
33.3 41.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 8.3 100.0 
Total 27.4 37.2 2.4 6.2 4.8 22.0 100.0 
Table 16: Reactions to Skeptic Comments per Comment Section in % (n=1,377) 
 
As was shown above Bild and Welt are very similar to the skeptic blogs and this 
also shows in the way users react upon skeptic comments. On Bild 81% of the reactions 
were written by skeptics and on Welt 75%. This stands in stark contrast to the liberal 
news media comment sections of Zeit and Spiegel where the mainstream factions are 
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more prominent and vocal. On Zeit the mainstream users wrote 78% of the reactions 
and on Spiegel it was 49%. Consequently, the comments are more critical as well as 
corrective and there is very little agreement. This also is true for the climate activist and 
science blogs where only few comments were skeptic in the first place and most users 
ignored them.  
In general, even though skeptics are in their supposed ‘echo chamber’ (Garrett, 
2009) there are users from the mainstream who appear to be on a ‘mission’ to counter 
the skeptic myths and talking points. However, this phenomenon pales in comparison to 
the counterpublic’s activity in mainstream comment sections. The hypotheses that 
skeptics comments will be more welcome on skeptic than on mainstream sites thus has 
to be discarded. 
 
To answer H3.2 and analyze the support skeptics get the amount of ‘likes’ the 
comments got from other users is examined. Since not all platforms offered the options 
to like comments I will focus on the sites which do: Bild, Welt, Zeit and Klimaretter. On 
Bild an average comment –disregarding if relevant or not– got roughly 20 likes, on Welt 
33, on Zeit 5 and on Klimaretter 1. When focusing on the relevant comments of the four 
platforms one can see that there is a significant difference with regard to how comments 
were liked (Table 17). 
 
Comment stance Average Likes per Outlet 
Bild (mean: 19.84) Welt (mean: 32.60) Zeit (mean: 4.68) Klimaretter (mean: .78) 
Mainstream 8.97* 12.46 3.98 0.59† 
Ambivalent / 13.75 4.79 0.00† 
Skeptic 23.42* 44.99* 4.95 0.16 
Table 17: Average Likes per Outlet and Position (n=3.678). * indicates significant mean 
difference between the comment stances (<0.05). † indicates significant mean difference 
between the mainstream and ambivalent position (<0.05). Significances have been 
calculated with the Games-Howell test. 
 
Indeed, counterpublic arguments are not only reacted more positively upon in Bild 
and Welt but they are also significantly more likely to be liked on these platforms in 
comparison to ambivalent or mainstream comments. On Zeit the differences between 
the means are not significant but it is interesting to note that ambivalent and 
counterpublic comments were liked more often than mainstream ones – a finding that is 
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in stark contrast to how users reacted upon skeptic comments on Zeit. This may either 
be explained by the skeptics’ loyalty to each other or the phenomenon of ‘lurkers’ (i.e. 
users that browse and read but do not actively engage in communication). 
Unsurprisingly, on Klimaretter users liked mainstream comments more than skeptic 
ones but were very hesitant to like comments in general. 
These results show that skeptics are not necessarily excluded in all mainstream 
associated publics and that some publics are even friendlier to counterpublic positions 




In this paper I set out to examine the relationship between mainstream public sphere and 
the climate skeptic counterpublic in Germany. By analyzing 10,262 online comments on 
ten different websites I was able to show three things:  
First, counterpublic voices are prominent within all sites even though skeptics are 
a minority in German and marginalized in the mass media. Roughly 40% of all relevant 
comments about climate change or science were skeptical which is four times more than 
one would expect from the populace. Surprisingly, skeptics were not only the dominant 
voice within their counterpublic but more so in the comment sections of conservative 
media Welt and Bild. This does not only add to the literature that connects climate 
skepticism with a conservative mindset (McCright & Dunlap, 2011b) but also is in line 
with research that suggests that minorities are more likely to speak out in places where 
like-minded people are (Porten-Cheé & Eilders, 2015).  
Second, it was hypothesized that skeptics would adjust their framing of climate 
change and climate science according to the comment section they write in, because 
some arguments may be more mainstream friendly than others. This, however, was not 
the case and demonstrates that marginalized skeptics tend to speak out regardless the 
place. This is also in line with Porten-Chée and Eilders’ (2015) finding that skeptics are 
more vocal than their social standing may suggest. Although skeptics adapted their 
framing to recent events and added the ‘hiatus’ to their repertoire (i.e. the supposed 
pause in global warming) one third of the idea elements were ‘classical’ denialist 
arguments that cast doubt about climate change’s existence and mankind’s influence. 
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Third, although skeptics are very active most reactions to their comments are 
critical. Even within their own counterpublic skeptics as well as users from the 
mainstream attack skeptic users. A reason for the challenging environment in the 
counterpublic may be that there is no clear skeptic common ground. Where some users 
are vocally against the ‘climate church’ and deny climate change altogether, others 
admit that climate change is happening but posit that the consequences will be good for 
mankind (Rahmstorf, 2005). In this sense, their identity seems not to form around a 
specific skeptic idea but rather an antagonistic position that is in opposition to the 
mainstream. Another possibility could be that skeptics try to counter each other in their 
own space in order to test and strengthen their own arguments and thus make each other 
less vulnerable to hegemonic positions. It has to be noted, however, that skeptic 
comments on conservative comments received significantly more likes than mainstream 
comments, suggesting that either skeptic users use this feature more actively than others 
or that the userbase as a whole is more skeptical. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the networked public sphere and 
counterpublics in three ways: it structurally shows the network’s polarization with a 
hyperlink network analysis and then highlights the discursive struggle between 
mainstream public sphere and counterpublic that takes place in all analyzed comment 
sections and which shows how connected the different publics are with each other. I, 
however, do not agree with Toepfl and Piwoni’s (2015) assessment that a counterpublic 
majority within the comment sections makes them a counterpublic but rather posit that 
comment sections are per se contested with members from the counterpublic trying to 
seize their chance by brigading relevant threads. Even though some publics are closer to 
counterpublic than others (e.g. politically) the development of this discursive struggle is 
something which should be looked at in future research.  
I also propose that counterpublics should not be idealized as a progressive 
grassroots movement that necessarily aims to improve democracy and the societal 
discourse. By looking at a somewhat problematic public that negates the scientific 
consensus and is prone to conspiracy theories it can be shown that these need to be 
included in the counterpublic theory as well in order to fully analyze exclusion and 
inclusion processes in the networked public sphere.  
Finally, it can be shown that counterpublics are not a unity which necessarily are 
founded on one core principle that might be necessary for its identity but can also be 
fostered by exclusion from the mainstream public sphere and the consequent feeling of 
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antagonism. I thus suggest that the networked public sphere not only connects 
mainstream public and counterpublic but that its core idea is also valid within the 
counterpublics themselves.  
 
 
6.5.10 Limitations & Outlook 
This paper has several limitations: First, by opting for a manual content analysis there 
had to be compromises with regard to sample size. Even though this allowed for 
analyzing the skeptical frames and reactions upon other comments future studies should 
look into computer-assisted methods like LDA for a full analysis. Second, climate 
skepticism is a peculiar case since there is no clear delineation between what is 
skeptical and what not. To-be studies could, for example, also take a closer look at 
political climate skepticism. Third, the networked public sphere theory is a very useful 
framework, however there need to be more theoretical as well as empirical research 
with regard to the integration of counterpublics within this concept. 
 
 
6.6 Interim Conclusion: ‘Public Spheres of Skepticism’ 
In the paper ‘Public Spheres of Skepticism’ I presented that climate skeptics are very 
active in online comment sections and are often more vocal than users from the 
mainstream. I could thus show that in the analysed online comment sections skeptics 
can be considered integrated with regard to connectivity and similarity of discourses. 
However, there was little integration with respect to a collective identity as there were 
significant differences regarding to how skeptics were treated in the mainstream 
comment sections compared to their counterpublic comment sections. This paper, then, 
shows that skeptics are more integrated than the previous studies suggested and do not 
‘hide’ in their echo chamber. In the next chapter I will sum up and discuss the results of 
the three studies to then tackle the overarching research question of whether the climate 





7. Conclusion: The Integration of Counterpublics in the 
Networked Public Sphere 
In this thesis I set out to analyze if and to what extent the climate skeptic counterpublic 
is integrated in the German networked public sphere. The level of integration was 
measured based on the criteria similarity of discourses, connectivity and collective 
identity. These criteria were further differentiated. Similarity of discourses was 
understood as the usage of climate skeptic frames in the mass media and comment 
sections. Connectivity was operationalized on a structural level (i.e. do climate skeptic 
and mainstream sites link to each other) but also with regard to the skeptic users’ 
visibility in the mainstream comment sections and the mainstream users’ visibility in 
the counterpublic comment sections. Collective identity, then, referred to the general 
consensus in the comment sections regarding climate change but also how users reacted 
to skeptic users. To answer the main research question I will first outline the results of 
the different studies to then combine them with regard to the integration of climate 
skeptics in the networked public sphere. 
 
 
Study 1: Alliance of Antagonism 
In the first study we were interested in how the German climate change online discourse 
was structured with regard to linking practices and asked what roles skeptics play in it. 
To answer these questions a manual snowball crawl of climate blogs and websites was 
conducted in which only the links of blogrolls or linklists were counted. We then coded 
all sites that had at least one in- and one outlink with regard to their affiliation (i.e. 
institution or individual) and their stance on climate change (mainstream/skeptic). In a 
next step a network analysis of the linking relationship between the different sites was 
calculated with regard to their centrality metrics and community structures and 
visualized as a graph.  
The result shows a highly polarized network that is structured along 
mainstream/skeptic ‘party’ lines. It is indeed noteworthy how seldom skeptic and 
mainstream websites link to each other: mainstream sites only link 14 times to skeptic 
ones and skeptic sites only 19 times to mainstream ones. When looking at the network, 
however, one can see that whereas some mainstream sites can be found in the skeptic 
 127 
community, there are zero skeptic actors within the mainstream communities. This can 
very well be understood as a sign that skeptics form their own counterpublic. And 
against the background of counterpublic theory this can be seen as the skeptics’ 
exclusion from the main debate which, then created their own climate skeptic 
counterpublic. The counterpublic’s exclusion seems even more emphasized when 
looking at the actors behind the websites: whereas most of the skeptics are individuals 
who host their own blog, a substantial amount of the mainstream sites consists of 
institutions (e.g. universities, federal agencies). Keeping Sunstein’s (2001) 
understanding of echo chambers in mind, it can be stated that climate skeptics form 
their own counterpublic within the German networked public sphere. 
Another result that emphasizes this assumption is what we call ‘alliance of 
antagonism’ which is a description of the websites that can be also found within the 
skeptic cluster and which range from neo-Nazi to conspiracy theory sites. When 
keeping in mind that there is even no clear consent between skeptics about what to be 
skeptical of the addition of further actors who are also climate skeptic but also have 
other agendas may be interpreted as “antagonism” (Mouffe, 1999) in its truest form, i.e. 
the opposition of the mainstream. 
We were thus able to show that there is little structural connectivity between 
climate skeptics and mainstream as there was little connectivity to begin with which 
shows how excluded the skeptic counterpublic is in the German networked public 
sphere. These results, then, suggest that skeptics form an echo chamber since they are 
not only excluded from the mainstream but the other sites (e.g. far right-wing sites) 
within the skeptic community also point towards a potential (political) radicalization. In 
general, climate skeptics are on the level of hyperlinks barely integrated in the 
networked public sphere. 
 
 
Study 2: Questioning the Doubt 
In the second study our main interest was to identify the skeptic frames within the mass 
media’s coverage of the climate summit in Durban in 2013. We conducted an 
explorative qualitative content analysis of 379 articles from eight national newspapers 
(and their online versions).  
By doing so, we were able to identify 31 unique skeptical idea elements that could 
be aggregated to seven frames. Theses frames could then be aggregated into two 
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overarching media packages. One media package dealt with skepticism with regard to 
the phenomenon of climate change, whereas the other dealt with skepticism with regard 
to climate science. The former consisted of three frames: skepticism about the existence 
of climate change, its causes and its impact. This is very much in line with Rahmstorf’s 
(2005) typology. Additionally, we found four frames that emphasized – i.e. questioned 
– different aspects of climate science: its politicization, its uncertainty, its alarmism as 
well as its conspiracy. We showed that even though there was no clear skeptical 
medium, the conservative news outlet was more skeptical about climate change than the 
other outlets, whereas the more liberal ones did on occasion use the frames but, at the 
same time, heavily refuted them. In general, the media outlets tended to be more 
skeptical about climate science than about climate change. This can, to some extent, 
also be explained with our more open understanding of climate skepticism that also 
includes ambivalent cases. In sum, we identified skeptical idea elements in about 15 
percent of the articles. However, only 7 percent of these idea elements were evaluated 
positively, i.e. truly skeptical.  
When looking at these results through the lens of counterpublic theory it becomes 
obvious that skeptics are mostly excluded from the mass media discourse. Although we 
identified more skeptical elements in mass media’s reporting than other studies 
(Grundmann, 2007; Grundmann & Scott, 2014), our results are in line with the general 
tenor. This, too, is a clear indicator that skeptics build their own counterpublics. When 
keeping other studies (Engels et al., 2013; Metag et al., 2015) in mind one could even 
state that they are underrepresented in mass media’s reporting. Thus, when looking at 
the counterpublic’s integration with regard to similarity of discourses we also have to 
note that skeptics are rarely integrated in mass media’s reporting and that there is little 
integration of counterpublic views in mass media reporting. Even when some of their 
frames are used there is a chance that their opinion is being opposed or contradicted 
which may lead to an active retreat into a counterpublic where the alternative media 
reflect one’s opinion. 
 
 
Study 3: Public Spheres of Skepticism 
In the final study I was interested in the skeptic’s visibility in the comment sections of 
the German mass media and several climate blogs, the frames they use and how users 
from the mainstream react to them. To do so 10,262 comments from ten comment 
 129 
sections (4 mass media, 2 climate skeptic blogs, 2 climate science blogs, 2 climate 
activist blogs) were manually coded and then quantitatively analyzed.  
The results show that climate skeptics are very active and visible on their own 
sites but also in the mass media’s comment sections which, at least in the cases of the 
conservative outlets, can even be considered counterpublics. Even on the liberal sites at 
least one third of the relevant comments were written by skeptics. In general, 40 percent 
of the relevant comments were skeptical about either climate change and/or climate 
science. This shows that climate skeptics, even though excluded from the mass media 
and the German climate discourse with regard to links, do not solely retreat to their 
counterpublic but actively look for possibilities to voice their opinion and especially do 
so in the media induced public spheres. 
When looking at the frames skeptics used in the comment sections of the mass 
media as well as different climate blogs, I could show that the frame usage, even though 
different from site to site, shows no clear pattern regarding the type of outlet 
(conservative/liberal media; counterpublic/climate activist/climate science blog). In 
general, the comment sections of the mass media outlets were similar to each other and 
only in the liberal Zeit comment section climate science skepticism was more popular 
than on others. The counterskeptic blogs, however, differed with regard to their frame 
usage which can be most likely be explained with their different thematic focus: 
whereas Eike focuses more on climate politics, ScS focuses more on climate science. 
Interestingly enough, the climate science blogs Klimazwiebel and Klimalounge differed 
prominently from each other. On the former, skepticism with regard to climate change 
was more prominent, whereas on the latter skeptic climate science frames were more 
widespread. The climate activist blog Klimaretter is comparable to Klimalounge even 
though it focuses mostly on climate politics. In general, it can be stated that skeptic 
frames about climate change were slightly more used than those about climate science.  
Taking these results into account it seems that although the users on each site 
differ with regard to what they are skeptical about, they are not vastly different from 
each other and argue similarly on different sites. This suggests that there is indeed a 
similarity of discourses as all skeptic frames are used on all sites, albeit that skeptics are 
especially active in the mass media and counterpublic comment sections and less so on 
climate activist and science comment sections. Yet, it is remarkable in this context how 
visible the skeptics are in all comment sections. Even on the climate activist or science 
blogs skeptics accounted for 10 to 17 percent of the comments. At the same time it has 
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to be noted that there was also mainstream minority in the counterpublic comment 
sections (5 to 7 percent). Since I understand visibility as a proxy for connectivity, the 
analysis for this study on counterpublic integration in the networked public sphere 
differs from the previous ones. Indeed, it can be stated that skeptics actively bridge the 
gap between their counterpublic echo chamber and the mainstream publics to make 
their voice heard. In return, even though there are some users from the mainstream who 
try to ‘convert’ or ‘correct’ the skeptics, the mainstream mostly ignores the skeptics and 
if users from the mainstream chose to react to skeptic users it is mostly in a corrective or 
critical manner. In addition, the high amount of unclear comments on all sites can be 
understood as two opposing identities: whereas skeptics do not see the need to argue 
their skepticism in the counterpublic comment sections, users from the mainstream feel 
the same way with regard to their support of the theory of anthropogenic climate 
change. These results, then, can be also seen as the skeptic’s attempt to extend the 
public sphere through counterdiscourses. 
The analysis of the comment sections thus shows that even though skeptics are 
not integrated on a structural level or represented in the mass media, they are very 
active in the comment sections. In this context, they can be considered integrated in the 
networked public sphere and since similar skeptic frames are used in almost all 
comment sections since skeptics are highly active, thus connecting the counterpublic 
with the mainstream public. There is, however, a clash of identities that seems to be 
insurmountable since, as the user reactions show, the mainstream reacts very critically 
to skeptics whereas skeptics are very friendly to each other.  
 
When taking all these results (see Table 18) into account the question remains: is 
the skeptic counterpublic integrated in the German networked public sphere, and if so to 
what extent? Naturally, when looking at a counterpublic the result cannot be positive. 
Indeed, I was able to show that when looking at the hyperlink network analysis climate 
skeptics can be considered an echo chamber that is only loosely connected with the 
mainstream public sphere. By looking at the mass media’s reporting that barely 
consisted skeptic frames the skeptics’ exclusion by the mainstream was also confirmed 
on the level of the mass media public sphere. Against this background one could very 
well echo Sunstein (2001, 2007) and suggest that German climate skeptics form their 
own exclusive enclave in which they radicalize themselves even more and no longer 
participate in the broader public sphere. This, however, as the third study shows, would 
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be premature. Undeniably, skeptic users do not stay within their counterpublic but reach 
out and voice their opinion in other publics. They also did not radicalize themselves in 
their echo chamber as Sunstein suggested but rather used similar frames throughout all 
comment sections. It could, however, be argued that the skeptics ‘brigaded’ the 
conservative news outlets and claimed them as counterpublic. Yet, studies have shown 
that debates between polarized positions can lead to a less entrenched perspective and 
decrease polarization (Hart, Feldman, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2015; Mutz, 2002; 
Parsons, 2010). This, then, shows that skeptics, albeit mostly excluded, are still 
integrated within the German networked public sphere and actively involved in 
discussing climate change and climate science. Since users from the mainstream also 
argue on climate skeptic blogs, this shows that the connectivity of each other goes both 
ways (even though skeptics are far more active in mainstream comment sections than 
vice versa). 
In general, this thesis was able to show where and how skeptics are active within 
the German networked public sphere and also how they are excluded from the 
mainstream. I call this entanglement between climate skeptic counterpublic and 
mainstream positions in different publics and on several empirical levels (hyperlinks, 
media content, user comments) that differ from level to level with regard to the 
visibility of skeptic content ‘spheres of skepticism’. The term refers both to the skeptic 
content as well as to the different publics within the networked public sphere and yet 
emphasizes their connection on a structural, content and user level. 
From a theoretical point of view this thesis could show that looking at polarized 
online discourses through the lens of counterpublic theory can be fruitful in order to 
understand the debates as a battle for contestation and a social debate rather than a 
failed attempt of deliberation. Indeed, by understanding skeptics as counterpublic this 
thesis could also give empirical weight to Engesser and Wimmer’s (2009) suggestion 
that counterpublics cannot be considered without the Internet anymore since it offers 
counterpublics easy and cheap ways to make their voice heard. By looking at the 
relationship between counterpublic and mainstream from the perspective of integration I 
was also able point out that examining similarity of discourses, connectivity and 
collective identity can be a valuable way to understand and measure integration 
mechanisms. I, then, was finally able to demonstrate that studies which look at the 
exclusion of publics (or echo chambers) only on the basis of one level of interaction 
(e.g. hyperlinks, mentions, follower/followee-relationship, etc.) are highly limited since 
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even though on one level – as in this study – a counterpublic may be excluded or 









connectivity Highly polarized network with little connection between 
mainstream and counterpublic 
low 
Skeptics are excluded from the mainstream but also 
rarely link to mainstream sites 
Skeptics can be considered to form an “echo chamber” 
Skeptics form an “alliance of antagonism” with other 






Identification of skeptic frames regarding climate change 
(existence, causes, impact) and climate science 
(politicization, uncertainty, alarmism, conspiracy) 
low 
skeptics are mostly excluded from the mass media: 
roughly 7,5% of the articles contained skeptic frames, 
whereas in 6% of the articles skeptic frames were being 
evaluated critically 






skeptic users are highly visible in the analyzed comment 
sections (over 40% of the relevant comments were 
skeptical) 
high 
the skeptic counterpublic is to some extent integrated in 
the German networked public sphere as skeptics and 
their frames are visible in the mainstream publics and 
mainstream users are active in the counterpublic 
similarity of 
discourses 
skeptics did not adjust their messages with regard to 
where they posted their comments, i.e. there was no 





there is a clear skeptic consensus in the conservative and 
counterpublic comment sections (Bild and Welt in 
particular where over 70% were skeptical) that differs 
significantly from the other comment sections 
low 
mainstream users reacted critically to skeptics’ 
comments and also confronted skeptics within their 
counterpublic 
Table 18: Results per paper concerning the different dimensions of integration  
 
By choosing the case of climate skepticism and thus of people who reject 
scientific findings and question a wide consensus in climate science I opted for a critical 
case since honesty is a fundamental component of the public sphere (Habermas, 
2006[1962]). Indeed, Neidhardt (1994, p. 24, own translation) thus wonders “What 
chances for survival do lies have?” and Peters (1994, p. 66, own translation) even 
suggests that lies and manipulation would lead to a collapse of the “public space for the 
participants since the affected persons have been stripped of their freedom to respond.” 
And even though I do not want to suggest that skeptics per se lie, the question remains 
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if and how deliberation with skeptics is possible if they choose to disregard scientific 
facts. However, I suggest that even though deliberation in the Habermasian (1992; 
2006[1962]) sense is desirable it is not necessarily needed for a functioning public 
sphere (c.f. Rauchfleisch & Kovic, in press) and for facilitating a public debate that 
connects counterpublic and mainstream public. Comment sections can be considered to 
be an important aspect of this contestation since they connect mainstream and 
counterpublic users, make counterdiscourses visible and possible and can potentially 
lead to a less polarized discourse. This thesis, then, shows that the contestation between 
counterpublics and the mainstream takes places on several levels of the Internet that are 
connected with each other but also have to be considered as such to contextualize the 




In this thesis I set out to analyze if and to what extent counterpublics can be integrated 
in the networked public sphere. The case of climate skepticism in Germany was used to 
answer this research goal by conducting a hyperlink network analysis, an explorative-
qualitative content analysis of the news media’s reporting as well as a qualitative-
quantitative content analysis on online comments on different websites. Albeit the 
integration (or mostly lack thereof) could be shown empirically, there are a few aspects 
that I was not able to consider fully in this thesis. 
As I showed in chapter 3.1.4 the online public sphere (but also the public sphere 
in general) can be looked at from several angles. By looking at climate skepticism I 
opted for the issue public of climate change and even though this issue was looked at 
from several angles (hyperlinks, mass media and comment sections) future research 
could add more perspectives. Most notably, the role of the users within online 
communication with regard to their intentions is much needed. This was, for example, 
outlined by Adolf (2015) who suggested that future public sphere research should not 
only look at the public communication at hand but also at the users’ intention to 
communicate publicly. By adding users’ motivation I would have, for example, been 
able to contextualize the high amount of skepticism in the mass media’s comment 
sections and find out their motives for writing there. Similarly, it would be also 
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interesting to know when users tend to not participate in a debate, for example why a 
user when confronted with a lot of climate skeptic comments decides to enter or leave 
the debate.  
At the same time it seems important to also question users’ with regard to their 
feeling of inclusion or exclusion. Do climate skeptics, for example, feel excluded or, at 
the same time, part of a climate skeptic counterpublic that may even be part of their 
identity? And if so, do climate skeptics get more extreme in their counterpublic as 
Sunstein (2001; 2009) but also recent research about political issues in the USA 
(Binder, Dalrymple, Brossard, & Scheufele, 2009; Hart et al., 2015; Keating, Van 
Boven, & Judd, 2016) suggested? This, then, would also highlight the individual user 
perspective within a counterpublic and their potentially feeling of an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 2006). In addition, future research could also look into the 
potential effect counterpublic messages, for example in comment sections, can have on 
other users with regard to how they perceive an issue but also if this leads to further 
polarization or rather to an understanding of the other position and a less polarized 
worldview (Hart et al., 2015; Mutz, 2002; Parsons, 2010). 
It also has to be noted that even though I focused in this thesis on climate 
skepticism in the German networked public sphere the results regarding the frames that 
skeptics use and the polarized discourse between mainstream and skeptics are 
comparable to other studies that did not focus on Germany (Elgesem et al., 2015; 
Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Painter & Ashe, 2012). It would thus be interesting to take a 
closer look at how connected skeptics are transnationally and if they form a 
transnational counterpublic in which the national climate skeptic publics are integrated. 
Additionally, as I conducted three studies within different timeframes the results of the 
studies, even though comparable, are confined as they do not cover the same events. 
Future studies thus could conduct a similar study as this thesis with one timeframe.    
Another aspect that is worthy of scholarly attention is how moderation in 
comment sections can help deliberation and, in turn, lead to a less polarized discourse. 
As others have pointed out moderation can foster but also stifle user engagement 
(Geiger, 2016; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Loosen & Schmidt, 2012; Meyer & Carey, 
2014). In a next study scholars should thus consider also including interviews with 
moderators and/or obtaining the data from the sites directly so that deleted comments 
can be included. In a similar vein future research could also take a closer look on the 
direct relationship between news media as well as blog article and comments, that is if 
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something in the article triggers a specific kind of comment (in this case if a skeptical 
frame within an article results in more skeptical comments). Even though this has been 
done with regard to news factors (Weber, 2013; Ziegele et al., 2014) it would be 
interesting to see if specific positions or frames trigger more of the same and if this 
leads to a more deliberative or a one-sided debate, for example that only skeptics voice 
their opinions and members from the mainstream decide not to participate. 
Finally, I propose that the relationship between counterpublic and public sphere 
should be analyzed empirically more in the future. Indeed, even though I am partial 
with regard to Sunstein’s (2001, 2009) diagnosis that the Internet fosters smaller 
communities and even enclaves, this thesis was able to show that identifiying echo 
chambers and a polarized discourse on one level does not necessarily mean that there 
are no other forms of connection and integration. Indeed, future research should thus 
analyze the integration of counterpublics on several levels to help us understand what 
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10.1 Codebook for Paper 1: ‘Alliance of Antagonism’ 
 
V1. Topic 
What is the major and overarching topic of the website / blog? The websites header and 
sidebar serve as main indicator for this category. If these state that the site focuses on 
more issues and one of them deals with climate change, code as such.  






5. Climate Change 
6. Energy 
7. Environment 
8. General Interest 
 
V2. Skepticism 
What “side” is the site leaning to? Keywords like “Klimalüge”, “Klimaschwindel” or 
the trope of “global cooling” are indicators for skeptical sites. Further aspects would be 
being skeptical of climate change in general, its consequences, its roots as well as 
climate science. 
 
0 = undefined / unclear 
1 = climate “friendly” 
2 = climate skeptic 
 
V3. Content Creators 
Who is responsible for the website’s content? Indicators are “About us” pages or the 
imprint. 
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If the author(s) of the website/blog differ from the person/institution that is noted in the 
imprint, code the content creator first and if this is not possible (due to intransparency, 
etc) the person/institution in the imprint. 
 
1 = individual citizen 
2 = group of citizens  
3 = individual scientist(s) 
4 = scientific organization (university websites, department websites, scientific 
institutions) 
5 = political organization (party website or official website of party member) 
6 = administrational website (governmental websites and affiliated websites) 
7 = civil society (NGOs, foundations, grass root movements) 
9 = classic mass media (traditional journalistic outlets with roots in print, TV or 
radio) 
10 = extended mass media (online news-sites) 
11 = economic actor (business / entrepreneur / e-commerce site) 
12 = unclear 




1 = content is from 2015 
2 = content is from 2015 and regularly updated (more than three posts from the 
year) 
3 = content is from 2014 
4 = content is from 2014 and regularly updated (more than three posts from the 
year 
5 = content is from 2013 or older 







10.2 Appendix for Paper 1: ‘Public Spheres of Skepticism’ 
10.2.1 Codebook  
 
V1 Artikelnummer 
 Vgl. die Nummer des Artikels, auf die die Kommentare reagieren 
 
V2 Verortung des Mediums 
 1 Massenmedien 
 2 Mainstream 
 3 Klimaskeptisch 
 
V3 Kommentarnummer 
 001-100 (nach Reihenfolge Älteste zuerst) 
 
V4 Codierer*in 
 1 Sabrina Pensel 
 2 Jonas Kaiser 
 3 Sarah Klewes 
 4 Jeanette Orminski 
 5 Jenny Ritter 
 
V5 Autor // erfolgt automatisch 
  
V6 Überschrift des Kommentars (so verfügbar) 
  
V7 Anlass 
 0 Kein Anlass erkennbar 
 1 Direkte Reaktion auf den Artikel (auch direktes Zitat aus dem Artikel; bei 
SPON: Zitat von Sysop) 
 2 Direkte Reaktion auf einen Kommentar (entweder via Zitat, direkte Nennung 
(@XY) oder via Kommentarstruktur (sprich Antworten werden direkt an den 
Kommentar angeschlossen)) 
 3 Externer Anlass (offensichtlicher Verweis auf andere Ereignisse, Artikel, 
Nachrichtensendungen, die thematisch auch nicht mit dem Artikel oder dem 
Kommentar in einen Zusammenhang gebracht werden können) 
 4 Von der Redaktion entfernt  
 
V8 Bezug Artikel  
 Bezug bedeutet in diesem Fall der direkte Verweis auf den Artikel in expliziter Form. Dies 
bedeutet: ein expliziter Verweis auf den Artikelautor, den Artikel (in Form von Zitaten oder 
Formulierungen wie „wie der Artikel auch sagt“, oÄ), die Artikelüberschrift oder im Falle eines 
Interviews den Interviewpartner. Ein Zitat des Artikels kann auch bei SPON als 
Kommentarantwort erscheinen. Dies beginnt idR mit „Zitat von Sysop“. 
 0 Kein Bezug erkennbar 
 1 Bezug erkennbar 
 
V9 Relevanz  
 Filtervariable, die über die weitere Codierung entscheidet. So in dem Kommentar kein 
relevantes Thema angeschnitten wird, d.h. nicht über  
- Klimawandel (mögliche Signalwörter:  
Klima, Anpassung/Adaption, Vermeidung/Mitigation, globale Erwärmung, 
Erderwärmung, Klimakatastrophe, Meeresspiegelanstieg, Klimaflüchtlinge, etc.) 
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- Klimawissenschaft (mögliche Signalwörter:  
IPCC, Klimarat, Klimaberichte, Klimaforscher, Modelle, Berechnungen, Potsdam-
Institut für Klimafolgenforschung, Climategate,  etc.),  
- Klimapolitik (mögliche Signalwörter:  
Klimagipfel, COP, Klimaschutz, CO2 Emissionen, CO2-Zertifikate, Treibhausgase,  
Rio+20, Zwei-Grad-Ziel etc.) 
gesprochen wird, wird hier 0 codiert. Sollten sich der Kommentare mit einem der Themen 
beschäftigen, aber nicht skeptisch sein, so wird dennoch weiter codiert. Sollte es sich beim 
Kommentar um eine Reaktion auf ein relevantes Thema handeln, bei dem kein neues Thema 
etabliert wird, sondern lediglich –ohne die Wörter zu nennen– das bereits etablierte Thema 
weitergeführt wird, so ist dies ebenfalls relevant! 
 
NOTE: Eng verwandte Themen, wie etwa die Energiewende, die Förderung von Erneuerbaren 
Energien, oÄ sind nicht automatisch relevant. Auch Diskussionen über das Für und Wider von 
Kohlekraftwerken ist zwar thematisch eng assoziiert, jedoch nicht relevant, wenn das Thema 
nicht bewusst mit obigen Themen verknüpft wird. 
 
Kodieranweisung: So kein klares Hauptthema erkennbar bitte das erste genannte Thema 
kodieren!  
 
 0 Irrelevant 
 1 Relevant 
 
FILTER 
Wenn V9 = 0; nur noch die Likes in V21 codieren  
(so nicht schon automatisch erledigt) 
 
V10 Thema 
 Als Thema wird hier das Hauptthema des Kommentars codiert. Also das, worum es in dem 
Kommentar geht. Werden Demonstrationen erwähnt, so werden diese bspw. mit 402 codiert. 
Gesellschaftliche Themen, die nicht im Codebuch abgedeckt werden, werden mit 400 codiert. 
Hierbei geht es nicht nur um Klima-Themen! 
 Siehe Themenliste 
 
V11 Klimaskeptischer Inhalt 
 Klimaskepsis wird hier grob als das Hinterfragen des anthropogen induzierten Klimawandels 
gefasst. Dies geschieht idR durch das Anzweifeln der Existenz („KW gibt es nicht“, „KW 
gab es schon immer“, etc.), der Ursache („der Mensch kann das Klima nicht verändern“, 
etc.), den Folgen („KW ist gut für den Menschen“, etc.) oder der Klimawissenschaft („ist 
keine richtige Wissenschaft“, „die lügen alle“, etc.).  
Vgl. hierzu auch das Zusatzdokument Klimaskepsis.  
 
 Werden in dem Kommentar klimaskeptische Inhalte geäußert? 
 0 Nicht identifizierbar 
 1 Klimaskeptisch 




Klimaskeptische Idee-Elemente  
 Hier können maximal drei klimaskeptische Inhalte codiert werden. Entnehmen Sie diese 
bitte der Idee-Element-Liste. Wenn ein Idee-Element nicht vorkommt, so nutzen Sie bitte die 
Andere-Variable bei dem relevanten Frame. So Sie das Gefühl haben, dass kein Frame passt, 
so nutzen Sie bitte 999. Bspw. der Vorwurf einer Medienverschwörung. Falls kein Frame 







 1 Negativ (ablehnend) 
 2 Neutral (erwähnend, aber nicht klar, ob skeptisch oder nicht) 
 3 Positiv (d.h. skeptisch) 
 
V14 Ton 
 Hier wird der Ton codiert, in welchem der Kommentar verfasst ist. Achten Sie hierbei 
besonders auf Wörter und auf Satzzeichen. 
 1 Freundlich  
Positive Formulierungen, Zustimmungen, Solidaritätsbekundungen, 
Rechtgeben, Grüßen, etc. 
 2 Neutral 
Weder freundlich, noch konfrontativ formulierter Kommentar. Meinung darf 
vertreten sein, aber insgesamt werden neutrale Begriffe genutzt, d.h. nicht 
geschimpft, nicht herab gesetzt, normal Satzzeichen gesetzt, etc. 
 3 Aufgebracht 
Aufgebrachter Tonfall, der sich durch das Verwenden von vielen 
Ausrufezeichen oder Fragezeichen, leichten Verbalattacken (das kann man 
doch verstehen!) und im Rahmen der Kommentare akzeptablen Wortwahl 
(Blödsinn! ) äußert. 
 4 Beschimpfend 
Nutzung härterer Wörter, persönliche Angriffe (Unterstellung von Dummheit), 
etc. 
 5 Andere 
 
V15 Verschwörungstheorien 
 Werden in den Kommentaren folgende Verschwörungstheorien erwähnt?  
 0 Keine Verschwörungstheorie 
 1 Chemtrails  
(Die Annahme, dass die Flugzeugkondensstreifen weitere giftige Stoffe 
beinhalten, dies jedoch vertuscht wird) 
 2 9/11 (Vermutungen, dass es sich dabei um einen „inside job“ handelte, dass 
die US-amerikanische Regierung die Anschläge wissentlich zugelassen haben, 
etc.) 
 3 Besetzung BRD  
(Behauptungen, dass die BRD nach wie vor besetzt und insofern kein 
eigenständiger Staat ist) 
 4 Medienverschwörung 
(Behauptung, dass die Medien unter einer Decke stecken und bestimmte 
Themen, Meinungen und Akteure konzertiert unterdrücken; c.f. Lügenpresse, 
etc.) 
 5 Andere 
 
V16 Bewertung Verschwörungstheorie 
 1 Negativ (ablehnend) 
 2 Neutral  
 3 Positiv (d.h. ernsthafte Anführung der VT „was wäre wenn“, oder Darstellung 
als Fakt) 
 
V17 Wird in dem Kommentar das Waldsterben erwähnt?  
 V.a. in den 1980ern ein großes Problem (mögliche Signalwörter: Baumsterben, saurer 
Regen) 
 0 Nein 
 1 Ja 
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V18 Wird in dem Kommentar Atomkraft erwähnt?  
 Signalwörter: Atomenergie, Atomkraft, Kernkraft, Kernenergie 
 0 Nein 
 1 Ja 
 
V19 Wird in dem Kommentar die Energiewende erwähnt? 
 Signalwörter: EEG oder Energiewende 
 0 Nein 
 1 Ja 
 
V20 Reaktion auf klimaskeptische Inhalte 
 Wie wird auf klimaskeptische Inhalte reagiert? Wird eine Autorität bemüht, die Argumente 
hinterfragt, der User belehrt, versucht einen Konsens zu erzielen oder beschimpft? 
 
 0 Keine Reaktion auf klimaskeptischen Beitrag 
 1 Belehrend 
(d.h. korrigierend, verbessernd, weitere Quellen heranziehend, die Quellen des 
anderen mit anderen Quellen widerlegend, etc.) 
 2 Fragend 
(d.h. Nachfragen, Verständnisfragen, etc.) 
 3 Autoritativ 
(an der Autorität des Kommentierenden zweifeln, die eigene Autorität 
hervorheben oder die Autorität eines Dritten über die der anderen stellen) 
 4 Kritisierend 
(am gegenüber zweifeln, Kritik üben, Intelligenz in Frage ziehen, beleidigend, 
abwertend) 
 5 Konsenssuchend 
(versuchen, auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner zu kommen, Gemeinsamkeiten 
herauszustellen, in bestimmten Punkten übereinstimmen) 
 6 Zustimmend 
(Argumenten zustimmend, Recht geben, verstärken, etc.) 
 
V21 Likes // erfolgt automatisch 
 
 
10.2.2 List of Actors  
 
1000 Politik (Allgemein) 
1001 Exekutive (Regierung, Minister, Mitarbeiter) 
1002 Bundeskanzleramt  
1004 BMVBS – Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung  
1005 BMU – Bundesministerium für Umwelt  
1006 BMWi – BM für Wirtschaft und Technologie  
1007 UBA (Umweltbundesamt) 
 
1010 Bundestag  
1011 CDU/CSU im Bundestag  
1012 FDP im Bundestag 
1013 SPD im Bundestag 
1014 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen im Bundestag 
1015 Die Linke im Bundestag 
1017 Regierungsparteien im Bundestag: CDU/CSU und FDP  
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1018 Oppositionsparteien im Bundestag  
 
1020 Bundesrat  
1021 CDU/CSU im Bundesrat 
1022 FDP im Bundesrat 
1023 SPD im Bundesrat 
1024 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen im Bundesrat 
1025 Die Linke im Bundesrat 
1027 Vertretung eines Bundeslandes im Bundesrat  
 
1031 CDU/CSU  
1032 FDP  
1033 SPD  
1034 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  
1035 Die Linke  
1036 Piratenpartei  
1037 Andere Partei 
 
1050 Bundespräsident/Bundespräsidialamt 
1060 Ministerpräsidenten der Bundesländer 
1070 Umweltministerien der Bundesländer 
1080 Exekutiven der Bundesländer (Regierung, Minister, Mitarbeiter) 
 
1090 Sonstige Politik Deutschland (national, regional, lokal) 
 
1100 Politiker*innen/politische Institutionen anderer Länder 
1200 Europäische Union (EU) 
1300 Vereinte Nationen (UN) 
1500 Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) 
1550 OECD 
1600 Andere internationale Organisation 
 
2000 Wirtschaft (Allgemein) 
2001 Energieunternehmen (RWE, Vattenfall, Eon, EnBW, aber auch Solarunternehmen) 
2005 Versicherungen und Rückversicherer National 
2006 andere Unternehmen National 
2010 Börse/Aktienmarkt National 
2020 Wirtschaftsverband National (BDEW, etc.) 
2030 Gewerkschaft National 
2040 sonstige Wirtschaft National 
 
2100 Internationale Wirtschaft 
2101 Int. Energieunternehmen 
2105 Int. Versicherungen und Rückversicherer 
2106 Int. andere Unternehmen 
2110 Int. Börse/Aktienmarkt 
2120 Int. Wirtschaftsverband 
2130 Int. Gewerkschaft 
 






3060 Science Skeptical 
3070 Klimaretter 





3140 Mischung diverser Agenturen 
3150 Mischung Agentur / Journalist*innen 
3200 Internationale Medien / Journalist*innen 
3300 Deutsche Medien 
 
 
4000 Wissenschaft (Allgemein) 
4005 Potsdam-Institut für Klimafolgenforschung (PIK) (bspw. Rahmstorf, Schnellnhuber) 
4010 Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht (bspw. Hans von Storch) 
4020 Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie (bspw. Mojib Latif) 
4030 Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie (bspw. Uwe Schneidewind) 
4040 anderes Klima-Institut/Klimawissenschaftler*in National 
4050 Meteorologie National 
4060 Naturwissenschaft National 
4070 Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaft National 
4080 Humanmedizin National 
4090 Rechtswissenschaft National 
4100 Ökonomie National (z.B. MPG, DFG) 
4110 Wissenschaftsadministration (z.B. MPG, DFG) National 
4120 sonstige Wissenschaft National 
 
4130 Int. Klimawissenschaft 
4140 Int. Meteorologie 
4150 Int. Naturwissenschaft 
4160 Int. Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaft 
4170 Int. Humanmedizin 
4180 Int. Rechtswissenschaft 
4190 Int. Wissenschaftsadministration  
4200 Int. sonstige Wissenschaft 
4210 Demoskopie/Meinungsforschung  





5000 Zivilgesellschaft Allgemein 
5010 Bürger*innen / Bürgerbewegungen National 
5020 Leser*innen / Zuschauer*innen / Hörer*innen National 
5030 User*innen National 
5040 Stiftungen / Soziale Bewegungen / NGOs National 
5050 Greenpeace National 
5060 Eike (Europäisches Institut für Klima und Energie) National 
5070 Künstler*innen National 
5080 Andere National 
 
5100 Int. Zivilgesellschaft Allgemein 
5110 Int. Bürger*innen / Bürgerbewegungen 
5120 Int. Leser*innen / Zuschauer*innen / Hörer*innen 
5130 Int. User*innen 
5140 Int. Stiftungen / Soziale Bewegungen / NGOs 
5150 Int. Greenpeace 
5160 Int Klimaskeptische Akteure (Heartland, Cato-Institut, Heritage Foundation, etc.) 
5170 Int. Künstler*innen 
5180 Int. Andere 
 
6000 Justiz Allgemein 
6010 Bundesverfassungsgericht 
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6020 Sonstige Gerichte 
6030 Sonstige Juristische Institutionen / Jurist*innen 
6100 Int. Justiz Allgemein 
6110 Int. Oberstes Gericht  
6120 Int. Sonstige Gerichte 
6130 Int. Sonstige Juristische Institutionen / Jurist*innen 
 
7000 Religion (Allgemein) 
7010 Religiöse Institution 
7020 religiöse Person(en) 
7100 Int. Religion (Allgemein) 
7110 Int. Religiöse Institution 
7120 Int. Religiöse Person(en) 
 
8000 Sonstige Akteure 
8100 Int. Sonstige Akteure 
 
 
10.2.3 List of Idea Elements  
Nr Frames / Idee-Elemente 
 Skepsis am Phänomen Klimawandel 
 Existenz des Klimawandels 
101 Existenz des Klimawandels wird abgestritten (auch "Klimaleugner") 
102 Existenz des Klimawandels wird angezweifelt (auch "Klimaskeptiker") 
103 Existenz des Klimawandels wird für belanglos/unerheblich/irrelevant 
erklärt 
104 Die Erde hat sich die letzten zehn Jahre nicht erwärmt (Zeitraum variiert) 
105 Wetter zeigt keine Erwärmung (Es ist gerade sehr kalt, etc.) 
   
 Ursachen des Klimawandels 
111 Menschlicher Einfluss am Klimawandel wird abgestritten/angezweifelt 
112 Sonne wird für Klimawandel (mit)verantwortlich gemacht 
113 Klimawandel ist ein normales Phänomen 
114 Es gibt andere Gründe für die Erwärmung (Vulkane, Methan, …) 
115 CO2 ist nicht so stark für die Erwärmung verantwortlich / nicht giftig 
(oder Treibhausgase, bzw. das Verbrennen von fossilen Brennstoffen) 
116 Kosmische Strahlung ist für die Erwärmung verantwortlich 
117 Treibhauseffekt existiert nicht 
   
 Folgen des Klimawandels 
121 Folgen des Klimawandels werden abgestritten oder sind nicht so schlimm 
122 Klimawandel wird positive Folgen (für bestimmte Länder/Regionen) 
haben 
123 Negative Folgen des Klimawandels nur bei fehlender Adaption 
124 Länder/Regionen von den Folgen des Klimawandels nicht betroffen 
125 Menschen, Pflanzen und Tiere können sich an KW anpassen (Adaption) 
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126 Naturkatastrophen haben nichts mit Klimawandel zu tun 
   
 Skepsis an der Klimawissenschaft 
 Politisierung der Klimawissenschaft 
201 Klimawissenschaft wird von der Politik benutzt 
202 Klimawissenschaft verfolgt politische Ziele 
203 Die IPCC ist eine politische Organisation 
204 Klimawissenschaft betreibt mehr Politik als Wissenschaft 
   
 Unsicherheit der Klimawissenschaft  
211 Klimawissenschaft weiß vieles nicht  
212 Forschungen der oder eines Wissenschaftler/s weist/en Unsicherheiten auf 
213 Klimamodelle sind nicht verlässlich (wie bspw. Temperaturmodelle) 
214 Die Daten sind nicht verlässlich 
215 Wissenschaft kann noch nicht mal das Wetter vorhersagen 
216 Klimawissenschaft ist keine (richtige) Wissenschaft 
   
 Verschwörung der Klimawissenschaft 
221 Es gibt keinen Konsens innerhalb der Klimawissenschaft  
222 Klimawissenschaft unterdrückt kritische Meinungen und schließt Kritiker 
aus 
223 Klimawissenschaftler stecken „alle unter einer Decke“ 
224 Climategate beweist, dass Klimawissenschaftler lügen und betrügen oder 
nicht ehrlich sind 
225 Klimawissenschaftler verfolgen eigene Interessen  
226 Klimawissenschaftler sind alle gekauft 
227 Klimawissenschaft lügt 
   
 Alarmismus der Klimawissenschaft  
231 Alarmismus kann zu Fatalismus führen 
232 Wissenschaftler betreiben Panikmache 
233 Klimawissenschaftler übertreiben ihre Ergebnisse (absichtlich)  
   
0 Kein IE gefunden (v.a. bei "normalen" Klima-Diskussionen) 
999 Missing (nicht codierbar) 
 
